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Appellants. 
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result. 
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11. Did the court err in ruling that the temporary restraining 
order enjoining Respondents1 foreclosure and sale of the Property 
was wrongfully issued? 
VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. THE PARTIES' CONTRACT. 
On November 9, 1980, the Appellants Leon H. Saunders 
("Saunders"), Kenneth R. Norton ("Norton") and Robert Felton 
("Felton"), together with other persons not parties to this 
action,-' agreed to purchase from Respondents/ John C. Sharp and 
Geraldine Y. Sharp, 60.078 acres of unimproved real property near 
Park Cityf Utah (the "Property"). (F. K 1, Add. 11; Ex. D-14; 
TR. 27, 81, 341). The Property was purchased for the purpose of 
developing four- or five-acre residential lots. (F. 1( 2, Add. 11; 
TR. 341). 
On July 16, 1981, at the closing of the sale (the "Closing"), 
the parties executed a Memorandum of Closing Terms ("Closing 
Memorandum") (Ex. D-15, Add. 71), a Trust Deed Note (Ex. D-3, Add. 
64), a Trust Deed (Ex. D-2, Add. 60) and a Warranty Deed (Ex. D-17, 
Add. 83), collectively the "Contract". (TR. 30-31, 88, 358). These 
Closing documents were prepared by Respondents' counsel, Jon C. 
Heaton. (TR. 30-31). 
1
 Appellants include Saunders, Felton, Saunders Land Investment 
Corporation, a Utah corporation ("SLIC"), Norton, White Pine Ranches 
("WPR"), a general partnership formed after the Closing, and White 
Pine Enterprises ("WPE"), a general partnership which acquired a 
twenty-five percent (25%) interest in a portion of the Property (see 
Ex. P-46). Only Appellants Saunders, Felton and Norton executed the 
Contract. Paul H. Landes, one of the purchasers, sold his interest 
to Daniel C. Hunter III, who, in October, 1983, transferred his 
interest to SLIC. (Ex. P-46). 
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 The Contract's reference to "PUD lots" was intended to mean a 
Planned Unit Development, which is a private residential development 
havii lg some characteristics in common with a subdivision and 
condominium, but not necessarily subject to the Utah Condominium 
Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-8-1, et seq. (1953, as amended). The PUD 
involved in this case did not satisfy several of the requirements of 
the Utah Condominiurn Act and, therefore, is not suh iect. to it. 
The Closing Memorandum also provided that 
at the time of execution of this Memorandum, [Appellants] 
have paid to [Respondents] the sum of $620,000.00 which 
will release from the Deed of Trust three (3) PUD lots. 
Upon the recordation of the PUD Plat and Declaration of 
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions with the Summit 
County Recorder, [Appellants] shall be entitled to the 
release from the Deed of Trust of three (3) PUD lots of 
[Appellants1] choice together with the said roadway, 
(emphasis added.) 
(F. K 17, Add. 15; Ex. D-15 11 3, Add. 71; TR. 46, 89-90, 352-53). 
A plat depicting a proposed development of the Property and 
showing an internal roadway to be constructed for access to the lots 
from a county highway was affixed to the Closing Memorandum. (F. 
11 18, Add. 15-16; Ex. D-15 11 5, Add. 72; Ex. D-124; TR. 561, 829). 
Respondents agreed that M[c]hanges in the proposed plat and 
Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions when prepared 
shall be subject to the reasonable approval of [Respondents].11 (F. 
1[ 18, Add. 15-16; Ex. D-15 1( 5, Add. 72). The purpose of this 
provision was to assure Respondents, who owned adjacent property, 
that Appellants would construct a quality development. (TR. 138, 
744). 
It is undisputed Appellants paid Respondents a total of 
$1,546,400, which amount includes the down payment, the 1982 through 
1984 installments and part of the 1985 installment. (Ex. D-15, Add. 
71, P-44; TR. 36-39, 53-55, 94-96, 353-358). 
On December 23, 1983, the plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I 
(the "Plat") and the Declaration of Protective Covenants for White 
Pine Ranches, a Planned Residential Development (the "CCRs"), were 
recorded in the Office of the Summit County Recorder.. (F. 11 40, 
Add. 22; Ex. D-l, Add. 59; Ex. P-51, Add. 91-131; TR. 90-91). Six 
(6) lots and the private, internal roadway ("White Pine Lane" or 
"Roadwa*/"* • w e r e d e s c r . L * ; , . * 
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Considerable ,infusion exists 5 ^ , i f r.7v^ m ^ a ^ n was 
representing and *hen. Respondents ca * . *. :.*_.... ^3 a fart and 
expert witness at trial. (TR. 755-56) It is m<; * sputen i— -*r at 
least at different times he represented ooth Respondents and one of 
the Appellantsf White Pine Ranches, concerninq the transactions that 
are the subject of this action. (TR . 725-26, 789™ ,-4 . Heaton also 
testified that aftei Closing he acted as a ~*-i:atcr for the 
parties. (TP_ 79? ( ;'1 *s- -- * - *••/ * <->que * ~ * . ^ n c ^ r ^ c ^ 
Respondents1 use and access rights over the Roadway. (See Ex. D-25, 
Add. 85; Ex. D-26A, Add. 86). According to Heaton, when Respondents 
were asked to approve the Plat and CCRs, they sought access rights 
over the Roadway. (Ex. D-25, Add. 85). Felton communicated his 
refusal to Heaton by letter dated November 21, 1983. (Ex. D-26A, 
Add. 86). After Respondents executed the Consent to Record (Ex. 
D-7, Add. 67), and prior to its recordation, Heaton claimed that, 
based upon a telephone conversation with Felton, Appellants agreed 
to grant an easement in favor of Respondents over the Roadway. 
Heaton claimed that during the conversation he wrote the following 
in the left margin of Felton1s letter: "Felton agrees access over 
road retained if Sharp develops undeveloped property as Lots 7-12 
White Pine Ranch." (F. 11 37, Add. 21; Ex. D-26A, Add. 86; 
TR. 750). Felton disputes any such agreement. (TR. 168). No 
writing expressly modifying the Contract was ever executed. 
(TR. 166-168, 372). 
After recording the Plat and CCRs, Appellants began 
construction of improvements to the Property at a total cost of 
$1,063,348.10. (Ex. P-60; TR. 102-103). The improvements included 
construction of the Roadway, on-site improvements (underground 
electrical, gas, water, fire hydrant and sewer systems) and off-site 
improvements, including lengthy sewer and utility systems. (TR. 
138-39, 141-42, 249-50, 330). A culinary well to serve the Property 
was drilled on Lot 6, and a large water storage tank for culinary 
purposes and fire protection was constructed on the unplatted 
Heaton was unable to produce his billing records, which presumably 
would have detailed his representation of the parties. (See, e.g., 
TR. 843-51). 
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Lots 1 through 5 and the Roadway. (Ex. D-30, Add. 89; TR 1U4-06). 
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their Answer and Counterclaim. (Compare Ex. D-24, D-36 and P-55 
with Answer and Counterclaim/ R. 67-89). Respondents never claimed 
that Appellants defaulted prior to June 30f 1985. (TR. 50). 
B. RESPONDENTS' FORECLOSURE OF THE ONRELEASED PROPERTY. 
Respondents recorded a Notice of Default on September 16, 1985 
and published an Amended Notice of Trustee's Sale on December 19, 
1985. (F. 11 51f Add. 25; Ex. P-55, P-56; TR. 66). Appellants 
objected because the Notices included Lots 1 through 5 and the 
Roadway. (F. 11 54, Add. 25-26; Ex. D-35, P-57; TR. 106-107/ 109). 
Respondents later published an Amended Notice of Trustee's Sale 
excluding Lots 1 through 5/ but not excluding the Roadway. (F,. 
11 55/ Add. 26; Ex. P-58). 
On February 27/ 1986/ Felton objected to the Notices and 
demanded the release of the Roadway and Lot 6, (Ex. D-35; TR. 109). 
Felton received no response other than an Amended Notice of Default/ 
dated April 29, 1986. (F. 11 55, Add. 26; Ex. D-36; TR. 109-10). On 
May 7/ 1986/ Felton again demanded the reconveyance of Lot 6 and the 
Roadway. (Ex. D-37; TR. 110). Againf Respondents never responded 
to Felton (TR. 110); they simply published a Second Amended Notice 
of Trustee's Sale, which included Lot 6f the Roadway and all of the 
unplatted property. (Ex. D-5, Add. 66). Suit was filed and the 
scheduled trustee's sale was enjoined pursuant to a temporary 
restraining order entered by the Honorable Judith Billings. 
(R. 50-51/ 61). The parties subsequently stipulated to an 
injunction. (R. 96-97). 
C. THE TRIAL. 
Appellants claimed Respondents materially breached the Contract 
because they had never reconveyed the Roadway, Lot 6 or the 7.35 
acres. Appellants contended that Respondents were required to 
release the Roadway on December 23, 1983 (or no later than 
January 20, 1984), Lot 6 on June 30, 1984 and the 7.35 acres on 
June 30, 1985.1/ (Ex. D-53; TR. 96). Respondents asserted, 
however, they were excused from reconveying this property because 
Appellants failed to request releases, or alternatively, because the 
Consent to Record in effect released the Roadway. (R. 1650, p. 
45-47). Appellants sought specific performance of the Contract 
(i.e., release of Lot 6, the Roadway and the 7.35 acres) as well as 
damages arising from Respondents1 breach of the Contract.!/ 
As a specific performance remedy, Appellants claimed 
Respondents1 failure to release and reconvey portions of the 
Property on or about January 20, 1984, excused Appellants' 
obligation to make further installment payments, and tolled the 
accrual of interest on the unpaid principal balance. Appellants 
further asserted Respondents wrongfully refused to release and 
reconvey the Property, and Appellants were entitled to recover 
statutory damages under Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-33. (The text of Utah 
Code Ann. § 57-1-33 is set forth in the Addendum at 133.) 
By counterclaim, Respondents alleged Appellants materially 
breached the Contract, sought a dissolution of the injunction to 
permit Respondents' non-judicial sale of the Property and claimed 
Actually, Appellants became entitled to 5.35 acres on June 30, 
1984 and the remaining 2.0 acres on June 30, 1985. (Ex. D-53). 
5
 The damages included interest on construction loans 
(TR. 960-63), sales lost because of Appellant's foreclosure of the 
Property (TR. 270-90), damages in the amount paid for Lot 6, the 
Roadway and the 7.35 acres which were never conveyed plus interest, 
loss of Appellants' benefit-of-the-bargain (Ex. P-96), and 
attorney's fees. 
damages for the wrongful issuance of the injunction. Before and 
throughout trial, Respondents sought to foreclose Lot 6, all of the 
unplatted acreage and the Roadway. Although Respondents offered a 
stipulation during closing argument that their non-judicial or 
judicial foreclosure of the Roadway would not extinguish the rights 
of access of Lots 1 through 5 to the Roadway, Respondents 
nonetheless sought the foreclosure of the Roadway. (R. 1641, 
p. 27-28; R. 1650, p. 43) . 
The court rejected every claim of Appellants. The court ruled, 
inter alia, Appellants materially breached the Contract by failing 
to pay property taxes for Lot 6 and the unplatted acreage on 
November 30, 1984 (approximately $3,200.00) (C. 11 2, Add. 38); 
because this breach preceded any claimed breach of Respondents, 
Respondents were excused from releasing Lot 6, the Roadway and the 
7.35 acres; Appellants were obligated to request and identify lots 
specifically for release, but failed to timely do so prior to their 
breach on November 30, 1984 (C. 1111 8 and 9, Add. 39); and 
Respondents were entitled to foreclose and sell Lot 6 and all of the 
unplatted property. (C. UK 34-35, Add. 46-47). Judgment was 
entered against Appellants for $742,984.67,—' and the property was 
ordered sold at Sheriff's Sale. (R. 1370, Add. 3-4; C 1! 31-34, Add. 
44-47). 
0
 The Judgment is comprised of $371,739.35 in principal, 
$171,033.54 in interest, $14,869.57 in late fee charges, $1,803.80 
in trustee's fees, $2,881.04 in court costs, $144,088.75 in 
attorneys' fees and $20,368.62 for 1984-1987 property taxes on Lot 6 
and the unplatted property. These property taxes have been paid. 
VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. The Contract expressly requires partial reconveyances of 
property as Appellants made payments. Even though Appellants paid 
sufficient principal sums for the release of the Roadway, Lot 6 and 
the 7.35 acres and requested the release of this property, 
Respondents never made those reconveyances. The Respondents1 
signing of the Consent to Record did not affect any reconveyance. 
Respondents1 contractual obligation to make reconveyances was not 
excused by reliance upon advice of counsel, which is not a legally 
recognized defense to a breach of contract action. Respondents' 
performance was not excused because Appellants failed to make 
specific requests for reconveyances before failing to pay 
approximately $3,200 in property taxes in 1984. Such requests, 
although not required under the Contract or by law, were in fact 
made. Respondents were nevertheless obligated to make reconveyances 
under the Contract which required reconveyances to be made "at any 
time [after]" installment payments were made. 
The court erred in not ordering Respondents to specifically 
perform the Contract by releasing Property, tolling the payment of 
principal and accrual of interest under the Trust Deed Note and 
awarding the other relief and damages Appellants sought at trial. 
The court also erred in allowing Respondents1 foreclosure of the 
Property and awarding them damages and attorneys' fees. 
B. The court likewise erred in concluding that Appellants 
granted an easement to Respondents over the Roadway. None of the 
documents presented at trial, including the Consent to Record, 
created an easement in favor of Respondents. The court's decision, 
if not reversed, establishes precedent that a trust deed beneficiary 
may create an easement in favor of himself, enforceable against the 
actual fee owners, without a writing signed by the fee owners. 
C. Respondents' breach of the Contract precludes their 
recovery of attorneys' fees. Moreover, any award of attorneys' fees 
must be in accordance with the terms of the Contract, which in this 
case limits recovery, at most, to attorneys' fees strictly related 
to foreclosure of the Trust Deed. However, the court failed to make 
any finding as to the amount of fees related to the foreclosure, 
and, therefore, the award of attorneys' fees to Respondents cannot 
be supported by the evidence. Moreover, there is no evidence to 
support a finding that the award of attorneys' fees is reasonable. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
The property rights at issue in this case are a refined part of 
Utah's law. Each involves a distinct set of rights, which are 
created in very specific and legally different ways. While some of 
these concepts may involve the same rights (e.g., ownership 
generally embodies a right of use), care must be taken not to 
confuse them. Unfortunately, the court's decision greatly confuses 
ownership, use and other property rights and ignores the contractual 
rights of the Appellants. 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING APPELLANTS, NOT 
RESPONDENTS, BREACHED THE CONTRACT. 
1. The Contract Expressly Required Reconveyances Of Property. 
The Contract expressly provides that Appellants, upon making 
the down payment ($620,000) and recording the Plat and the CCRs, are 
"entitled to the release from the Deed of Trust of three (3) PUD 
lots of [Appellants1] choice together with said roadway." (Ex. D-15 
11 3, Add. 71, emphasis added). The Contract also provides that, 
upon payment of each $140,000 of principal thereafter by Appellants, 
Respondents "shall execute and deliver to [Appellants] a Partial 
Deed of Reconveyance for one (1) PUD lot." (Id. 11 1, Add. 71; 
emphasis added). 
Thus, as payments were made, the Contract clearly required the 
release of property from the effect of the Trust Deed through a 
reconveyance of title. This could only be accomplished through the 
execution of a "Deed of Reconveyance" by the trustee. (See 
Ex. D-15, 111! 1 and 3, Add. 71; D-28, Add. 88). 
A trust deed is a "conveyance by which title to the trust 
property passes to the trustee". General Glass Corp, v. Mast 
Construction Co., 766 P.2d 429, 432 (Utah App. 1988). A "trust 
deed" is a deed executed in conformity with Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 57-1-20, et_ seq., "conveying real property to a trustee in trust 
to secure the performance of an obligation of the trustor to the 
beneficiary." Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-19(3) The "trustee" is a 
"person to whom title to real property is conveyed by trust deed". 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-19(4) (emphasis added). Therefore, the only 
statutory means for releasing property from a trust deed is the 
trustee's execution of a deed reconveying title to the trustor — in 
this case, to the Appellants.2/ See Mast, 766 P.2d at 432. This is 
1
 Respondents1 purported real estate expert, Heaton, confirmed 
that a trustee's execution of a deed of reconveyance is the only way 
to remove a trust deed other than by judicial or non-judicial 
foreclosure or an equitable order of a court. (TR. 776-78). 
precisely the performance required of Respondents under the 
Contract.£/ 
2. The Reconveyance Of Property By Respondents As Sellers Was 
A Material Term Of The Contract. 
A material term of a contract is one that goes to the very 
substance of the contract and touches its fundamental purpose. 
Matter of the Estate of Bistro, 33 Or. App. 325, 576 P.2d 801, 804 
(1978); Rogers v. Relyea, 184 Mont. 1, 8, 601 P.2d 37, 41 (1979); 
cf. Aldape v. Lubcke, 107 Idaho 316, 688 P.2d 1221, 1222-1223 (App. 
1984) (a breach of a material term affects the substantive rights of 
the parties). See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241 (1981). 
Under facts similar to this case, courts in other jurisdictions have 
considered provisions requiring the "release" of property under an 
installment contract to be fundamental, material terms necessitating 
the seller's strict performance thereof. See Buckman v. Hill 
Military Academy, 190 Or. 194, 223 P.2d 172 (1950); Columbia 
Development, Inc. v Watchie, 252 Or. 81, 448 P.2d 360, 361-362 
(1968). 
In Buckman, the Oregon Supreme Court held the "release" 
provision to be so fundamental that the buyer's obligation to make 
future installment payments was excused by the seller's failure to 
release property. The Court stated: 
° This is precisely the performance Respondents made with respect 
to Lots 1 through 5, albeit two years later than required by the 
Contract. Consistent with Utah's statutory requirements, that 
Partial Reconveyance used the very language set forth in Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-1-33, reciting that it "does hereby reconvey . . . to the 
person or persons entitled thereto, a portion of the trust property 
now held by said Trustee." (Ex. P-45, Add. at 90). 
Where there is an essential part of a contract that one 
party shall perform certain acts which are requisite to 
enable the other party to carry out his part of the 
agreement, a repudiation of the agreement on the part of 
the former party, such as failure to perform without 
warrant by existing conditions, absolves the other party 
from complying with his part of the contract and gives him 
the right to rescind (citation omitted). 
Buckman, 223 P. 2d at 175. Other courts have concluded that release 
provisions are so material and fundamental that enforcement thereof 
will survive the buyer's own default. Watchie, 448 P.2d at 361-62; 
Burroughs v. Garner, 43 Md.App. 302, 405 A.2d 301 (1979); Eldridge 
v. Burns, 76 Cal.App.3d 396, 142 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1978); see also 
Construction of Provision in Real Estate Mortgagor Land Contract, or 
Other Security Instrument For Release of Separate Parcels of Land as 
Payments are Made, 41 A.L.R. 3d 7, 67 (1972). 
In this case, the release of Property as payments were made was 
so important that the parties made it an express requirement of the 
Contract. (Ex. D-15, 1Mf 1 and 3, Add. 71). When a specific (and 
substantial) amount of principal was paid, portions of Property were 
to be released. (.Id.) Otherwise, Appellants, while agreeing to pay 
$1,583,055.30 (in principal alone) over a five year period and 
making $1,000,000 of improvements to the Property, would have left 
the entire Property subject to foreclosure until the Trust Deed Note 
was fully paid. This was not the parties1 intention. 
The materiality of the release provision could not be more 
aptly demonstrated than by the court's decision: Appellants paid 
$465,604 in principal for the Roadway, Lot 6 and the 7.35 acres. 
Yet, as a consequence of Respondents1 refusal to honor their release 
obligations, this Property is now foreclosed and subject to sale 
under the court's ruling. (C. 11 34, Add. 46; Ex. P-54). 
Moreover, the foreclosure and sale of the Property will 
extinguish the covenants and easements created by the Plat and CCRsf 
including non-exclusive easements created in favor of owners of 
Lots 1 through 5 to the improvements and the Roadway.-/ Winn v. 
Mannhalter, 708 P.2d 444, 448 (Alaska 1985) (buyer at foreclosure of 
trust deed takes title equivalent to that of the trustor at the time 
the trust was created). See also, Frater Oklahoma Realty Corp. v. 
Allen Laughon Hardware Co., 245 P.2d 1144, 1148 (Okla. 1952) ("the 
proposition is fundamental that a mortgagor has no power or 
authority, in the absence of an express delegation or reservation 
thereof, to affect or impair the lien of a mortgagee11); Penn Mutual 
Life Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 170 Or. 248, 132 P.2d 979, 981 (1943) 
("defendants . . . could not, by any act of theirs subsequent to the 
date of the mortgage, create an easement upon the mortgaged premises 
which would be paramount to the rights of the mortgagee"); 
Burlington & C.R. Co. v. Colorado Eastern R. Co., 38 Colo. 95, 88 P. 
154, 155 (1906) (since lien of trust deed attached prior to granting 
easement, rights created by the easement were terminated and 
property passed to purchaser at foreclosure free of easement); see 
y
 At trial, there was great disagreement about the effect of the 
foreclosure action on the Roadway. The Roadway was expressly 
included in Respondents1 Second Amended Notice of Sale, (Ex. D-5, 
Add. 66), which Respondents, by way of their Answer sought to 
foreclose. (R. 67-78). While earlier suggesting the owners of Lots 
1-5 would not lose their "right of access" over the Roadway, not 
until Respondents' closing argument, was there an offer of a 
"stipulation" that the foreclosure action would not eliminate rights 
of access to the Roadway from Lots 1 through 5. (R. 1650, p. 43). 
This ignored Appellants' entitlement to unencumbered fee ownership, 
rather than mere access to the Property. The materiality of the 
release is surely demonstrated by the very fact that the Roadway was 
the subject of Respondents1 foreclosure action. (See R. 1641, 
p. 26-28; R. 1650, p. 43). 
also Foreclosure of Mortgage or Trust Deed as Affecting Easement 
Claimed In, Over, or Under Property, 46 A.L.R. 2d 1197, 1200 (1952) 
and cases cited therein. 
In effect, Appellants have suffered the very risks the release 
provisions were intended to avoid — the risk of loss or loss of the 
very property for which Appellants bargained and paid. Appellants 
are deprived of a significant benefit they anticipated and expressly 
secured under the Contract. The release provisions of the Contract 
cannot be characterized as anything less than material. 
3. Respondents Materially Breached The Contract By Failing To 
Reconvey The Property In Accordance With The Material 
Terms Of The Contract. 
The court certainly erred when it concluded Respondents 
"substantially complied with all of their obligations under the 
terms of the Contract." (C. 11 6, Add. 39). According to the court, 
the Respondents1 execution of the Consent to Record constituted a 
release of the roadway as required under the Closing Memorandum. 
(C. 1[ 10, Add. 39). The court did not find Respondents ever 
released Lot 6 or the 7.35 acres. Rather, it mistakenly ruled 
reconveyances were not required because Appellants failed under the 
Closing Memorandum to timely request the release of property, 
including the Roadway. (C. 1M[ 7 and 8, Add. 39).!^/ 
(a) The district court erred in applying the doctrine of 
substantial performance. 
Material terms of a contract must be strictly and literally 
performed. Substantial performance of material terms is legally 
The court erred. As a matter of law, requests were not 
required, and, even if required, such requests were timely made or 
unnecessary. See VIII.A.4.(b) infra, at p. 24. 
insufficient. Ram Development Corp. v. Siuslaw Enterprises, Inc., 
283 Or. 13, 580 P.2d 552, 555 (1977); Zions Properties, Inc. v. 
Holt, 538 P.2d 1319 (Utah 1975). When a party breaches a material 
term of a contract, there can be no "substantial performance" of 
that term as a matter of law. Measday v. Kwik-Kopy Corp., 713 F.2d 
118, 123-124 (5th Cir. 1983); see also, Fortress Re, Inc. v. 
Jefferson Ins. Co. of New York, 465 F.Supp. 333, 335 (D. N.C. 1978) 
aff fd 628 F.2d 860 (4th Cir. 1980) (party cannot substantially 
perform condition when it has materially undermined incentive giving 
rise to the provision at the outset). Frank E. Penney Co. v. United 
States, 524 F.2d 668, 677 (Ct. CI. 1975) (doctrine of substantial. 
performance shall not be applied to compel non-defaulting party to 
accept performance not bargained for). 
Since the release of property was a material term of the 
Contract, the court erred in applying a "substantial performance" 
standard and concluding that Respondents did not breach the Contract 
because they "substantially performed" it. 
(b) Respondents did not reconvey the Property by 
executing the Consent to Record, 
The court erroneously concluded that Respondents1 execution of 
the Consent to Record (Ex. D-7, Add. 67) constituted a release of 
the Roadway. The Consent to Record is not a reconveyance. It was 
never signed by the Trustee (Associated Title) to which Appellants 
had conveyed the Property pursuant to the Trust Deed. See Mast, 766 
P.2d at 432. The Consent to Record, therefore, is wholly 
ineffective because it contains no language purporting to reconvey 
the Property as required by Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-33 ("the trustee 
shall . . . reconvey the trust property"). The court flatly ignored 
these requirements. In doing so, the court erred as a matter of law 
in concluding that the Consent to Record operated as a 
reconveyance.—/ 
(c) Since reconveyances were not made, Respondents 
breached the Contract. 
A party's failure to perform a material term of an agreement 
constitutes a breach, which cannot be excused under any 
circumstances. Zions Properties, 538 P.2d at 1322. See Sagebrush 
Development, Inc. v. Moehrhe, 604 P.2d 198, 201 (Wyo. 1979); 17A 
C.J.S. Contracts § 494 (1963). Because the release of property was 
a material term of the Contract, Respondents1 failure to reconvey 
the Roadway, Lot 6 and the 7.35 acres was a material breach of the 
Contract. Respondents also breached the Contract by not releasing 
and reconveying Lots 1 through 5 until March 28, 1986. (Ex. P-45, 
Add. 90; TR. 69-70). The reconveyance of these lots was required on 
December 23, 1983 when Appellants recorded the plat and the CCRs, 
or, at the latest, on January 20, 1984, when Appellants selected 
Lots 1 through 5 for release. (Ex. D-30, Add. 89). Respondents 
It is painfully obvious the Respondents never regarded the 
Consent to Record as a reconveyance of the Roadway. When the 
Consent to Record was recorded on December 23, 1983, sufficient 
payments had been made to release five (5) lots and the Roadway. 
(Ex. P-44). On January 18, 1984, Respondents instructed Associated 
Title to "release from the Deed of Trust" Lots 1 through 5 (Ex. 
D-28, Add. 88; F. 11 42, Add. 23; TR. 69-70); those instructions 
expressly stated that "all other portions of the property [including 
the Roadway] remain subject to the Trust Deed." (^ d.) In fact, a 
Partial Reconveyance for Lots 1-5 was later signed and recorded by 
the Trustee two years later. (Ex. P-45, Add. 90). If Respondents 
had regarded the Consent to Record as a reconveyance, a Partial 
Reconveyance for Lots 1-5 was unnecessary, as the Consent to Record 
would have operated to reconvey those lots as well as the Roadway. 
Clearly, Respondents never considered the Consent to Record to be a 
reconveyance of the Roadway, and, in fact, testified they never 
planned to reconvey the Roadway at all until the Trust Deed was paid 
in full. (TR. 45). 
breached the Contract with respect to every release it required. 
The court erred in concluding otherwise. 
4. Respondents' Performance Under The Contract Was Not 
Excused, 
The court determined/ alternatively, that Respondents1 failure 
to release the property was excused and not done in bad faith 
because they relied upon the advice of Heaton, their counsel. 
(C. 11 7, Add. 39; C. 11 23, Add. 43). These findings constitute no 
legally recognized defense to a breach of contract action, but, even 
if they did, no such defense is supported by the evidence. 
(a) Respondents' breach is not excused by reason of their 
claimed reliance upon the advice of counsel. 
The Respondents1 good or bad faith is immaterial to the 
question of their breach of the Contract. Their claimed reliance 
upon advice of counsel is simply no defense to an action for breach 
of contract: 
The contract fixes the rights and obligations of the 
parties and a contracting party who refuses to perform, 
albeit in reliance on an attorney's advice, acts at his 
peril. 
Mann v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 418 F.Supp. 237, 251 (D. Nev. 1974), 
revfd on other grounds 541 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1976). 
Mr. Sharp's only testimony at trial concerning his reliance 
upon counsel was that "since we had a lawyer [Heaton], it behooved 
us to go on his advice and that's what we did." (TR. 62). 
Mrs. Sharp, although initially claiming Heaton decided not to 
release the lots or the roadway (TR. 457), later admitted at trial 
that she was not sure if Heaton made the decision or she simply 
relied on his advice (TR. 458-59), or that any such decision was 
ever made or by whom. (TR. 459). Even if reliance upon advice of 
counsel could excuse Respondents1 breach of the Contract (which it 
cannot), this testimony cannot support a finding of reliance upon 
advice of counsel. 
Moreover, the claim of good faith reliance on advice of counsel 
must be considered in light of the Respondents' understanding of the 
Contract, which unambiguously fixed their obligation to release 
property as payments were made. Respondents testified they 
understood these obligations. (TR. 46). Nonetheless, Mr. Sharp 
testified he was not obligated to release the Roadway until the 
Trust Deed Note was fully paid. (TR. 45). Mr. Sharp admitted this 
understanding was "out of [his] head and nowhere else". (TR. 45). 
More importantly, he admitted that under the Closing Memorandum the 
Roadway was to be released when the first three lots were released 
and that nothing contained in the Closing Memorandum required 
complete payment of the Trust Deed Note before release of the 
Roadway was required. (TR. 46). Mr. Sharp also admitted that his 
decision not to release Lot 6 was made "totally independent of the 
amount of principal paid by Appellants." (TR. 49, emphasis added). 
Mrs. Sharp's notes show the Respondents did not rely upon 
advice of counsel. Her notes contain calculations concerning the 
amount of each payment and the allocation thereof to principal and 
interest. (TR. 438, 445 and 447). Mrs. Sharp noted in her own 
handwriting the requirement of a "lot release on every $140,000 
paid," and the file contained calculations of the number of lots to 
be released based upon the payments made. (Ex. P-95; TR. 442).—/ 
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 All of Respondents1 admissions are binding upon them and cannot 
be contradicted by other evidence. See Hayes v. Xerox Corp., 718 
P.2d 929, 931 (Alaska 1986); Kempter v. Hurd, 713 P.2d 1274, 1280 
(Colo. 1986); Bailey v. Mead, 492 P.2d 798, 800 (Or. 1971). 
Heaton's testimony further demonstrates the court's error. He 
told the court he never advised Respondents not to release any 
portion of the Property from the effect of the Trust Deed. (TR. 
797-803). In fact, by letter dated November 18, 1983, Heaton 
specifically told Respondents that Appellants were entitled to a 
release of the Roadway and Lots 1 through 5. Heaton1s letter stated 
that: 
[A]t a later time in the near future Hy [Saunders] has 
indicated he will seek release of Lots 1 through 5 of the 
platted subdivision along with his road (White Pine Lane) 
. . . . For your information, I have reviewed the 
payments under the Note and find that he is entitled to 
those releases. 
(Ex. D-25, Add. 85, emphasis added). On July 1, 1986, Heaton again 
informed Respondents of property Appellants were entitled to under 
the Contract.il/ (Ex. P-131, Add. 134). 
There is simply no legal or factual basis for the court's 
decision that Respondents relied upon the advice of counsel or were 
legally entitled to do so. 
1J
 Until the last day of trial, Heaton and Respondents, claiming 
attorney/client privilege, withheld the production of documents from 
Heaton*s files concerning post-closing transactions and 
communications. (TR. 953-58, 963). Those documents, comprising two 
files, were not delivered to Appellants until the night before 
closing argument, after Heaton testified that he never represented 
the Sharps after Closing. (TR. 966-67). Pursuant to Rule 37 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Appellants moved to have Heaton's 
testimony stricken but the Court denied that motion. (TR. 970-80). 
The wrongful assertions of attorney/client privilege related to the 
very transactions involved in this case, and the withholding of 
Heaton's files until the last day of trial impaired Appellants' 
ability to assess the merits of Respondents' claims at trial. 
Heaton's testimony should have been stricken. See, e.g., W.W. & 
W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734, 738 
(Utah 1977). 
(b) Respondents' obligation to reconvey property was not 
excused by Appellants' alleged failure to make 
specific requests for release of property prior to 
Appelants' alleged default. 
The court ruled that Appellants "were obligated under the terms 
of the [Closing Memorandum] and pursuant to their own practice, to 
specifically request and identify lots, including Lot 6, for release 
by the [Respondents]". (C. 11 7, Add. 39, emphasis added). 
Respondents were thereafter excused from reconveying Lot 6, the 
Roadway and the 7.35 acres because Appellants1 breach of the 
Contract "preceded [any] timely requests [by Appellants1] for such 
reconveyances." (C. at 11 8, Add. 39). In other words, "the 
[Respondents] were justified in and were excused from [this] 
performance under the Contract . . . because the [Appellants] were 
in breach of the parties1 Contract at the time such reconveyances 
were requested." (C. 11 9, Add. 39). These Conclusions are not 
supported by the findings or the evidence.—/ 
The Closing Memorandum expressly provided that Appellants, upon 
making the down payment and recording the plat and CCRs, were 
"entitled to the release from the Deed of Trust of three (3) PUD 
lots of Buyer's [Appellants'] choice together with the said 
roadway." (Ex. 15 1[ 3, Add. 71, emphasis added). This language 
x
^ Appellants have contended throughout this proceeding they made 
numerous requests for release (TR. 104, 156, 197, 200 and 362), 
including a request for Lots 1 through 5 and the Roadway on 
January 20, 1984. (Ex. D-30, Add. 89). The court ignored this 
evidence and did not address it in its oral ruling, findings or 
conclusions. The court never made any finding that Appellants 
requested the release of Lots 1 through 5. The court only found 
that Appellants requested the release of lot 6, the Roadway and the 
7.35 acres after their alleged default. Thus, the court's own 
findings (and omitted findings) concerning requests preclude a 
determination that there was a "practice" of making "timely" 
requests for the release of property. 
does not require that Appellants request reconveyances, but merely 
permits them to choose which of the lots ("lots of Buyer's choice") 
shall be the subject of Respondents1 mandatory reconveyance. (Id*; 
TR. 156, 321).15/ 
Apart from these three lots and the Roadway, the Closing 
Memorandum required Respondents to release additional lots as 
installment payments were made: 
[U]pon receipt of each $140,000.00 in principal (but 
not including the earnest money and down payment money), 
Seller shall execute and deliver to Buyer [Appellants] a 
Partial Deed of Reconveyance for (1) PUD lot. 
(Ex. 15 11 1, Add. 71, emphasis added). The Closing Memorandum 
required the unconditional release of property upon payment of the 
release price or "at any time thereafter." (Ex. D-15 11 2, Add. 71, 
emphasis added). 
Nowhere does the Closing Memorandum require either a request by 
Appellants for reconveyance, or that such a request be made prior to 
any default by Appellants. Nowhere does the Closing Memorandum 
require that a lot be selected prior to any such default. Nowhere 
does the Closing Memorandum remove the Respondents1 obligation to 
release property if Appellants default in the future. Appellants 
were unconditionally entitled to a release upon payment "or at any 
time thereafter." (_Id., emphasis added). Regardless of Appellants1 
choice of lots, the Roadway was to be released and reconveyed after 
payment of the down payment, and no selection was necessary.—/ 
1^ When the Plat and CCRs were recorded on December 23, 1983, the 
Contract mandated the release of five lots and the Roadway. 
1 6
 The selection of property in this case is a meaningless, 
hypertechnicality that should not excuse Respondents' breach. In 
December 1983 and January 1984, Appellants informed Respondents of 
their selection of Lots 1-5 and the Roadway for release. (Ex. D-30, 
(Fn Con't Next Page) 
In Columbia Development, Inc. v. Watchie, 252 Or. 81, 448 P.2d 
360 (1968), the court refused to impose a limitation on the release 
of property not contained in the parties' contract. The plaintiff 
brought a foreclosure action under a conditional sales contract. The 
contract required defendant to pay plaintiff $165,000. Defendant 
defaulted, and later requested a partial release of property for 
which he had paid under the contract. Plaintiff refused. The trial 
court, however, ordered the release of the property requested by 
defendant upon condition that defendant pay the past due taxes. 
The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the decision and focused upon 
the purpose of the release provision and the inequities associated 
with plaintiffs' withholding the releases. The court reasoning is 
most instructive: 
* * * Whether the release privilege survives default 
depends, in the absence of equitable considerations, upon 
the intention of the parties, to be drawn from the 
language of the covenant read in the light of the other 
provisions of the contract and of surrounding 
circumstances at the time of execution. But, depending 
upon the facts of the particular case, the decision * * * 
may be varied by a consideration of what now seems fair 
and just in the light of subsequent events. It is no 
unusual thing for equity to refuse recognition to express 
contractual provisions relating to security for loans 
where their enforcement would not be consonant with 
justice. (citations omitted). 
Id. at 362 (emphasis added). The court also stated: 
Add. 89). In June 1984, sufficient principal payment was made for 
the release of Lot 6, the only remaining platted lot. (TR. 321). 
Requiring some formal selection of Lot 6 at that time was 
meaningless and not required. Utah State Building Bd. v. Walsh 
Plumbing Co., 16 Utah 2d 249, 399 P.2d 141, 144 (1965) (when 
contract requires giving of notice, unless failure to give it in 
some way puts a party to a disadvantage or adversely affects his 
rights, he should not be permitted to evade his obligations because 
of a mere technical failure to give notice). 
If the mortgagee is paid the proportionate share of the 
accrued interest, and reimbursed for his expensesf we do 
not see how he can be prejudiced. His remaining security 
would be just as ample as if the release had been demanded 
before default, and, in case foreclosure proceedings had 
been commenced, they would not be defeated or affected, as 
to the remaining lots, by the execution of a partial 
release. On the other hand, a contrary construction might 
work harshly against purchasers from the mortgagors, and 
defeat the very purpose for which the covenant was 
inserted. * * * Construing this covenant in connection 
with other provisions of the mortgage, and in the light of 
the manifest purpose which it was designed to subserve, we 
are of the opinion that the right to a partial release 
upon the stipulated terms continues until the mortgagee 
has fully executed the power by sale of the mortgaged 
premises. (citations omitted). * * * 
[R]elease clauses of this sort create vested rights which 
remain vested even beyond default and may be claimed at 
any time until a decree of foreclosure is entered. 
Id. at 362-63 (emphasis added). Equally as persuasive in 
determining a party's entitlement to partial release of property are 
the following decisions: Burroughs v. Garner, 405 A. 2d 301 and 
Eldridge v. Burns, 142 Cal. Rptr. 845. 
This Court should follow Watchie and reverse the district 
court's decision. Any other ruling will impose a harsh and 
inequitable result for several reasons. First, Respondents knew 
exactly what Property Appellants wanted released before any alleged 
default. (Ex. D-23, Ex. D-25, Add. 85; Ex. D-30, Add. 89). 11/ 
Second, the Contract does not expressly preclude partial releases 
after default. The Contract, in fact, expressly states Appellants 
*•' Respondents were notified throughout the Contract period what 
lots Appellants wanted released. (Ex. D-23, D-25, Add. 85; D-30, 
Add. 89). Having executed the Consent to Record and having received 
Felton's letter of January 20, 1984, demanding deeds of reconveyance 
for Lots 1-5 and the Roadway (Ex. D-30, Add. 89), Respondents knew 
that Lot 6 was the only remaining lot to be released. Moreover, 
Appellants have contended from the outset Respondents breached the 
Contract no later than January 20, 1984, more than ten (10) months 
before any conceivable default by Appellants. 
were entitled to partial releases upon payment "or at any time 
thereafter." Consistent with this language, Lots 1 through 5 were 
actually reconveyed to Appellants after the date on which the court 
found that Appellants materially breached the Contract by failing to 
pay less than $3,200 in taxes. (See Ex. P-45, Add. 90). The other 
property should likewise have been reconveyed to Appellants. 
Moreover, apart from making improvements costing $1,000,000, 
Appellants paid Respondents in excess of eighty percent (80%) of the 
$1.5 million Contract. But Respondents, by their failure to perform 
under the Agreement, chose to release only forty-six percent (46%) 
of the Property.i£/ The court's decision allows Respondents to 
withhold their performance based upon Appellants1 mere failure to 
pay approximately $3,200 in property taxes in November, 1984, after 
Respondents had breached the Contract by intentionally refusing to 
reconvey the Property.—/ Such a result is grossly 
inequitable.—/ As in Watchie, irrespective of any failure to pay 
taxes, Appellants had a vested right to the release of Lot 6, the 
Roadway and 7.35 acres under the Contract. The court's decision to 
the contrary is in error and must be reversed. 
x
° A release of the Roadway, Lot 6 and 7.35 acres of unplatted 
property would still leave 22.2180 acres subject to the Trust 
Deed. Assuming a fair market value of $25,000 per acre (Ex. P-97), 
Respondents were still secured by property worth $555,450 — an 
amount far in excess of the principal balance. 
19
 The $3,200 in taxes represents less than one percent (1%) of 
$1,546,400 paid to Respondents under the Contract. 
^
u
 The court's decision should be reversed because it causes a 
forfeiture not allowed by. the Contract. Such a result is contrary 
to public policy and applicable law. See First Security Bank of 
Utah v. Maxwell, 659 P.2d 1078, 1081 (Utah 1983) (the law abhors 
forfeitures); Moon Lake Electric Ass'nf Inc. v. Ultrasystems Western 
Constructors, Inc., 767 P.2d 125 (Utah App. 1988). 
(c) Appellants' failure to pay taxes did not excuse 
Respondents' obligation to reconvey portions of the 
Property under the Contract. 
The court concluded that Appellants first breached the Contract 
by failing to pay approximately $3f200 in property taxes due on 
Lot 6 and the unplatted acreage on November 30, 1984 (C. 11 2, Add. 
38). According to the court, this breach was "material, 
significant, continuing and uncured11 when releases were first 
requested by Appellants (C. 11 4, Add. 38), and occurred prior in 
time to any alleged breach by Respondents, who did not materially or 
significantly breach the Contract. (C. 11 5, Add. 39). Since trial, 
Appellants have paid all unpaid Property taxes on Lot 6 and the 
unplatted property, the property covered by the Trust Deed. 
(R. 1687-91). 
Appellants have demonstrated above why the release provisions 
were material and why Respondents1 failure to comply with those 
provisions was a material breach of the Contract. See § VIII.A.2. 
and VIII.A.3., supra, p. 21-29. Under that same analysis, it is 
clear Appellants1 failure to pay the 1984 taxes was not so 
significant as to excuse Respondents' obligation to reconvey 
property, nor did it fundamentally affect the purpose of the 
Contract. See Matter of the Estate of Bistro, 576 P.2d at 804; 
Rogers v. Relyea, 601 P.2d at 41. The payment of taxes, one of the 
many requirements of the Trust Deed, is not "requisite to enable the 
other party to carry out his part of the agreement" and, therefore, 
did not excuse Respondents' performance.—/ Buckman v. Hill 
Military Academy, 223 P.2d at 175. 
This Court should be guided by the Oregon Supreme Court's 
decision in Watchief which dealt with this very issue. The sellers 
argued they were not obligated to release real property under an 
installment contract because buyers' requests for release of 
property were made (i) after they defaulted in making principal and 
interest payments totaling $101,767, and (ii) during the period of 
buyer's default in the payment of real estate taxes that continued 
over the four-year existence of the parties' agreement. 
Nonetheless, the court ordered the release of the property subject 
to the payment of the delinquent taxes. The court stated: 
The non-payment of taxes had constituted a default earlier 
but, as already noted, in amount of money the unpaid taxes 
were much less than the money defendant had paid 
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs are not prejudiced for it is 
apparent that plaintiffs still have ample security and the 
substantial security for which they contracted, and the 
decree does require that all of the taxes on all of the 
property must be paid before the partial transfer of 
property occurs. 
Watchie, 448 P.2d at 363 (emphasis added). In short, the non-
payment of taxes did not excuse the seller's obligation to release 
property. 
Applying Watchie, this Court should rule that Appellants' 
failure to pay taxes in 1984 was not a default excusing Respondents' 
obligation to release property under the Trust Deed. Consistent with 
Watchie, Appellants have paid all unpaid property taxes, and it 
would be most unconscionable for the non-payment of $3,200 in taxes 
*
x
 The court failed to consider that if Respondents had released 
Lot 6 as required, Appellants' failure to pay taxes on the lot could 
not have been a breach of the Trust Deed. 
(which has been cured) to excuse Respondents1 obligation to release 
property for which Appellants paid $465/604, Id. 
5. The District Court Erred In Concluding That Respondents 
Did Not Act In Bad Faith, Thereby Refusing To Grant Relief 
To Appellants Onder Utah Code Ann, § 57-1-33. 
The district court concluded that Respondents did not withhold 
the reconveyances in bad faith (C. 11 23/ Add. 43)/ and/ therefore, 
no action for statutory damages existed under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 57-1-33.—/ As a matter of law, however, the court erred. 
When a trustor satisfies the obligations secured by any trust 
deed/ even if by partial performance/ the trustee is required/ upon 
written request from the beneficiary/ to reconvey the trust property 
to the trustor. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-33. This statutory 
requirement serves the purpose of protecting borrowers who secure 
debts with an interest in real estate from lenders who refuse to 
return the security when the debt is discharged. Hector/ Inc. v. 
United Savings & Loan Association/ 741 P.2d 542/ 545 (Utah 1987). 
Although "good faith" may be a defense to the assessment of 
penalties under § 57-1-33/ such good faith does not exist when the 
seller uses its leverage to obtain security for the payment of 
another debt. Hectorf 741 P.2d at 545. See also Swaner v. Union 
Mortgage Co.t 99 Utah 298f 105 P.2d 342f 346 (1940) (a party cannot 
justifiably refuse to perform under one contract to compel other 
party to the contract to perform under another contract). 
Respondents' admissions concerning their withholding of 
releases contrary to the requirements of the Contract, are discussed 
2* of course, such a conclusion does not affect Appellants1 
independent claims for breach of contract/ with respect to which 
good or bad faith is irrelevant. 
in detail in § VIII A.4.(a) and (b), p. 21-29. Those admissions are 
binding, cannot be contradicted by other evidence and as a matter of 
law preclude a finding that Respondents acted in good faith. Hayes 
v. Xerox Corp., 718 P.2d at 931; Kempter v. Hurd, 713 P.2d at 1280; 
and Bailey v. Mead, 492 P.2d at 800. Respondents were not entitled 
to rewrite the Contract unilaterally to increase their leverage and 
security for payment. Hector 741 P.2d at 545. Likewise, the 
district court was not entitled to rewrite the parties' Contract, 
and its decision, which in effect did so, is in error. 
6. This Court Should Rule That Appellants Are Entitled To 
Specific Performance, Decree That Principal Payments And 
The Accrual Of Interest Under The Trust Deed Note Were 
Tolled No Later Than January 20, 1984, And Remand The Case 
To The District Court For A Determination Of Appellants' 
Damages. 
This Court should reverse the decision of the district court 
and decree that Respondents, not Appellants, breached the 
Contract.—/ In addition, this Court should address Appellants1 
remedies, which the court did not do, because of its fundamental 
determination that Appellants breached the Contract and, therefore, 
were not entitled to relief. 
(a) Appellants are entitled to specific performance. 
Specific performance should be ordered if the parties' intent 
as to the material terms of the Contract is clear. Barnard v. 
Barnard, 700 P.2d 1113, 1114 (Utah 1985); Eliason v. Watts, 615 P.2d 
ZJ
 The material facts have been fully developed, and this Court 
has authority to render a judgment in favor of Appellants, which the 
district court failed to do. Coffey v. Stephen, 3 Kan, App. 2d 596, 
599 P.29 310 (1979); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 645 P.2d 476 (Okla. 
1982); Matter of Magoon's Estate, 569 P.2d 884 (Haw. 1977) (when 
result is foreordained from the record, appellate court should 
exercise its power to render final judgment on reversal). 
427, 429 (Utah 1980).—/ The reconveyance of property was a 
material condition of the Contract sufficiently specific to require 
the Contract to be performed according to its terms. (Ex. D-15 1MI 1 
and 3, Add. 71). The parties clearly understood this obligation, 
including the fact that the Roadway was to be reconveyed along with 
the first three (3) PUD lots. (TR. 46). This being the case, 
Appellants were entitled to the release of property. The court thus 
erred in not ordering Respondents to specifically perform their 
obligations and reconvey the Roadway, Lot 6 and the 7.35 acres, and 
this Court should now award Appellants this relief. See Eliason, 
615 P.2d at 429. 
(b) The district court erred in not tolling Appellants' 
payment of principal and the accrual of interest 
under Trust Deed Note. 
In awarding specific performance, courts are compelled to 
evaluate the equities and place the parties in a position they would 
have been had no breach occurred. Eliason, 615 P. 2d at 430 (court 
awarded specific performance plus lost rent and profits offset by 
interest earned on purchase money). See also, Alexander v« Brown, 
646 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 1982). The Utah Supreme court has held that 
no interest shall accrue on the principal bailance of payments due 
from a buyer if the buyer has not received the benefit of his 
bargain because of the seller's breach. Pack v. Hall Development 
Company, Inc., 667 P.2d 39, 40 (Utah 1983); Blomquist v. Bingham, 
652 P.2d 900, 902 (Utah 1982); Amoss v. Bennion, 456 P.2d 172, 175 
(Utah 1969). The Blomquist court stated: 
zq
 Neither Respondents nor Appellants contend any ambiguity exists 
with respect to the release provisions of the Contract. 
Where a purchaser's possession is not beneficial, or is 
incomplete or where the vendor has wilfully refused to 
perform his contract, a court of equity, decreeing 
specific performance, should postpone the date for 
commencement of interest and the date upon which 
installment payments are to be made . . . . [I]t would be 
unjust to allow the vendor interest on the unpaid balance 
of the purchase price when the failure to perform the 
contract was caused by his fault and the vendee had not 
been in possession. 
Blomquist, 652 P.2d at 902 (emphasis added). 
Respondents breached the Contract by failing to release 
property from the Trust Deed and by later commencing both 
non-judicial and judicial proceedings to foreclose that unreleased 
property. Appellants purchased the Property with an obvious intent 
to develop it. Respondents1 breach precluded Appellants from 
effectively marketing and promoting the Property. (TR. 276-77). As 
an aspect of specific performance, the court should have extended 
the time to pay the remaining principal balance and ordered that 
interest was tolled from and after the date of Respondents' breach 
(not later than January 20, 1984). See Amoss, 456 P.2d at 175-76 
(court affirmed the tolling of interest on unpaid balance due to 
seller's refusal to perform under the Contract); Blomquist v. 
Bingham, 652 P.2d at 902. 
(c) Appellants were entitled to an award of damages due 
to Respondents' failure to reconvey. 
The court concluded Appellants' damages were "too remote, 
conjectural and speculative," and Appellants "failed to establish 
that they have suffered actual damages resulting from any alleged 
breach by [Respondents]." (R. 1651, p. 8; C. 1[ 28). The court 
erred, however, in not awarding damages for interest on the money 
paid Respondents for property they failed to release. 
When a party retains and makes use of money belonging to 
another, equity requires that interest be paid on the money 
retained. See Malechy v. Malechy, 148 Ariz. 121f 713 P.2d 322, 323 
(App. 1985); Rose City Transit Co. v. City of Portland, 18 Or.App. 
369. 525 P.2d 1325, 1339 modified 271 Or. 588, 533 P.2d 339 (1974). 
Since Respondents had the use of the money paid by Appellants, while 
simultaneously withholding reconveyance of extensive portions of the 
Property, Appellants are entitled to an award of damages 
representing a reasonable rate of return on the purchase money 
paid. "Neither party should enjoy the possession and use of the 
subject matter of the contract [i.e., the Property] and also the 
purchase price." Dillingham Commercial Co., Inc. v. Spears, 641 
P.2d 1, 10-11. n. 9 (Alaska 1982). Appellants1 damages need not be 
proved with mathematical certainty. Highland Construction Co. v. 
Union Pac. R. R. Co., 683 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Utah 1984), and this 
court should remand for a determination of those damages. 
(d) The trial court erred when it failed to award 
Appellants the benefit-of-the-bargain. 
In Utah the general theory of damages for breach of contract is 
to place the non-breaching party in as good a position as he would 
have been had the contract been performed. Alexander v. Brown, 646 
P.2d 692 (Utah 1982); Keller v. Deseret Mortuary Co., 23 Utah 2d 1, 
455 P.2d 197, 198 (1969). When a party refuses to reconvey land, 
the non-breaching party is generally entitled to the difference 
between the contract price and the market value at the time of the 
breach. Terry v. Panek, 631 P.2d 896, 897 (Utah 1981); Ranch Homes, 
Inc. v. Greater Park City Corp., 592 P.2d 620, 624 (Utah 1979); 
Smith v. Warr, 564 P.2d 771, 772 (Utah 1977). 
The Contract provides for the purchase and sale of 60.078 acres 
for $26,350 per acre. Thirty-seven (37) acres remain covered by the 
Trust Deed at a contract price of $974,950.00. The fair market value 
of the Property on January 20, 1984, when Respondents refused to 
release, was $37,500 per acre. (Ex. P-97; TR. 472-473). Appellants 
claimed at trial Respondents1 breach caused general damages of at 
least $123,944.00, representing the difference in market value. 
(Ex. 96; TR. 474-475). The court erred in failing to consider or 
award such damages, and this court should remand the case to the 
court for a determination of Appellants1 damages. Associates 
Northwest, Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 733 P.2d 824 (1987). 
(e) The district court erred in excluding evidence 
concerning damages which arose from Appellants' 
construction loans. 
The court refused to admit evidence establishing the amount of 
interest that Appellants paid to Tracy Mortgage Company for loans 
they obtained to construct the improvements upon the Property. 
(TR. 120-124).—/ The court based its decision upon an incorrect 
interpretation of Ranch Homes, supra. (Id.). 
In Ranch Homes, developers entered into an option contract to 
purchase thirty (30) acres of real property in Park City, Utah for 
$502,000. The developers, who paid $10,000 for the option, timely 
exercised the option. The sellers subsequently repudiated the 
agreement. The developers sought to recover damages they incurred 
both prior to and subsequent to their exercise of the option. The 
trial court found in favor of the developers. Id. at 623. The Utah 
" Appellants proffered evidence showing interest costs of 
$258,092 on this loan. (TR. 960-63). 
Supreme Court affirmed, but reduced the amount recoverable since the 
developer's preparation of final architectural and engineering plans 
was not reasonably foreseeable "prior to the time the option was 
exercised," ^d. at 625. 
Unlike the developers in Ranch Homesf the damages sought by 
Appellants included only interest costs incurred after the execution 
of the Contract. This is not an option case; this was a completed 
sale with development underway. The costs were reasonably 
foreseeable by Respondents, who always knew and understood 
Appellants intended to develop the Property and construct 
improvements. (TR. 50-51). In fact, Respondents agreed to pay a 
pro-rata cost for use of some of the improvements. (Ex. D-14, Ex. 
D-15f Add. 71). It was foreseeable Appellants would incur interest 
costs as a natural and probable consequence of Respondents1 material 
breach, and the court erred in excluding this evidence. Therefore, 
the court should be instructed on remand to consider the amount of 
interest paid upon this loan in determining Appellants' damages. 
Christensen v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 21 Utah 2d 194, 443 P.2d 385 
(1968). 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING APPELLANTS GRANTED AN 
EASEMENT OVER THE ROADWAY TO RESPONDENTS. 
The court held Respondents and "owners and purchasers" of the 
unplatted property held a "non-exclusive appurtenant easement" (that 
"ran with the land") "for utilities and for access to and the right 
to use as a means for ingress and egress for vehicular and 
pedestrian access over, under and across" the Roadway. (C. 11 11, 
Add. 40). According to the court, this easement was created by the 
Respondents1 "execution of the Consent to Record and the subsequent 
recordation of the final plat and the CCRs." (^ d.) As a fundamental 
part of its ruling the trial court expressly found that the 
Respondents, by their own conduct as trust deed beneficiaries/ 
created an easement in favor of themselves. The court determined 
that Respondents1 signing of the Consent to Record and "allowing its 
recording, together with the CCRs, "created nonexclusive easements 
or covenants running with the land in the owners of the lots to the 
use of the roadway, water line and sewer system. (R. 1651, Add. 52, 
emphasis added). 
Respondents asserted no claims in their pleadings or at trial 
for this declaration. The Respondents claimed no easement by 
necessity, nor would the evidence support such a claim since 
Respondents1 own property, abutting the unplatted property, can be 
accessed from an adjacent county road. (TR. 59). The court's 
gratuitous finding of an easement in favor of Respondents is 
contrary to law and not supported by the evidence. 
1. As A Matter Of Law, Respondents Could Not Create An 
Easement In Favor Of Themselves, 
Only the fee simple owner of real property may create an 
easement. Hollabaugh v. Kolbert, 604 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Wyo. 1980). 
At the closing in July 1981, Respondents conveyed fee title to 
Appellants without reservation of an easement. (Ex. D-17, Add. 
83). When Respondents subsequently executed the Consent to Record 
in November 1983, they were merely beneficiaries of the Trust Deed 
given by Appellants to secure payment of the purchase price. 
Appellants, the absolute fee owners of the Property, did not sign 
the Consent to Record. (See Ex. D-7, Add. 67). The court 
erroneously focused on Respondents1 conduct, although only 
Appellants could grant the easement. ^d. Respondents could not 
have conveyed an easement to themselves since they were not the fee 
owners. 
2. The Consent To Record Does Not Create An Easement In Favor 
Of Respondents And Evidences No Intention To Do So. 
Whether an easement is created depends upon the intent of the 
parties as expressed in the documents executed by them, taken as a 
whole. Labrum v. Richenback, 711 P.2d 225, 227 (Utah 1985); 
Chournos v. D'Angillo, 642 P.2d 710, 712 (Utah 1982) Creason v. 
Peterson, 24 Utah 2d 305, 470 P.2d 403, 405 (1970). 
The Consent to Record evidences no intent to create an 
easement. The document was not signed by the Appellants, the fee 
owners. It contains no "granting" language—/ purporting to convey 
any interest to anyone. No easement or access right is even 
mentioned. The Consent to Record repeats verbatim the boundary 
description of White Pine Ranches Phase I shown on the Plat but it 
does nothing else. (Compare Ex. D-7, Add. 67; with Ex. D-l, Add. 
59). Respondents had no authority from Appellants as owners to 
grant themselves an easement. 
The purpose of the Consent to Record was not to create an 
easement. Under the Closing Memorandum, the final plat and CCRs 
required the reasonable approval of Respondents. (Ex. 15, K 5, Add. 
72). Respondents own real property adjacent to the Property, and 
were concerned about the quality and extent to which the Property 
z o
 See Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-1-12 (warranty deeds) and 57-1-13 
(quit claim deeds). See also the strange acknowledgement at the end 
of the so-called Consent. The Consent and its acknowledgement make 
no sense. The Consent was apparently prepared by Heaton who at 
various times represented both parties. 
would be developed, (TR. 138, 744). They had received earlier 
offers to develop the Property but did not like the nature of the 
developments proposed. (TR. 744). Thus, the purpose of paragraph 5 
was to evidence Respondents1 approval of the nature and extent of 
Appellants1 development of the Property and nothing else. 
3. The Declaration Of Protective Covenants Did Not Create An 
Easement In Favor Of Respondent« 
As a part of the platting process. Appellants recorded the 
CCRs. (Ex. D-51, Add. 91, 92). The CCRs apply to "Phase I" of White 
Pine Ranches — i.e., Lots 1 through 6 and the Roadway but not the 
unplatted property. (Ex. D-51, Add. 91-92). 
References to easements and to the Roadway are collected in 
Articles XI and XII of the CCRs. (Ex. 51, Add. 112-15). No 
easements are granted to Respondents therein. To the contrary, the 
CCRs provide that 
11.2 Easements Reserved: Easements over the Lots and 
common area properties for the installation and 
maintenance of electric, telephone, cable television, 
water, gas and sanitary sewer lines, water wells, private 
streets, water reservoir, private pathways, drainage 
facilities, and street entrance ways as shown on the 
recorded tract map of the properties, other documents of 
record or existing prior to October 30, 1983 are hereby 
reserved by Declarant, together with the right to grant 
and transfer the same. 
(Ex. D-51, Add. 113, emphasis added). The CCRs unequivocally 
identify the "Declarant" to whom the foregoing easements are 
reserved "as the persons executing" the CCRs — i.e., the 
Appellants. (Id,., Add. 92). 
The CCRs further dedicate the Roadway (White Pine Lane) for 
restricted private use of the "owners" of Lots 1 through 6. (Id., 
Add. 114). However, the Respondents are not "owners" under the CCRs 
(Ex. P-51, Add. 92), and, therefore received no easement or other 
rights by reason of the CCRs. 
4. Contrary To The Court's Ruling, There Is No Evidence That 
An Easement Was Created By The "Mutual Intent And 
Agreement" Of The Parties, 
The court ruled that: 
The evidence has established that the parties by both 
mutual intent and agreement granted to the [Respondents] 
the use of the roadway, Exhibits 25 and 25A, which 
agreement was later memorialized and recorded in the 
Consent to Record, Exhibit 7. Access to the unreleased 
and unpaid for land was intended to be given to the 
[Respondents] in case of default and this Court so 
determines. 
(R. 1651, Add. 53). But, the court's reliance on Exhibits 25 and 
25(a) is misplaced. These documents do not evidence a mutual intent 
to create the easement claimed by Respondents. 
Exhibits 25 and 25A are copies of a letter dated November 18, 
1983, written by Heaton to John Sharp, one of the Respondents. The 
letter addressed the Consent to Record transmitted with it. Saying 
nothing whatsoever about an easement, Mr. Heaton told Mr. Sharp in 
this letter that "[his] signature on the enclosed consent document 
only acknowledges your approval of [Mr. Saunder's] recording the 
plat and the [CCRs], copy here enclosed." (Id). In the letter, 
Heaton also told Mr. Sharp that: 
By Hy's signature, which I will obtain to this letter 
prior to releasing your consent to the recordation of the 
subdivision plat, he agrees that you continue to have your 
right of approval with regard to how the southern portion 
of the property is platted. 
(Ex. 25, Add. 85; Ex. 25A) . At the bottom of the letter, Heaton 
placed the following signature block: 
"Approved: 
By 
The letter was never signed by Saunders or any other Appellant. 
(Tr. 372). 
Heaton also told Mr. Sharp that Hy Saunders (one of the 
Appellants) intended to seek a "release of Lots 1 through 5 of the 
platted subdivision along with his road (White Pine Lane)." (Ex. 
25f Add. 85; Ex. 25A). More importantly, Heaton unequivocally told 
Mr. Sharp he had "reviewed the payments under the Note" and found 
that Saunders "is entitled to those releases." Id. Heaton also 
stated: 
When those releases [Lots 1 through 5 and the Roadway] are 
madef pursuant to your instruction we will insure that 
rights are reserved in White Pine Lane for access for the 
southern portions of the property purchased from you until 
your Deed of Trust is fully paid. 
(Id.) 
Obviously lacking authority to grant such access rights, Heaton 
delivered the letter to Saunders, who in turn delivered it to Felton 
for his review. (TR. 162). By letter dated November 21, 1983, Felton 
rejected the idea of creating an easement in favor of Respondents 
along the Roadway (White Pine Lane) and objected to the scope of the 
access rights Heaton proposed. (Compare Ex. 25, Add. 85 with 
Ex. D-26A, Add. 86). Admittedly, Felton discussed an access right 
over White Pine Lane, albeit one limited to "access to Lot 6 on the 
north half of the property." In contrast, however, Heaton1s letter 
contemplated much broader "access to the southern portions of the 
property purchased from [Respondents]" — i.e., to all the unplatted 
property. (Ex. 25, Add. 85). Yet, none of the Appellants ever signed 
Exhibit 25 or 25A nor. did Appellants otherwise authorize the 
statements Heaton made therein. (TR. 372). 
No document granting an easement or access rights of any scope 
to Respondents was ever prepared or recorded. Nevertheless, the 
court, relying solely on Heaton's letter (Exhibit 25), determined an 
easement had been granted to Respondents over the Roadway for access 
to the unplatted property by the "mutual intent and agreement of the 
parties"- (R. 1651, Add- 53). 
This ruling, however, ignores the fact that Heaton's letter was 
subject to at least two wholly unfulfilled conditions: (1) Saunders 
(or other Appellants) signing the letter; and (2) Respondents1 
release of Lots 1 through 5 and the Roadway. Respondents1 failure 
to fulfill these conditions precludes Respondents' assertion that 
any easement or access rights were given to them. 
It is settled law that parties to a contract may, by mutual 
consent, alter all or any portion of a contract by agreeing to its 
modification. Rapp v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 
606 P.2d 1189, 1191 (Utah 1980); Provo City Corp. v. Nielson Scott 
Co., 603 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1979). But, the Closing Memorandum 
expressly states that it "may not be orally changed, modified, or 
terminated, except in writing, by the party against whom the same is 
sought to be enforced." (Ex. D-15 11 10, Add. 74). Since the 
Contract was for the sale of real property, any modification of the 
Contract was governed by Utah's Statute of Frauds. Utah Code Ann. § 
25-5-3 (1953, as amended). Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Manta, 699 
P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1985); Strevell-Patterson Co., Inc. v. Francis, 
646 P.2d 741, 742 (Utah 1982); Zions Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 
P.2d 1319, 1322 (Utah 1975). No written memorandum or contract, 
however, was ever executed or agreed to by the parties satisfying 
the Statute of Frauds. 
Even assuming Felton1s letter grants access rights to 
Respondents (which it does not), the letter does not satisfy the 
Statute of Frauds because it was not executed by the other 
Appellants who owned the property jointly with Felton. (Ex. 
P-46). Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421, 423 (Utah 1986). The 
court made no finding that Felton had authority to modify the 
Contract on behalf of the other parties thereto or on behalf of 
those Appellants who acquired the property from such parties. 
Therefore, no easement or access rights were ever granted to 
Respondents. I_d. The district court's conclusion that the Contract 
was modified to grant access rights to Respondents was in error. 
Co THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING RESPONDENTS' ATTORNEYS' 
FEES. 
The district court held that Appellants "are responsible to pay 
attorneys1 fees to [Respondents]" (R. 1651, p. 8-9), and that an 
award of $144,469.75 is reasonable. (C. 11 29, Add. 44; R. 1370, 
Add. 3; R. 1401). This award includes every single hour claimed by 
Respondents' attorneys, except those fees "attributable to 
examination of [a] potential . . . malpractice [claim] against 
[Heaton]." (R. 1640, p. 67-69). The court also ruled Respondents 
are entitled to augment this amount for post-trial proceedings, and, 
if necessary, "after prevailing on appeal." (_Id.) These rulings 
are not supported by evidence or law. 
1. Respondents Materially Breached The Contract And, 
Therefore, Are Not Entitled To An Award Of Attorneys' 
Fees, 
Attorneys1 fees may be awarded only if provided for by contract 
or statute. Golden Key, 699 P.2d at 734 (Utah 1984); Turtle 
Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 
1982). The Closing Memorandum provided that "the defaulting party 
shall pay all expenses . . . arising out of the breach or default 
thereof." (Ex. 15, 11 11, Add. 74). Respondents materially breached 
the Contract and, thus, are the defaulting party. (See Section 
VIII. A.3, supra, p. 18-20). Therefore, the court erred in awarding 
attorneys' fees to Respondents. 
2. The Award Of Attorneys1 Fees To Respondents Is Contrary To 
The Contract And Wholly Unreasonable. 
An "award of attorneys' fees is allowed only in accordance with 
the terms of the contract." Turtle Management, Inc., 645 P. 2d at 
671 (emphasis added); Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 714 P.2d 1149, 1150 
(Utah 1986); Traynor v. Gushing, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984). A 
"prevailing party" may not recover attorneys' fees unless the 
contract expressly provides for such recovery. Traynor, 688 P.2d at 
858; see, e.g., Faulkner, 714 P.2d at 1151 ("the contractual 
language does not award attorneys' fees to the prevailing party who 
succeeds in enforcing the agreement, but against the defaulting 
party whose default necessitates enforcement"). The award must also 
be reasonable. Associated Developments, Inc. v. Jewkes, 701 P. 2d 
486, 488 (Utah 1984); Traynor, 688 P.2d at 858; Turtle Management, 
Inc., 645 P.2d at 671. 
The court's award of attorneys' fees to Respondents is not 
allowed under the documents comprising the Contract. None of the 
documents contain a "prevailing party" provision. (See Ex. D-2, Add. 
62; Ex. D-3, Add. 64; Ex. D-15, Add. 74). The Closing Memorandum 
only provides that "the defaulting party shall pay all expenses 
. . . arising out of the breach or default thereof." (Ex. D-15, 
11 11, Add. 74). The Closing Memorandum contains no covenants for the 
payment of taxes or principal installments, which the court 
determined Appellants breached. Those covenants are found only in 
the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note. Thus, the award of attorneys' 
fees cannot be based upon a "breach" or "default" of the Closing 
Memorandum. 
The only remaining documents even mentioning attorneys' fees 
are the Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed. (Ex. D-2, Add. 62; Ex. D-3, 
Add. 64). The Trust Deed provides that the Respondents are entitled 
to recover, in a foreclosure, "all costs and expenses incident 
thereto." (Ex. D-2, 1[ 16f Add. 62). The Trust Deed Note provides 
that if it must be collected by an attorney after default, the 
Appellants "agree to pay all costs and expenses of collection, 
including reasonable attorneys' fees." (Ex. 3, Add. 64 emphasis 
added). 
Respondents cannot, as a matter of law, recover attorneys' fees 
if such fees are incurred in matters unrelated to the Respondents' 
foreclosure action. Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168, 171 (Utah 
1977); Utah Farm Production Credit Association v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62, 
66 (Utah 1981). Even if Respondents are entitled to attorneys' fees 
related to the foreclosure, the court made no finding concerning the 
amount of fees strictly related to the foreclosure of the Trust 
Deed.—/ The Respondents, therefore, should not be entitled to 
ZD
 Absent such a finding, which is required pursuant to Rule 
52(a), Utah R. Civ. P., the district court's decision awarding 
attorneys' fees must be vacated. Parks v. Zions First National 
Bank, 673 P.2d 590, 601 (Utah 1983) (failure of trial court to enter 
adequate findings require judgment to be vacated). 
recover attorneys1 fees at all in a foreclosure action upon property 
they failed to release pursuant to the Contract. 
Moreover, there is no evidence to support the conclusion that 
the amount of attorneys1 fees awarded to Respondents is reasonable. 
See Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Association, 657 P.2d 
1279, 1287 (Utah 1982) ("it is well established that to justify a 
finding of reasonable attorneys1 fees, there must be evidence in 
support of that finding"). See Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 
485 P.2d 1044, 1046 (1971) (absent evidence of reasonableness, 
attorneys1 fees should not be awarded).—/ 
In determining the reasonableness of the award, the court 
relied upon the Affidavits of Donald J. Winder filed in support of 
Respondents1 request for attorneys1 fees. (R. 713-805, 1218-1239, 
1251-1260, and 1276-79). Mr. Winder, one of Respondents1 lawyers, 
merely recited that his firm's services were "reasonably necessary" 
for the development of the case and the protection of Respondents1 
rights, and that the rates charged are "reasonable and in accordance 
with those rates generally charged by attorneys in this area for 
similar services." (^d). The court's reliance on this self-serving 
opinion was improper and cannot support an award of attorneys' 
fees. Paul Mueller Co., 657 P.2d at 1287 (court's reliance on 
statement of prevailing party's counsel does not provide adequate 
evidentiary basis for awarding attorneys' fees). Sharp v. Hui 
Wahine, Ins., 49 Haw. 247, 413 P.2d 242, 246-47 (1966) (reliance on 
counsel's self-serving opinions to show reasonableness of attorneys' 
z/
 It was Respondents' burden to show by a preponderance of 
evidence that the fees they claim are reasonable, Sharp, 413 P.2d at 
246, and they failed to do so. 
fees is not good practice and insufficient to support an award of 
attorneys1 fees). Since, as a matter of law, Mr. Winder's opinion 
alone is insufficient to support the court's conclusion that its 
award of attorneys1 fees was reasonable, the court erred in making 
the award. 
3. The District Court Erred In Awarding Post-Judgment 
Attorneys' Fees, 
The district court also awarded attorneys' fees to Respondents 
for post-judgment work, including this appeal. (C. 11 29, Add. 44). 
None of the operative documents comprising the Contract provide for 
the recovery of attorneys' fees after judgment or on appeal. Absent 
an agreement or statute awarding attorneys' fees on appeal, the 
allowance of such fees is improper. Ohio Realty Investment Corp. v. 
Southern Bank of W. Palm Beach, 300 So.2d 679 (Fla. 1974) ("to hold 
otherwise would place an unwarranted penalty on the prosecution of 
an appeal by a mortgagor"); Vantage Broadcasting Co. v. Wint Radio, 
496 So.2d 969 (Fla. App. 1986). Because the Contract contains no 
express provision allowing recovery of attorneys' fees on appeal, 
the court's award of such fees is in error. 
D. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THE ORDER WAS WRONGFULLY 
ISSUED. 
The court erred in concluding that the temporary restraining 
order, issued by the Honorable Judith Billings, was wrongful. 
(C. 11 32, Add. 45). Because Respondents' breach preceded any 
breach of Appellants, the temporary restraining order could not 
have been wrongfully issued. (See VIII.A.3., supra, p. 18-20). 
In addition to this argument, Appellants adopt the arguments 
asserted in the Brief of Surety/Appellant, Commissioner of Financial 
Institutions, dated July 19, 1989, except Appellants do not adopt 
part IV therein. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the decision of the district court 
and order that Respondents, not Appellants, breached the Contract. 
Respondents should be ordered to specifically perform the Contract 
by reconveying Lot 6, the Roadway and the 7.35 acres to Appellants. 
The Court should decree that all interest on the unpaid balance of 
the Trust Deed Note is tolled from January 20, 1984 until the 
reconveyances are made, and that all principal payments remaining 
under the Trust Deed are excused pending the reconveyances. In 
addition, the case should be remanded to the district court to 
conduct further proceedings to determine Appellants' damages, 
including attorneys1 fees, in accordance with the instructions of 
this Court. Any lesser relief from this Court will not remedy the 
harsh and inequitable decision of the trial court or correct its 
fundamental errors in reaching that decision. 
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WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES, a 
Utah general partnership, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN C. SHARP, and GERALDINE 
Y. SHARP; ASSOCIATED TITLE 
COMPANY, as Trustee, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
JOHN C. SHARP, and GERALDINE 
Y. SHARP, 
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROBERT FELTON, LEON H. 
SAUNDERS; J. RICHARD REES; 
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT 
CORPORATION, a Utah corpora-
tion; KENNETH R. NORTON dba 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C87-1621 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
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INTERSTATE RENTALS, INC., 
and PAUL H. LANDES, indivi-
dually? WHITE PINE RANCHES, 
a Utah general partnership, 
and WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES, 
a Utah general partnership, 
Counterclaim-Defendants. 
This cause came on for trial before the Honorable 
J. Dennis Frederick on January 28, 1988 through January 29, 
1988 and March 22, 1988 through March 25, 1988, with the de-
fendants John C. and Geraldine Y. Sharp (hereinafter the 
••Sharps") appearing by counsel Donald J. Winder, Kathy A- F. 
Davis and Tamara K. Prince, the latter being admitted pro hac 
vice, and plaintiffs White Pine Ranches, White Pine Enter-
prises, Leon H. Saunders (hereinafter "Saunders"), Robert 
Felton (hereinafter "Felton"), J. Richard Rees and Saunders 
Land Investment Corporation appearing by counsel Robert M. 
Anderson, Glen D. Watkins and Mark R. Gaylord. Counterclaim 
defendant Kenneth R. Norton ("Norton") appeared through his 
counsel John B. Anderson, only to introduce a Stipulation and 
Indemnification Agreement between plaintiffs and counterclaim 
defendant Norton. Defendant Associated Title was never served 
in this action. Counterclaim defendant Paul H. Landes (here-
inafter "Landes") was never served in this action. 
Having heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DE-
CREED that plaintiffs1 Complaint be dismissed, no cause of 
action. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
Saunders, Felton, Interstate Rentals, Inc. and Norton are in-
debted, jointly and severally, to the Sharps in the following 
amounts: 
a. i. Principal: $ 371,739.35 
ii. Interest through 
March 22, 1988: $ 171,033.54 
iii. Late payment charge: $ 14,869.57 
TOTAL: $ 557,642.46 
together with interest thereon at the per diem rate of 
$183.32 from and after March 22, 1988. 
b. i. Trusteed fees: $ 1,803.80 
ii. Court Costs: $ 
iii. Attorneys' fees through 
August 31, 1988: $ 144,469.75 
together with interest thereon at the rate of 10% per 
annum from the date of expenditure by the Sharps until 
paid by plaintiffs. 
c. Delinquent property taxes: $ 20,368.62 
together with interest and penalties assessed thereon as 
provided by law, property taxes accruing for 1988, and 
post-judgment interest thereon at the rate of 12% per 
annum. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this 
Judgment shall be supplemented and augmented in the amount of 
the Sharps' reasonable attorney's fees as established by affi-
davit and as incurred after August 31, 1988 in preparation of 
the Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, in responding to any 
post-trial motions, in collecting said Judgment by execution 
or otherwise, and after prevailing in any appeal, 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Temporary Restraining Order entered in the above captioned 
matter by the Honorable Judith M. Billings on September 4, 
1986 was wrongfully issued and it is hereby lifted and dis-
solved. The Sharps are hereby awarded judgment against the 
bond posted by plaintiffs with the Summit County Clerk in Sep-
tember 1986 in the amount of $2,400.00 and against the secur-
ity posted by Tracy Collins Bank with the Clerk of this Court 
in the amount of $50,000. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Lot 6 as 
described in the final recorded plat of White Pine Ranches 
Phase I and the unplatted property more particularly described 
on Exhibit "A" attached hereto or such portions thereof as may 
be sufficient to pay the amounts found to be due and owing 
under this Judgment, together with interest as set forth here-
inabove and accrued costs herein, and expenses of sale, be 
sold at public auction by the Sheriff of Summit County, State 
of Utah, in the manner prescribed by law for such sales; that 
said Sheriff, if and when the subject premises are sold by 
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him, out of the proceeds of such sale shall retain first his 
costs, disbursements and commission, and then pay to the 
Sharps, or to their attorneys, the accrued and accruing costs 
of this action, then said sums for the Sharps1 attorneys1 
fees, and the amount owing to the Sharps for principal, in-
terest, costs and expenses of sale and maintenance, taxes, 
assessments and/or insurance premiums, together with accrued 
interest thereon, or so much of said sums as said proceeds 
will pay, and that the surplus, if any, shall be accounted for 
and paid over to the Clerk of this Court subject to this 
Court's further order. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that all per-
sons having an interest in the subject premises shall have the 
right, upon producing satisfactory proof of interest, to re-
deem the same within the time provided by law for such redemp-
tion; that from and after the expiration of the period of re-
demption as provided by law, that the plaintiffs above named, 
and each of them, and all persons claiming by, through or un-
der them, or any of them, shall be forever barred and fore-
closed of all right, title, interest and estate in and to the 
subject premises, and that from and after the delivery of the 
Sheriff's Deed to the subject premises that the grantees named 
therein be given possession thereof. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that if a 
deficiency results after due and proper application of the 
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proceeds of such Sheriff's Sale, the Sharps are hereby awarded 
a personal judgment against Saunders, Felton, Norton and 
Interstate Rentals, Inc., and each of them, jointly and sev-
erally, for the full amount of such deficiency. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Sharps shall have the right, at their request, to one connec-
tion to both plaintiffs' culinary water and sewer systems on 
White Pine Ranches Phase I for a connection fee of $2,000 
each. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that a non-
exclusive appurtenant easement shall run with the land, as a 
covenant running with the land or as an equitable servitude, 
as the case may be, in favor of and for the use and benefit of 
the unplatted acreage described on Exhibit HA" attached hereto 
and incorporated herein by reference and the owners and pur-
chasers thereof (including the Sharps) and their invitees, 
guests, heirs and successors in interest, for utilities and 
for access to and the right to use as a means for ingress and 
egress for vehicular and pedestrian access over, under and 
across the private roadway (White Pine Lane) shown on the re-
corded final plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I, recorded with 
the Summit County Recorder, and a non-exclusive appurtenant 
easement to run with the land, as a covenant running with the 
land or as an equitable servitude, as the case may be, in 
favor of and for the use and benefit of White Pine Ranches 
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Phase I and the owners and purchasers thereof (including the 
Sharps) and their heirs and successors in interest for water 
lines, water tank and water systems over, under and across the 
subject premises near the southwest corner of the unplatted 
acreage as also shown on the final recorded plat of White Pine 
Ranches Phase I. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
final plat and Declaration of Protective Covenants recorded 
for White Pine Ranches Phase I with the Summit County Record-
er's Office and the non-exclusive easements set forth above 
shall remain in full force and effect, and not be affected by 
the foreclosure ordered herein, a purchase at the Sheriff's 
Sale, or a subsequent redemption of the subject premises, 
other than a complete redemption thereof by the plaintiffs 
herein coupled with plaintiffs' declaration for the ex-
tinguishment of the non-exclusive easement in favor of the 
unplatted acreage. 
Beginning a t a point South 89 degrees 43 , 35 \West along the 
North l i n e of Lot 3, 175.42 f e e t from the corner of Lots 1 
and 8, a brass cap s e t by the U.S. General Land Office, sa id 
bras s cap a l so being South 00 degrees 19 ,4 6tt West along 
s e c t i o n l i n e 133 6.14 fee t from the Northeast, corner of 
S e c t i o n 1, Township 2 South, Range 3 East, Salt LaXe Base 
and Meridian; and running thence South 89 degrees 43 !36" 
West along the North l i n e of Lot 7 and 8 2948.98 f e e t to the 
Northwest corner of Lot 7; thence South 00 degrees 13 l29 I f 
East a long the West l i n e of Lot 7, 1312.34 feet to the • 
Southwest* corner of Lot 7; thence North 89 degrees 47'41" 
East along the South l ine of Lot 7, 332.67 feet; thence 
North 61 degrees OO'OO11 East 1956.90 f e e t ; thence North 47 
degrees 33 !15" East 462.75 f e e t ; thence North 42 degrees 
44 MO" East 35.63 feet to the point of beginning. 
LESS am excepting White Pine Banches, Phase I , a Planned Pesidential 
Development, according to the official plat thereof on f i le and of 
record in the Summit County Becorderfs Office/ State of Utah. 
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Donald J. Winder, Esq. (#3519) 
Kathy A. F. Davis, Esq. (#4022) 
Tamara K. Prince, Esq. (#5224) 
WINDER & HASLAM 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendants Sharps 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LEON H. SAUNDERS; ROBERT 
FELTON; J. RICHARD REES; 
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT 
CORPORATION, a Utah corpora-
tion; WHITE PINE RANCHES, 
a Utah general partnership; 
WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES, a 
Utah general partnership, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN C. SHARP, and GERALDINE 
Y. SHARP; ASSOCIATED TITLE 
COMPANY, as Trustee, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
JOHN C. SHARP, and GERALDINE 
Y. SHARP, 
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROBERT FELTON; LEON H. 
SAUNDERS; J. RICHARD REES; 
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT 
CORPORATION, a Utah corpora-
tion; KENNETH R. NORTON dba 
INTERSTATE RENTALS, INC., 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C87-1621 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
nm.ioi; 
and PAUL H. LANDES, indivi-
dually; WHITE PINE RANCHES, 
a Utah general partnership, 
and WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES, 
a Utah general partnership, 
Counterclaim-Defendants. 
This cause came on for trial before the Honorable 
J. Dennis Frederick on January 28, 1988 through January 29, 
1988 and March 22, 1988 through March 25, 1988, with the de-
fendants John C. and Geraldine Y. Sharp (hereinafter the 
"Sharps") appearing by counsel Donald J. Winder, Kathy A. F. 
Davis and Tamara K. Prince, the latter being admitted pro hac 
vice, and plaintiffs White Pine Ranches, White Pine Enter-
prises, Leon H. Saunders (hereinafter "Saunders"), Robert 
Felton (hereinafter "Felton"), J. Richard Rees and Saunders 
Land Investment Corporation appearing by counsel Robert M. 
Anderson, Glen D. Watkins and Mark R. Gaylord. Counterclaim 
defendant Kenneth R. Norton ("Norton") appeared through his 
counsel John B. Anderson, only to introduce a Stipulation and 
Indemnification Agreement between plaintiffs and counterclaim 
defendant Norton. Defendant Associated Title was never served 
in this action. Counterclaim defendant Paul H. Landes (here-
inafter "Landes") was never served in this action. 
The Court, having heard the testimony of witnesses, hav-
ing reviewed and received exhibits, having heard the arguments 
of counsel, having received stipulations of counsel, having 
reviewed memoranda presented by counsel, having presented its 
oral ruling on the issues involved in the case on March 30, 
1988, and for good cause appearing, hereby makes and enters 
the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about December 9, 1980, Leon H. Saunders, 
Robert Felton, Norton and Paul H. Landes entered into an Ear-
nest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase (hereinafter "Earnest 
Money") with the Sharps for the purchase of certain real prop-
erty located in White Pine Canyon, Snyderville, Summit County, 
State of Utah (hereinafter "the Subject Property"). (Exhibit 
14). 
2. Plaintiffs' "development plans presently anticipated 
12 to 15 four-acre to five-acre lots" and the Earnest Money 
provided "such plans shall be subject to the reasonable 
approval of Seller [the Sharps]." 
3. The Earnest Money also provided, inter alia; 
At a time desired by Seller, Purchaser 
shall allow Seller to hook into the 
culinary water system and sewer system 
developed by Purchaser on the subject 
Property at the same per-hook-up price 
charged by Purchaser to the buyers of 
lots developed on the subject Property. 
4. The plaintiffs acted upon the understanding that be-
fore Summit County would approve any planned development, 
they, as the developer, must provide to Summit County for 
approval an environmental impact statement, a plat map and, if 
a planned residential development, a declaration of protective 
covenants. The Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement District 
("SBSID") required all sewer design improvements be approved 
and construction must receive final approval. 
-3-
nn1ooj 
5. Plaintiffs wanted to promptly develop the Subject 
Property and anticipated the approval process would be com-
pleted by June, 1981. 
6. Prior to closing the transaction which was the sub-
ject of the Earnest Money, a Shared Water System Cost Estimate 
was prepared for Saunders by J, J. Johnson & Associates, engi-
neers in Park City, The Estimate proposed two alternatives 
wherein 15 units at Saunders Ranch (subsequently White Pine 
Ranches), known herein as the "Subject Property", develop a 
water system sufficient for its needs and the needs of various 
adjacent properties in order to provide users of the water 
system an economy of scale resulting in lower water system 
costs to each user. (Exhibit 105). Although considered by 
him, Saunders never adopted any of these proposals. 
7. In April, 1981, an Environmental Impact Statement 
(hereinafter "EIS") was prepared by J. J. Johnson for Saunders 
Land Investment Corporation concerning development of the Sub-
ject Property and was delivered to the Sharps prior to clos-
ing. (Exhibit 67). 
8. The EIS provided the "sewer system will be connected 
to the Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement District and a line 
extension agreement with the Sewer Improvement District will 
be signed." The EIS also provided two alternative water stor-
age systems for the development on the Subject Property which 
would be available to other proposed developments, including 
Ranch Place and Landmark Plaza, as well. The EIS further pro-
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vided that the internal traffic circulation in the subject 
project would be via private road. 
9. In April 1981, Felton, Norton, Saunders and Landes 
operated under the assumed name of White Pine Ranches. 
(Plaintiffs1 Complaint, M l and 5). 
10. Thereafter, on or about July 16, 1981, the parties 
closed the sale of the Subject Property through the execution 
of a Memorandum of Closing Terms (Exhibit 15) executed by 
Saunders, Felton, Norton, Landes and the Sharps; a Special 
Warranty Deed (Exhibit 17) executed by the Sharps and convey-
ing the title to the Subject Property to Landes, Felton, 
Saunders and Interstate Rentals, Inc.; a Trust Deed Note ex-
ecuted by Felton, Saunders, Landes, Norton and Interstate 
Rentals, Inc. by its president, Norton, in the amount of 
$963,055.30, together with an addendum to the Trust Deed Note 
(Exhibit 3) outlining the schedule of payments, and a Trust 
Deed covering the Subject Property executed by Saunders, 
Landes, Felton and Interstate Rentals, Inc. by its president, 
Norton, and securing the Trust Deed Note (Exhibit 2) (herein-
after collectively referred to as "the Closing Documents"). 
11. A partnership agreement establishing White Pine 
Ranches was executed September 25, 1982 with Felton, Saunders, 
Dan Hunter and J. Richard Rees as general partners. (Exhibit 
49). Saunders Land Investment Corporation subsequently as-
sumed and bought out the interest of Dan Hunter in the White 
Pine Ranches partnership. 
~
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12. On June 30, 1982 White Pine Ranches and Howells In-
vestment executed a Partnership Agreement of White Pine Enter-
prises for the purposes of "investing in, managing, leasing, 
developing, subdividing and selling unimproved real estate 
(Exhibit 48) described on Exhibit 'A1 attached" thereto, which 
unimproved real estate was the approximately 27 southern acres 
of the Subject Property that was never platted. 
13. Both partnerships, White Pine Ranches and White Pine 
Enterprises, are general partnerships. 
14. Preliminary plats (Exhibits 18 and 19) of the Sub-
ject Property were prepared by J. J. Johnson & Associates for 
the development prior to closing, but were modified by plain-
tiffs because the County Commission was opposed to the private 
road concept. (Exhibit 109). These preliminary plats were 
not approved prior to closing because the County Attorney 
would not approve a private road system (Exhibit 114). A new 
plat was prepared for White Pine Ranches, a Planned Unit De-
velopment ("PUD") and attached as Exhibit "A" to the Memo-
randum of Closing Terms. This Exhibit "A" to the Memorandum 
of Closing Terms platted all of the Subject Property and was 
initialed by all the parties thereto except Felton. (Exhibit 
20). 
15. Paragraph 1 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms (Ex-
hibit 15) provided as follows: 
1. It is mutually agreed and 
understood that after recordation of 
the PUD Plat and the Declaration of 
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions, 
and upon receipt of each $140,000.00 in 
principal (but not including the 
earnest money and down payment money), 
Seller shall execute and deliver to 
Buyer a Partial Deed of Reconveyance 
for one (1) PUD lot. (Emphasis added.) 
16. Paragraph 2 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms pro-
vided as follows: 
2. Upon the payment of the 
release price, Buyer shall be entitled 
to the release of one (1) lot of Buy-
er's choice upon receipt of the payment 
or at any time thereafter. (Emphasis 
added.) 
17. Paragraph 3 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms pro-
vided as follows: 
3. It is agreed that, at the time 
of execution of this Memorandum, Buyer 
has paid to Seller the sum of 
$620,000.00 which will release from the 
Deed of Trust three (3) PUD lots. Upon 
the recordation of the PUD Plat and 
Declaration of Covenants, Conditions 
and Restrictions with the Summit County 
Recorder, Buyer shall be entitled to 
the release from the Deed of Trust of 
three (3) PUD lots of Buyer's choice 
together with the said roadway. (Em-
phasis added.) 
18. Paragraph 5 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms pro-
vided as follows: 
5. The proposed plat is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A" and by this ref-
erence incorporated herein. Seller 
hereby acknowledges and agrees to exe-
cute as a lienholder the original plat 
prior to recordation. Changes in the 
proposed plat and the Declaration of 
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions 
when prepared shall be subject to the 
reasonable approval of Seller. (Em-
phasis added.) 
19. The proposed plat, Exhibit "A" attached to the Memo-
randum of Closing Terms included a boundary description de-
scribing all of the Subject Property and an Owner's Dedica-
tion. The Owner's Dedication is a standard printed form used 
by J.J. Johnson, parallels dedications used in the city limits 
of Park City and is commonly used in plats to dedicate roads 
to public use, not as a dedication for a private road as orig-
inally contemplated in the EIS. The Owner's Dedication pro-
vides in pertinent part as follows: 
Know all by these present that we the 
undersigned owners of the herein de-
scribed tract of land, having caused 
the same to be subdivided into lots 
and streets to hereafter be known as 
White Pine Ranches Subdivision, do 
hereby dedicate for perpetual use of 
the public all parcels of land shown 
on this plat as intended for public 
use, and do warrant, defend, and save 
the city harmless against any ease-
ments or other encumbrances on the 
dedicated streets which will interfere 
with the city's use, operation, and 
maintenance of the streets and do fur-
ther dedicate the easements as shown. 
(Emphasis added.) 
(Exhibit 20). 
20. Paragraph 6 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms pro-
vided in part as follows: 
6. Seller agrees to grant to Sum-
mit County the ten and one-half (10-
1/2) foot strip of land outlined in 
red on Exhibit "A", Said conveyance 
shall be for the sole purpose of 
widening the County roadway. If pos-
sible, such grant shall be in the form 
of an easement. The County indicates 
that it is possible that the County 
road as it exists is not where it is 
platted. 
21. The County roadway has not been widened, there are no 
current plans to do so, and Summit County has never requested 
such an easement from plaintiffs or the Sharps. (See Exhibit 
107, p. 15; Exhibit 87, p. 8; and Exhibit 34). 
22. Paragraph 7 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms pro-
vided in pertinent part as follows: 
7. Buyer agrees to provide Seller 
with one (1) sewer connection and one 
(1) culinary water connection into Buy-
er's systems at such time as each is 
available, and Seller shall pay a con-
nection fee and service fee equal to 
the pro rata cost to the purchaser of a 
lot in Buyerf s proposed PUD plus any 
charges of Summit Water Distributing 
Company. The sewer and water connec-
tion granted above can be used by Sell-
er in new construction if allowed on 
the 8.5 acre parcel or for connection 
to the existing residence of Seller.... 
(Emphasis added.) 
23. Subsequent to closing, attorney Jon Heaton represent-
ed Saunders in continuing plaintiffs' attempts, begun prior to 
closing, to obtain County approval of a private road for the 
development. (Exhibit 127). 
24. Before signing the Closing Documents, on June 16, 
1981 and subsequently on November 1, 1983, Plaintiff White 
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Pine Ranches entered into sewer extension agreements with the 
SBSID to install a sewer trunk line up White Pine Canyon pur-
suant to which agreements White Pine Ranches would receive 
reimbursement for their construction costs of the sewer line 
to the development from connection fees charged to third par-
ties connecting to that line: 
Said third parties will be allowed to 
connect to such lines only upon payment 
to the District of the applicable num-
ber of connection fees. The District 
shall retain $100 plus the actual costs 
of construction and inspection from 
each such connection fee and pay the 
balance of each such connection fee to 
Applicant [White Pine Ranches]. 
(Exhibits 80 115(c) and 81 J5C) . 
25. At the time plaintiffs were trying to obtain County 
approval of the development and agreeing to run the sewer line 
to Subject Property, it was anticipated that additional devel-
opments by third parties would occur in the White Pine Canyon 
vicinity, including the development of a ski resort in White 
Pine Canyon and the development of adjoining parcels of land, 
all of which future developments would hook into the sewer 
trunk line plaintiffs were to construct, allowing plaintiffs 
the opportunity to recoup expenditures for the sewer system 
through the connection fees paid pursuant to the provisions of 
the line extension agreements. (Exhibits 104, 105, 107 and 
117). 
26. On June 30, 1982, White Pine Ranches paid the Sharps 
the installment payment of $308,177.69, by check (Exhibit 44) 
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enclosed with a cover letter from Felton stating: "Upon final 
plat approval, we will notify you to obtain the releases for 
the lots and the road as per the contract." (Exhibit 21). 
27. On June 28, 1983 and June 30, 1983, Felton and 
Saunders Land Investment Corporation paid to the Sharps the 
sum of $178,165.23 by two checks in the amount of $71,266.09 
and $106,899.14 respectively. (Exhibit 44). The remaining 
portion of the June 30, 1983 installment payment due from 
plaintiffs, a check from Dan Hunter in the amount of 
$106,849.14 was returned for insufficient funds, resulting in 
a default in the June 30, 19823 installment payment. (Exhibit 
22). 
28. On or about July 19, 1983, while the June 30, 1983 
payment was in default and prior to the recordation of a final 
plat on the Subject Property, Felton wrote a letter to attor-
ney Jon Heaton, inquiring about obtaining a release from the 
Sharps of the road and five lots. The letter further ex-
plained that a final plat had not been recorded because "[a]s 
soon as we file the plat real estate taxes are going to go up 
significantly, which we would like to avoid until we have an 
actual buyer for one of the lots." (Exhibit 23). 
29. On or about September 23, 1983, a Notice of Default 
was filed pursuant to the Trust Deed on the Subject Property 
for the default in the June 30, 1983 payment. (Exhibit 24.) 
30. Plaintiffs made no claim during 1983 that the Sharps 
had breached the Closing Documents. 
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31. On or about November 14, 1983, the June 30, 1983 de-
fault under the Trust Deed was cured with a payment in the sum 
of $118,397.39 from Saunders Land Investment Corporation (Ex-
hibits 4 and 44). 
32. On or about November 18, 1983, attorney Jon Heaton 
sent a letter to the Sharps enclosing for their approval a 
proposed final plat, which was later recorded with Summit 
County (hereinafter the proposed "final plat"), and a Declara-
tion of Protective Covenants (hereinafter "CCRs"), which Dec-
laration was prepared on behalf of Saunders by Heaton and 
which contained covenants, conditions and restrictions for use 
of respecting a portion of the Subject Property by lot owners. 
(Exhibit 25). 
33. The proposed final plat enclosed with the November 18, 
1983 letter did not plat the entire approximately 60 acre par-
cel as originally contemplated in the Earnest Money and the 
Memorandum of Closing Terms, but platted only the northern 
portion of the Subject Property into six PUD lots, leaving the 
southern portion (approximately 27 acres) of the Subject Prop-
erty unplatted (hereinafter the "unplatted acreage"). (Exhib-
it 1). 
34. The proposed final plat included an Owner's Dedica-
tion for a private road in the PUD and delineated the exist-
ence and location of the private road and certain utility 
easements, including easements for water lines, water tank and 
water systems. (Exhibit 1). 
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35. The November 18, 1983 letter from attorney Jon Heaton 
to the Sharps further provided in pertinent part that: 
At a later time in the near future, Hy 
[Saunders] has indicated he will seek 
release of Lots 1 through 5 of the 
platted subdivision along with his road 
(White Pine Lane).... We will handle 
that matter when it is presented.... 
When those releases are made, pursuant 
to your instruction we will insure that 
rights are reserved in White Pine Lane 
for access for the southern portions of 
the property purchased from you until 
your Deed of Trust is fully paid. (Em-
phasis added.) 
(Exhibit 25 and 25a). 
36. On or about November 21, 1983, Felton mailed a letter 
to Jon Heaton regarding the November 18, 1983 letter to John 
Sharp. The letter provided in pertinent part: "It is per-
fectly acceptable to us that he [Mr. Sharp] retain an easement 
over White Pine Lane to the southern part of his property as 
well as to Lot 6 from White Pine Canyon Road up to the western 
boundary of Lot 6." (Exhibit 26). 
37. On or about November 28, 1983, Felton had a telephone 
conversation with attorney Heaton memorialized by notes of 
attorney Heaton in the margin of Feltonfs November 21, 1983 
letter (Exhibit 26). Felton agreed that "access over road 
[White Pine Lane] retained if Sharp develops undeveloped prop-
erty Lots 7-12 White Pine Ranch." (Exhibit 26a). 
38. On or about November 23, 1983, the Sharps authorized 
the recording of a Cancellation of Notice of Default relating 
to the June 30, 1983 payment (Exhibit 27). 
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39. On or about November 23, 1983, the Sharps, in consi-
deration of the agreement of plaintiffs to allow them access 
over the private roadway (White Pine Lane) in the event of 
foreclosure, and pursuant to their right of approval under 
paragraph 5 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms, also executed 
a Consent to Record Phase I of White Pine Ranches, which Con-
sent after setting forth the metes and bounds description of 
Phase I of White Pine Ranches granted: 
[A] non-exclusive easement for water 
lines, water tank and water systems 
over, under and across the property, 
shown here near the southwest corner of 
the subject property, and specifically 
described in the Declaration of Pro-
tective Covenants and reserving unto 
the owners, for granting to the owners 
of adjacent or nearby property, a 
non-exclusive easement for utilities 
and vehicular and pedestrian access 
over the private roadway shown on the 
plat and from the well sites as de-
veloped. (Emphasis added,) 
(Exhibit 51) . As additional consideration for signing the 
Consent to Record, the Sharps permitted the platting of only a 
portion of the Subject Property, 
40. The proposed final plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I 
sent to the Sharps for approval on November 18, 1983 was re-
corded on December 23, 1983 in the office of the Summit County 
Recorder following the execution of the Consent to Record by 
the Sharps. (Exhibit 1). The CCRs were also recorded in the 
office of the Summit County Recorder on December 23, 1983 and 
the Consent to Record was attached as an exhibit thereto. 
(Exhibit 51) . 
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41. After recordation of the final plat, the CCRs and the 
Consent to Record, plaintiffs proceeded with construction of 
the improvements on the Subject Property. However, instead of 
adopting any of the alternatives described in Finding No. 6, 
supra, plaintiffs constructed a small, private water system 
for this development. 
42. On or about January 18, 1984, the Sharps executed a 
direction to the Trustee under the Deed of Trust to release 
from the Deed of Trust Lots 1 through 5 of White Pine Ranches 
(Exhibit 28). 
43. The Partial Reconveyance of Lots 1 through 5 directed 
and authorized by the Sharps, was not prepared by Associated 
Title, the trustee under the Trust Deed, until January 7, 1986 
and was recorded March 26, 1986 (Exhibit 45). No explanation 
of the delay in preparing the Partial Reconveyance was provid-
ed at trial. Plaintiffs, although naming Associated Title as 
a defendant in this action, chose not to serve or pursue and 
question Associated Title for such delay. No other request 
for reconveyance was authorized by the Sharps. 
44. On or about January 20, 1984, Felton sent a letter to 
attorney Heaton expressing astonishment that the deeds to Lots 
1 through 5 had not been received but stating, "I realize that 
the deeds for the road may be difficult to do." (Exhibit 30). 
45. On or about January 17, 1984, Felton sent a letter to 
attorney Heaton requesting the approval by the Sharps of a 
"multi-family development" on the unplatted acreage, "which is 
-15- 001340 
the only way it [the development] will be economically feasi-
ble." (Exhibit 29). A multi-family concept was never adopt-
ed. 
46. Felton testified at trial and affirmed on May 7, 1986 
in a letter sent to the Sharps that the plaintiffs "were in a 
position to prepare and obtain approval of that plat [for the 
unplatted acreage] immediately." (Trial Transcript, p. 110, 
hereinafter "R." 110 and Exhibit 37). 
47. It was the actual practice of plaintiffs and a re-
quirement of paragraph 2 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms to 
make specific requests for the release of specific PUD lots 
from the Sharps after required payments were made and provided 
no defaults existed under the Closing Documents. (R. 334). 
48. Property taxes on the unreleased property (Lot 6 and 
the unplatted acreage) became delinquent pursuant to law on 
November 30, 1984 when plaintiffs failed to pay all of the 
1984 property taxes due on the Subject Property (Stipulation 
of counsel at Trial) in violation of paragraphs 5 and 14 of 
the Trust Deed, which provided in paragraph 5 that the Trustor 
[plaintiffs] agrees "to pay at least 10 days before delinquen-
cy all taxes and assessments affecting said property...." 
(Exhibit 2). 
49. Except for $1,515.24 in property taxes paid on the 
unplatted acreage in 1984, no taxes have been paid on the 
unreleased Subject Property (Lot 6 and the unplatted acreage) 
subsequent to November 30, 1984, and including 1985, 1986 and 
1987 (Stipulation of counsel at Trial), and plaintiffs, there-
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fore, remained in default under the provisions of paragraphs 5 
and 14 of the Trust Deed. 
50. Plaintiffs paid the 1984 installment payment. However, 
on or about June 27, 1985, the Sharps received only a portion 
of the June 30, 1985 installment payment in the form of a 
check from Felton in the amount of $59,709.47 (Exhibit 44). 
51. As a result of plaintiffs' defaults, a Notice of 
Default was recorded on September 16, 1985 covering the Sub-
ject Property as described in the Trust Deed, which descrip-
tion included Lots 1-5. (Exhibit 55). 
52. On or about September 24, 1985, Felton sent a 
letter to Mr. Sharp acknowledging receipt of the September 
1985 Notice of Default and assuring him "every attempt is be-
ing made to resolve the problem...." (Exhibit 31). Felton, 
in his letter made no allegation that the Sharps had slandered 
plaintiffs' title as a result of the inclusion of Lots 1-5 in 
the Notice of Default nor did Felton or any other plaintiff 
allege in 1984 or 1985 any breach of Closing Documents by the 
Sharps. 
53. Significantly, as bearing upon the credibility of 
plaintiffs' arguments is the fact unrebutted that plaintiffs 
made no claims whatsoever of breach by the Sharps until after 
their own admitted breaches of the Closing Documents. (Ex-
hibit 31). 
54. On or about January 10, 1986, Felton wrote a letter 
to Blake G. Heiner of Associated Title Company, the Trustee 
under the Trust Deed, informing him that the Notice of Default 
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(Exhibit 55) and Amended Notice of Sale (Exhibit 56} covering 
the Subject Property included Lots 1 through 5 which were to 
have been released, pursuant to the Sharps1 direction. (Ex-
hibit 57). 
55. In response to Felton's letter (Exhibit 57), Blake 
Heiner for Associated Title Company prepared and recorded an 
Amended Notice of Trustee's Sale against the Subject Property, 
excluding Lots 1 through 5. (Exhibit 58). Other Notices 
filed subsequently against the Subject Property also excluded 
Lots 1 through 5. (Exhibits 3 and 36). 
56. All of the Notices of Default and Notices of 
Trustee's Sale recorded against the Subject Property specif-
ically provided that such Notices are: 
SUBJECT TO Easements, Encroachments, 
Restrictions, Rights-of-Way and matters 
of record enforceable in law (sic) 
equity. 
(Exhibits 5, 36, 55, 56, and 58). 
57. No payment at all was made when the final install-
ment under the Closing Documents was due on June 30, 1986. 
58. The balance owing to the Sharps under the Trust Deed 
Note through March 22, 1988 is $557,642.46, including 
$371,739.35 principal; $23,113.33 interest at 12%; $147,920.21 
default interest at 18%; and $14,869.52 late payment charges 
of 4% on each overdue payment, interest is accruing at a per 
diem rate of $183.32. (Exhibit 122). 
59. Plaintiffs made no written or oral request for the 
release of the roadway or Lot 6 prior to their default in 
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November 1984, when the 1984 property taxes became delinquent, 
and prior to their default in failing to make the entire 1985 
installment payment when due. Plaintiffs' first requests were 
made for such releases on February 27, 1986 and May 7, 1986, 
respectively. (Exhibits 35 and 37). Also for the first time 
in the letter dated February 27, 1986, plaintiffs requested a 
release from the Sharps for 7.5 acres of the unplatted acre-
age, despite the provision in paragraphs 1-3 of the Memorandum 
of Closing Terms for the release by the Sharps of "PUD lots" 
only. As of these dates, plaintiffs were still and are in of 
default for the 1984 and 1985 property taxes and the payment a 
portion of the 1985 payment and the full 1986 payment required 
under the Addendum to the Trust Deed Note. 
60. The Sharps perceived that the execution by them of 
the Consent to Record constituted substantial performance of 
any obligation to release the roadway pursuant to paragraphs 3 
and 6 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms. 
61. As plaintiff Felton testified, "the contract [Memo-
randum of Closing Terms] says lots of buyer's choice and that 
would require a choice." After the release of Lots 1-5, 
plaintiffs may have chosen to prepare a plat of the then un-
platted acreage and seek a release of a portion of it instead 
of Lot 6. 
62. Also in the letter of February 27, 1986, Felton de-
manded from the Sharps for the first time approximately 
$73,000.00 as their "cost of the sewer and water hook-ups 
which are now available." (Exhibit 35). No demand for such 
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costs had been made of the Sharps prior to that time nor had 
plaintiffs provided an accounting of such costs. Before 
trial, plaintiffs claimed exorbitant expenses of $1,638,753.61 
for the complete costs for the construction of the improve-
ments on and to the Subject Property (Exhibit 32a). 
63. At trial, plaintiffs claimed costs for the construc-
tion of improvements on and to the Subject Property of 
$1,063,348.10, (Exhibit 60) and plaintiffs modified their de-
mand from the Sharps for water and sewer connection fees to 
$43,706.00. (Exhibit 66). 
64. Prior to actual construction of the sewer system, 
Saunders told the Summit County Planning Commission in a 
meeting on December 14, 1982 that they "would really like to 
have the septic tank system used because of the high cost of 
the sewer line but in the long run it may be the best way to 
go." (Exhibit 79). On or about September 16, 1983, Felton 
wrote Summit County challenging the requirement "to install a 
sewer line up the County road from Highway U-224 to the 
Project, a distance of about one and one-half (1-1/2) miles." 
(Exhibit 79). Felton concluded the letter by declaring: "In 
the event we are required to install the sewer line, we will 
test the validity of that requirement in court." 
65. Plaintiffs made formal demand upon Summit County on 
or about July 26, 1984 for, inter alia, the following damages: 
The sum of $117,297.15 being the 
costs of off-site sewer which we 
were, under protest, required to 
install to service the subdivision. 
*** 
-20-
001S4t1 
[W]e [plaintiffs] have lost one sale or 
more sales and anticipate the damages, 
loss of profit and interest at between 
$250,000 and $500,000. 
[Djamages for the loss of sale, reduction 
in business and damages suffered in reduc-
tion to profit .... 
(Exhibit 84). 
66. Soon thereafter plaintiffs brought suit in the United 
States District Court, District of Utah, Civil No. C84-2090W, 
against Summit County, the SBSID and various officials thereof 
to recover their claimed damages. 
67. In answer to interrogatories dated December 28, 1984 
in the Federal Court litigation, plaintiffs stated: 
Because of the imposition of the re-
quirement that Plaintiffs construct an 
off-site sewer approximately one mile in 
length, the costs of developing the 
entire project became prohibitive. 
(Exhibit 116; see also, Exhibit 107, p. 7). 
68. In further interrogatory answers on March 31, 1986, 
Saunders declared: 
At the present time I have recently found 
out that the right-of-way servicing my 
property has been forfeited by Summit 
County contrary to law. This will not 
allow my development to proceed, will not 
allow me to recover costs for the capital 
improvement and significantly diminishes 
the value of the property. 
(Exhibit 107, p. 15). 
69. In Saunders1 Federal Court affidavit dated March 17, 
1986, he also swore: 
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10. As a result of the various 
delays [caused by the County and the 
SBSID], which are detailed below, the 
market for exclusive building lots is now 
virtually non-existent, cost of improve-
ments escalated to be several times what 
I had anticipated, and much of the real 
property in the project is threatened by 
foreclosure. 
(Exhibit 86, p. 3). 
70. Most of the damages sought to be recovered by the 
plaintiffs in the lawsuit against the SBSID and Summit County 
are the same damages plaintiffs sought to recover from the 
Sharps in the present case. (R. 252 and 263; cf. Exhibits 60 
with 86; see also Exhibits 87, 88, 107, 116 and Plaintiffs1 
Verified Complaint herein). 
71. No written or oral claim of default on the part of 
the Sharps under the Closing Documents was made by the plain-
tiffs until February 27, 1986, subsequent to plaintiffs' own 
defaults in failing to pay the 1984 and 1985 property taxes 
and failing to pay the full 1985 payment required under the 
Addendum to the Trust Deed Note. 
72. The Sharps did not interfere with plaintiffs1 
attempts to market or sell the Subject Property. 
73. Plaintiffs received only one invitation for an offer 
to purchase Lot 1 or Lot 6, which invitation was not consum-
mated due to the failure of conditions imposed by the one, 
B. F. Sammons, and the failure of such conditions were unre-
lated to any actions or statements of the Sharps. (Exhibit 
88). 
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74. One of the conditions of purchase by Sammons was an 
independent appraisal supporting a $220,000 proposed sales 
price (Exhibit 88). The plaintiffs provided Sanunons with a 
letter appraisal, dated August 8, 1986, which had been pre-
pared by LeRoy Pia. (Exhibit 9a). This appraisal stated that 
Lots 1 and 6 had a fair market value of $220,000. On or 
about November 11, 1986, while Sammons and Saunders were still 
negotiating, a letter appraisal was obtained by Steve Clyde, 
attorney for the plaintiffs from the same appraiser, valuing 
the lots at an average of only $190,000.00 (Exhibit 9). The 
November 11, 1986 appraisal was not shown to Sammons. (R. 
283-4). 
75. Saunders had given Sammons "the impression" that 
plaintiffs could convey Lot 6 to him even though it had not 
been released from the Trust Deed. (R. 389; see also R. 284). 
76. On or about March 24, 1987, Felton, pursuant to the 
request of the real estate agent, Steve Clegg, employed by 
plaintiffs to list Lots 1, 2 and 5, wrote a letter to Clegg 
for dissemination to other Park City real estate agents, which 
letter stated " [t]he current litigation does not affect the 
marketability or encumber that [Subject] property." (Exhibit 
89.) 
77. After the commencement of this action, the Sharps 
took all reasonable steps to facilitate the sale and marketing 
of the Subject Property as evidenced by a letter dated Septem-
ber 30, 1986, to plaintiffs' prior attorney, Steven Clyde, who 
was notified by Donald J. Winder, the Sharps1 attorney, that 
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the Sharps would take all steps reasonable to effect a sale of 
Lot 6 or the unplatted acreage (Exhibit 33), and the Sharps1 
Motion to Appoint a Receiver for the Subject Property in this 
proceeding dated May 14, 1987. 
78. There have been no arms length sales to purchasers of 
PUD lots at the Subject Property wherein sewer and water con-
nection and service fees have been assessed. The only convey-
ance of a PUD lot has been to Felton, a member of the partner-
ships. At trial, plaintiffs testified that they intended, at 
all times, to include the cost of the sewer and water connec-
tion and service fees within the sales price of lots. (R. 
310-312). 
79. Mr. Sammons was not to be charged any sum above and 
beyond a $220,000 land price for sewer or water connection 
fees. (R. 285) . 
80. Felton testified that a purchaser of one of the PUD 
lots listed with real estate agent Clegg would only be charged 
"over and above ... the purchase price" "the hook-up fee to be 
charged by Snyderville Basin for sewer." (R. 310). 
81. If plaintiffs sold a lot to Sammons at $220,000, they 
would not have been "compensated for those [sewer and water] 
improvement costs " At a $220,000 sales price itfs "impos-
sible" to recover the costs of sewer and water improvements to 
the Subject Property. "You have to take a loss." (R. 311-
312). 
82. The sewer system, as of the date of trial, is not 
completed or operational, nor has its construction been 
"
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approved by the SBSID. (Exhibits 83, 83a and 99 through 103). 
The culinary water system as of the date of trial is also not 
operational. Under paragraph 7 of the Memorandum of Closing 
Terms, the Sharps do not have to pay connection fees for these 
systems until they are "available." (Exhibit 15). 
83. The sewer system constructed by plaintiffs has a 
capacity to handle between 2,000 and 3,800 connections. (Ex-
hibit 86) . 
84. Under the line extension agreements with the SBSID, a 
connection fee "at the rate in effect at the time of connec-
tion" shall be determined by the SBSID for the system on the 
Subject Property (Exhibit 81, paragraph 4D; see Exhib-
it 80, paragraph 4(d)). The "connection fee shall be paid by 
the property owner" before issuance of a building permit, to 
the Application (the plaintiffs herein), except that the 
SBSID, shall be entitled to "the first $100 of the connection 
fee." 
85. The parties intended the language in the Earnest 
Money concerning "same per-hook-up price" to be synonymous 
with the language contained in paragraph 7, Memorandum of 
Closing Terms, regarding "pro rata cost" to a PUD lot purchas-
er. 
86. Average and reasonable connection fees for culinary 
water and sewer systems in the Park City and Snyderville Basin 
area are $2,000.00 each. (See Testimony of John C. Brown and 
Rex Ausburn, of. Exhibit 86, p. 6). 
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87. The Sharps intended and wanted to be charged only 
what purchasers of a PUD lot would be charged as fees to con-
nect to the culinary water and sewer systems on the Subject 
Property, and the plaintiffs should have understood that this 
was the intent of paragraph 7, Memorandum of Closing Terms. 
88. The Sharps repeatedly assured plaintiffs that they 
did not intend, through their foreclosure, to interfere with 
access rights over the private roadway or to the utility ease-
ments shown on the Consent to Record which the Sharps signed. 
(R. 64; Exhibits 33 and 51; cf. Exhibits 25, 25a, 26 and 26a). 
89. Correspondingly, it was both the mutual intent and 
agreement of the parties that the Sharps be granted use of the 
roadway in event of default (Exhibits 25, 25a, 26 and 26a), 
which agreement was later memorialized and recorded in the 
Consent to Record. (Exhibit 51). 
90. The inclusion of Lots 1 through 5 in the September 
1985 Notice of Default (Exhibit 55) and December 1985 Amended 
Notice of Trustee's Sale (Exhibit 56) was inadvertent, un-
intentional and without malice. 
91. In refusing to reconvey Lot 6, the road, the unplat-
ted acreage, the Sharps acted in good faith and relied on the 
advice of attorney Jon Heaton. 
92. The Sharps have been charged trustees" fees by 
Associated Title in their efforts to foreclose the Subject 
Property in the amount of $1,803.80 (Exhibit 42). 
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93. Plaintiffs have not suffered any damages, special or 
otherwise, as a result of any act or failure to act by the 
Sharps. 
94. Paragraph 13 of the Trust Deed provides that failure 
to promptly enforce any right thereunder does "not constitute 
a waiver of any other right or subsequent default." (Exhibit 
2). 
95. On September 4, 1986, the day before the scheduled 
Trustee's Sale, plaintiffs filed a Complaint commencing this 
action and obtained the issuance of a Temporary Restraining 
Order (TRO) from Judge Judith M. Billings to restrain the 
Sharps from conducting the Trustee's Sale of the Subject Prop-
erty. The TRO required a bond in the amount of $2,400. In a 
hearing held on January 4, 1988, this Court required that the 
bond be increased to $50,000 "to protect the Sharps for the 
payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suf-
fered if the Sharps are found to have been wrongfully enjoined 
or restrained...." 
96. The Trust Deed Note provided that if it "is collected 
by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or 
interest, either with or without suit, the undersigned ... 
agree to pay ... a reasonable attorney's fee." (Exhibit 3)., 
Paragraph 16 of the Trust Deed provided: "Upon the 
occurrence of any default hereunder, Beneficiary [the Sharps] 
shall have the option to ... foreclose the Trust Deed ... and 
Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover ... a reasonable 
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attorney's fee...." (Exhibit 2; see also All thereof). Fur-
ther, paragraph 6 of the Trust Deed provided that Beneficiary 
(the Sharps) may "commence, appear in and defend any action or 
proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof or the 
rights of [sic] powers of Beneficiary . .. and in exercising 
any such powers ... employ counsel, and pay his reasonable 
fees." Additionally, paragraph 7 of the Trust Deed requires 
Trustor to Mpay immediately and without demand all sums ex-
pended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee, with interest from 
date of expenditure at the rate of ten per cent (10%) per 
annum until paid, and the repayment thereof shall be secured 
hereby." Paragraph 11 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms pro-
vided that "the defaulting party shall pay all expenses of 
enforcing the same or any right arising out of breach or de-
fault thereof, including reasonable attorneys1 fees, whether 
incurred with or without suit and both before and after judg-
ment." (Exhibit 15). 
97. Legal services have been rendered to the Sharps by 
the law firm of Winder & Haslam in the nature of time expended 
by individual members, through August 31, 1988, in the amount 
of $144,469.75. 
98. The foregoing amount does not include any services 
performed on or after August 31, 1988, including those servic-
es of Winder & Haslam necessary for finalizing the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and preparing for, re-
sponding to and arguing any post trial motions. The legal 
fees for such matters may be supplemented later. 
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99. The services rendered by the law firm of Winder & 
Haslam were reasonably necessary for the development of the 
case and protection of the rights of the Sharps; and the rates 
charged are reasonable and are in accordance with those rates 
generally charged by attorneys in this area for similar ser-
vices, 
100. Plaintiffs breached the Memorandum of Closing Terms 
by, inter alia, failing to make the payments intended thereby 
to the Sharps and by failing to make available sewer and water 
connections at the same charge to purchasers of a PUD lot. 
101. Pursuant to paragraph 12 of the Memorandum of Closing 
Terms, all "agreements contained [t]herein shall survive the 
closing of this transaction...." (Exhibit 15). 
102. The Sharps' defense of plaintiffs1 Complaint was an 
action purporting to offset the security under the Trust Deed 
and the rights and powers of the Sharps related to collecting 
the Promissory Note after default; related to foreclosing the 
Trust Deed; and related to enforcing the Memorandum of Closing 
Terms and rights arising out of a breach or default thereof. 
103. After closing the sale on the Subject Property, on or 
about July 16, 1981, attorney Heaton represented White Pine 
Ranches relating to the development of the Subject Property 
(R. 789) until the filing by Associated Title of a Notice of 
Default on or about September 16, 1985. (R. 836; Exhibit 55). 
Attorney Heaton did not represent the Sharps between the clos-
ing of the sale and the filing of the first Notice of Default 
on or about September 23, 1983. (R. 791; Exhibit 24). Except 
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for perhaps a period of time after the filing of the first 
Notice of Default on or about September 23, 1983, and perhaps 
after the filing of the Notice of Default on September 16, 
1985. (R. 793), attorney Heaton did not represent the Sharps. 
104. The Sharps have incurred costs of court in this ac-
tion. 
Having made the above Findings of Fact, the Court here-
with makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
L The Closing Documents, which term is defined in 
Finding No. 10 above, are the operative documents relating to 
the parties' closing of the sale of the Subject Property by 
the Sharps to the plaintiffs, and this transaction constitutes 
the Contract between the parties (hereinafter the "Contract"). 
2. Plaintiffs, by their failure to pay the 1984, 1985, 
1986 and 1987 property taxes on Lot 6 and the unplatted acre-
age on November 30 of each respective year, are thereby in 
breach of the Trust Deed. 
3. Plaintiffs' failure to pay the entire June 30, 1985 
installment payment and the 30, 1986 final installment payment 
required pursuant to paragraph ID and IE of the Addendum to 
the Trust Deed Note constitutes a breach of the Trust Deed 
Note, Trust Deed and Memorandum of Closing Terms. 
4. Plaintiffs' breaches were material, significant and 
continuing and were uncured when plaintiffs releases were 
first requested by plaintiffs for the roadway and Lot 6 on 
February 27, 1986 and again on May 7, 1986. 
"
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5. The breaches by plaintiffs of the Contract occurred 
prior in time to any alleged breaches by the Sharps, and this 
Court specifically holds there were no material or significant 
breaches on the part of the Sharps of their obligations under 
the parties' Contract. 
6. The Sharps have substantially complied with all of 
their obligations under the terms of the parties' Contract. 
7. Plaintiffs were obligated, under the terms of the 
Memorandum of Closing Terms and pursuant to their own prac-
tice, to specifically request and identify lots, including Lot 
6, for release by the Sharps. 
8. Because the plaintiffs' material and continuing 
breaches of the parties' Contract preceded timely plaintiffs' 
requests for reconveyance of Lot 6, the roadway and the un-
platted acreage, defendants were not obligated to reconvey Lot 
6, the roadway and the unplatted acreage. 
9. The Sharps were justified in and were excused from 
performance under the Contract to reconvey Lot 6, the roadway 
or the unplatted acreage shown on the final plat of to the 
plaintiffs because the plaintiffs were in breach of the par-
ties' Contract at the time such reconveyances were requested. 
10. Alternatively, the Sharps' execution of the Consent 
to Record the final plat of and the CCRs constituted a release 
of the roadway shown on such plat in accordance with para-
graphs 3 and 5 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms. 
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11. The execution of the Consent to Record by the Sharps 
and the subsequent recordation of the final plat and the CCRs 
created a non-exclusive appurtenant easements to run with the 
land, as a covenant running with the land or as an equitable 
servitude, as the case may be, in favor of and for the use and 
benefit of the unplatted acreage and the owners and purchasers 
thereof (including the Sharps), and their invitees, guests, 
heirs and successors in interest, for utilities and for access 
to and the right to use as a means for ingress and egress for 
vehicular and pedestrian access over, under and across the 
private roadway (White Pine Lane) shown on the recorded final 
plat, and a non-exclusive appurtenant easement to run with the 
land, as a covenant running with the land or as an equitable 
servitude, as the case may be, in favor of and for the use and 
benefit of White Pine Ranches Phase I and the owners and pur-
chasers thereof (including the Sharps) and their heirs and 
successors in interest for water lines, water tank and water 
systems over, under and across the Subject Property near the 
southwest corner of the unplatted acreage as shown on the 
final recorded plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I. 
12. The Sharps are estopped to deny the dedication of 
White Pine Lane, pursuant to the final recorded plat, for the 
private use of the parcel owners, their invitees and guests, 
subject to the CCRs and the non-exclusive appurtenant easement 
for the use and benefit of the unplatted acreage described in 
Conclusion No. 11 above. Further, the Sharps are estopped to 
deny the non-exclusive utility easement also described in Con-
clusion No. 11 above. 
13. The Sharps, by the execution of the Consent to Re-
cord , are estopped to deny the operative and legal effect of 
the recordation of the final plat and CCRs and the rights and 
obligations of the owners of PUD lots as set forth in the re-
corded final plat and CCRs for White Pine Ranches Phase I. 
The final recorded plat and CCRs and the non-exclusive ease-
ments set forth in Conclusion No. 11 above shall remain in 
full force and effect, and not be affected by the foreclosure 
ordered herein, a purchase at the Sheriff's Sale, or a subse-
quent redemption of the subject premises, other than a com-
plete redemption thereof by the plaintiffs herein coupled with 
plaintiffs1 declaration for the extinguishment of either non-
exclusive easement. 
14. Owners and purchasers of the unplatted acreage (in-
cluding the Sharps), and their successors in interest are en-
titled to use of the private roadway (White Pine Lane) for 
access to the unplatted acreage of the Subject Property as set 
forth in the legal description attached hereto as Exhibit "A" 
and incorporated by reference herein, as a result of the 
mutual intent and agreements between the parties to grant to 
the Sharps the use of the roadway, which agreement was memori-
alized by the letters of Heaton and Felton and evidenced by 
the part performance and reliance of the Sharps on such let-
ters and agreements in executing the Consent to Record. 
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15. General partners in a partnership are bound by the 
actions of other partners taken on behalf of the partnership 
and by the actions of the partnership itself. 
16. The language in paragraph 7 of the Memorandum of 
Closing Terms "pro rata cost to the purchaser" is ambiguous, 
necessitating the use of extrinsic evidence to interpret the 
same. 
17. The extrinsic evidence presented at trial demon-
strated that the parties intended to allow the Sharps, at 
their request, one connection each to both the culinary water 
and sewer systems when and if such systems are available and 
operational. 
18. The construction costs of the culinary water and 
sewer systems claimed by the plaintiffs are not reasonable, in 
violation of the reasonable value rule. 
19. Seven years is an unreasonable time within which to 
complete the culinary water and sewer systems and require the 
Sharps to mandatorily hook into these systems, which systems 
still are not yet operational. The Sharps are not obligated, 
but have the option, to hook into the culinary water and sewer 
systems should such systems become operational. 
20. It is an unreasonable interpretation of the language 
"pro rata costs" in the Memorandum of Closing Terms and the 
earlier language in the Earnest Money delineating "the same 
per-hook-up price" to require the Sharps to pay 1/13 of the 
exorbitant construction costs for culinary water and sewer 
hook-ups. Such an interpretation would recast the Sharps as 
developers rather than the mere sellers of Subject Property 
that they were and intended to be in this transaction. 
21. A reasonable fee to be paid by the Sharps to the 
plaintiffs for a connection to the culinary water and sewer 
systems is $2,000.00 each. 
22. The inclusion of Lots 1-5 in the initial Nctice of 
Default (Exhibit 55) and Notice of Trustee's Sale (Exhibit 
56) on behalf of the Sharps was inadvertent, unintentional and 
without malice. 
23. There was no improper holding by the Sharps of any 
requested reconveyance, but even if there were, it was not 
done in bad faith. The Sharps acted in reliance on the advice 
of their counsel, and did so in good faith. 
24. Alternatively, the Sharps did not improperly withhold 
reconveyances and plaintiffs have failed to establish a cause 
of action for failure to reconvey under U.C.A. §57-1-33. 
U.C.A. §57-1-33 is applicable only when a beneficiary refuses 
to request a reconveyance within 30 days after written demand 
therefor is made by the Trustor. The Sharps requested the 
Trustee to reconvey Lots 1-5 on or about January 18, 1984, and 
because of plaintiffs' subsequent breaches were under no obli-
gation to reconvey the remainder of the Subject Property. 
25. As a result of plaintiffs' breaches of the Contract, 
the Sharps were entitled to record all of the Notices of De-
fault and Notices of Sale described in the Findings against 
the Subject Property. 
26. The Sharps acted in good faith and not maliciously in 
having recorded the Notices of Default and the Notices of Sale 
and in refusing to reconvey Lot 6 and the unplatted acreage, 
27. The plaintiffs have not established a cause of action 
for slander of title against the Sharps. The Sharps did not 
act maliciously or cause any special damages to the plain-
tiffs. 
28. All of the damages, including, without limitation, 
those under U.C.A. §57-1-33, claimed by the plaintiffs are too 
remote, conjectural and speculative. The plaintiffs have 
failed to establish they have suffered actual damages result-
ing from any alleged breach by the Sharps, and this Court con-
cludes no such breach by the Sharps occurred. 
29. The attorney's fees incurred by the Sharps in this 
matter through August 31, 1988 in the amount of $144,469.75 
are reasonable and the Sharps are entitled to an award of the 
same. Further, the Sharps are entitled to supplement and aug-
ment this amount by affidavit for their reasonable attorney's 
fees incurred after August 31, 1988 in preparation of the 
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, in responding to any post-
trial motions, in collecting said Judgment by execution or 
otherwise, and, if necessary, after prevailing on any appeal. 
30. The Sharps are entitled to their costs of court in 
the amount as assessed or taxed pursuant to U.R.C.P. 54 and to 
post-judgment interest as provided by law. 
31. By virtue of the significant and material breaches of 
the Contract by the plaintiffs, the Sharps are entitled to 
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judgment against Saunders, Felton, Interstate Rentals, Inc. 
and Norton, jointly and severally, in the following amounts: 
a. i. Principal: $ 371,739.35 
ii. Interest through 
March 22, 1988: $ 171,033.54 
iii. Late payment charge: $ 14,869.57 
TOTAL: $ 557,642.46 
together with interest thereon at the per diem rate of 
$183.32 from and after March 22, 1988. 
b. i. Trustee's fees: $ 1,803.80 
ii. Court Costs: Pursuant to U.R.C.P. 54 
iii. Attorneys' fees through 
August 31, 1988: $ 144,469.75 
together with interest thereon at the rate of 10% per 
annum from the date of expenditure by the Sharps until 
paid by plaintiffs. 
c. Delinquent property taxes: $ 20,368.62 
together with interest and penalties assessed thereon as 
provided by law, property taxes accruing for 1988, and 
post-judgment interest thereon at the rate of 12% per 
annum. 
32. As a result of the significant and material breaches 
of the Contract by the plaintiffs, the Temporary Restraining 
Order entered in the above captioned matter by the Honorable 
Judith M. Billings on September 4, 1986 was wrongfully issued 
and the Sharps are entitled to have it lifted and dissolved. 
-37-
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33. The Sharps are entitled to be paid the bond posted by 
plaintiffs with the Summit County Clerk in September 1986 in 
the amount of $2,400 and to be paid from the security posted 
by Tracy Collins Bank in the amount of $50,000 for their 
attorney's fees, interest and other damages incurred as a re-
sult of the issuance of the wrongful Temporary Restraining 
Order. 
34. The Sharps are entitled to have Lot 6 as described in 
the final recorded plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I and the 
unplatted property more particularly described on Exhibit "A" 
attached hereto or such portions thereof as may be sufficient 
to pay the amounts found to be due and owing under the Judg-
ment, together with interest as set forth hereinabove and 
accrued costs herein, and expenses of sale, sold at public 
auction by the Sheriff of Summit County, State of Utah, in the 
manner prescribed by law for such sales; that said Sheriff, if 
and when the subject premises are sold by him, out of the pro-
ceeds of such sale shall retain first his costs, disbursements 
and commission, and then pay to the Sharps, or to their attor-
neys, the accrued and accruing costs of this action, then said 
sums for the Sharps* attorney's fees, and the amount owing to 
the Sharps for principal, interest, costs and expenses of sale 
and maintenance, taxes, assessments and/or insurance premiums, 
together with accrued interest thereon, or so much of said 
sums as said proceeds will pay, and that the surplus, if any, 
shall be accounted for and paid over to the Clerk of this 
Court subject to this Court's further order. 
-38-
Court subject to this Court's further order. 
35. All persons having an interest in the subject premis-
es shall have the right, upon producing satisfactory proof of 
interest, to redeem the same within the time provided by law 
for such redemption; that from and after the expiration of the 
period of redemption as provided by law, that the plaintiffs 
above named, and each of them, and all persons claiming by, 
through or under them, or any of them, shall be forever barred 
and foreclosed of all right, title, interest and estate in and 
to the subject premises, and that from and after the delivery 
of the Sheriff's Deed to the subject premises that the 
grantees named therein be given possession thereof. 
36. If a deficiency results after due and proper applica- ' 
tion of the proceeds of such Sheriff's Sale, the Sharps are 
entitled to be awarded a personal judgment against Saunders, | 
Felton, Norton and Interstate Rentals, Inc., and each of them, 
jointly and severally, for the full amount of such deficiency. 
37. The Sharps are entitled to have the right, at their I 
request, to one connection to both plaintiffs' culinary water 
and sewer systems on White Pine Ranches Phase I for a conned 
tion fee of $2,000 each. 
38. The Sharps are entitled to have the Complaint of the 
plaintiffs dismissed, no cause of action. 
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THE COURT: We are meeting again in :he instant 
matter, that is. White Pine Ranches, et cetera, versus 
the Sharps, case number C-87-1621. I note couniel are all 
present. 
This Court has requested this opportunity to present 
its rui;ng post-trial on the issues involved in this case. 
This Court, having now heard the evidence, the arguments, 
reviewed the file materials, the trial briefs and the 
exhibits, is prepared to rule. 
The Plaintiffs seek, inter alia, by their verified 
Complained amended as to party designation only, a deter-
mination by this Court that the Defendants breached their 
contractual obligations arising out of the sale of July the 
16th of 1981 as detailed by the so-called operative 
documents consisting of Exhibit 15, the Memo of Closing, 
Exhibit 3, the Trust Deed Note, Exhibit 2, the Trust Deed, 
and Exhibit 17, the Special Warranty Deed. 
The Plaintiffs further allege that the Defendants 
slandered their title to the oroperty in question and seek 
title to the disputed property to be quieted themselves. 
Plaintiffs' claims for damages resultant from alleged 
misrepresentation of material facts were dismissed by Judge 
an 
Russon while this matter pended in Summjt County. 
Defendants, on the contrary, allege in their 
Counterclaim that the PJamtiffs breached their contractual 
duties pursuant to the same operative documents and the 
Defendants seek to have the temporary restraining order entered 
by Judge Billings on September the 4th of 1986 lifted, 
thereby allowing them to proceed with the trust deed fore-
closure commenced prior to the filing of this act:on. 
First the issues dealing with breach of contract. ThisJ 
Court is persuaded that the initial breach of the operative 
documents was by the Plaintiffs in failing, pursuant to 
paragraph 5 of the Trust deed, Exhibit 2, to pay the 1984 
and subsequent property taxes before delinquency. This 
breach commenced November 30, 1984, and has continued to 
date. A fortiori it was in effect without having been 
cured when Plaintiffs requested release of the roadway 
and lot 6 on May 7, 1986. Compare Exhibit 37 as well as 
stipulation of counsel during the course of the trial. 
Plaintiffs yet again breached their obligation by 
failing to pay the June 30, 1985, and June 30, 1986, 
installment payments pursuant to the Addendum to the 
Trust Deed, which delinquencies contmue to date resulting 
in a balance owing the Defendants through March 22nd, 1988, 
of $557,642.46, including interest and penalties. Exhibit 
122. 
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This Court is persuaded that the evidence has establis 
by a preponderance that the foregoing breaches were and are 
both material, significant and continuing. Plaintiffs' 
evidence has failed to establish by a preponderance that the 
Defendants breached the operative documents in any material 
or significant fashion. On the contrary, this Court is 
persuaded that the Defendants have substantially complied 
with their obligations under the terms of the operative 
documents. 
The claim that the Defendants were required and failed 
to release lot 6 and the roadway prior to Plaintiffs' 
delinquencies having occurred is not supported by the 
record. There were no requests for release or identifica-
tion of the lot or lots sought to be released after the 
release of lots 1 through 5 pursuant to paragraph 3 of 
Exhibit 15, the Memorandum of Closing, until after Plaintiff^ 
breaches were in effect. Therefore, this Court determines 
that the Defendants' refusal to reconvey after the 
delinquencies was justified. If a trustor is in default 
at the time he requests reconveyance, the beneficiary is 
not obligated to reconvey. Plaintiffs' request for recon-
veyance was untimely. Significant, in this Court's view, 
as bearing upon the credibility of Plaintiffs' argument 
in this regard is the fact unrebutted that the Plaintiffs 
made no claim of breach by the Defendants until after their 
1 own admitted breaches. Exhibit 31. 
2 As to the roadway and improvements, this Court is 
3 persuaded that the Defendants' conduct in having executed ancji 
4
 allowed the recording of the Consent to Record, Exhibit 7, 
5 and the Declaration of Protective Covenants, Exhibit 51, 
6 constituted a release of the roadway sufficient to satisfy 
7 the terms of paragraph 3 of Exhibit 15. Such conduct 
8 constituced substantial performance by the Defendants 
9 with their obligation and indeed, was so perceived by the 
10 Defendants. Moreover, it is this Court's view that such 
11 conduct by the Defendants created nonexclusive easements 
12 or covenants running with the land in the owners of the lots 
13 to the use of the roadway, water line and sewer system. 
14 At the very least, equitably, the Defendants' conduct, 
15 coupled with their repeated assurances, admissions, and 
16 testimony during the course of the trial would estop them 
17 from denying to the lot owners rights to access and use 
18
 of the -o-idway, the water and sewer systems, and this Court 
19 so determines. 
20 Curiously, in the face of the foregoing, the Plaintiff^ 
21 persist in advancing the unpersuasive argument that 
22 regardless of Defendants' assurances that there is no intent 
23 to interfere with Plaintiffs' access and use rights, the 
24 Plaintiffs will still lose the same if the Defendants are 
25 allowed to pursue their legal remedies. This Court is not 
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impressed with that argument. The evidence has established 
that the parties by both mutual intent and agreement 
granted to the Defendants the use of the roadway, Exhibits 
25 and 25A, which agreement was later memorialized and 
recorded in the Consent to Record, Exhibit 7. Access to the 
unreleased and unpaid for land was intended to be given 
to the Defendants in case of default and this Court so 
determines. 
In part by the use of the language, quote, pro rata 
cost to the purchaser, end quote, this Court determined 
that paragraph 7 of Exhibit 15, the Memorandum of Closing, 
was ambiguous, necessitating the use of extrinsic evidence 
to interpret the same. An examination of the extrinsic 
evidence necessitates the conclusion that the parties 
intended to allow the Defendants at their request to 
connect to both the water and sewer systems for Defendants' 
private residence, when and if such systems are functioning. 
To opt for Plaintiffs1 interpretation of the meaning 
of pro rata cost and thereby require the Defendants to pay i 
$43,706 to hook up to said system would be to disregard 
the testimony and the language of the Earnest Money Receipt 
and Offer to Purchase, Exhibit 14. Moreover, such 
construction is not reasonable. It violates the so-called 
reasonable value rule. There is in the record no factual 
basis, in this Court's view, upon which to support the claini 
6 ! 
of the Plaintiffs because there have been no arm's length 
purchasers wherein such costs have actually been assessed. 
The evidence supports the view that the Defendants wanted 
only to be charged what other purchases would be charged, 
but to require the Defendants to mandatorily hook up to 
Plaintiffs' systems after now some seven years, which are 
still not operational, and pay one-thirteenth of the exor-
bitant total construction costs would be to recast the 
Defendants' role as that of developers, rather than as mere 
sellers of real property and hence, in this Court's 
view, an unresonable strain interpretation of the language 
in question. 
This Court finds that a reasonable fee to be paid by 
the Defendants to the Plaintiffs for connection to the water 
system and the sewer system is $2000 each. 
Failure to reconvey. The cause of action failure to 
reconvey is asserted in Plaintiffs' proposed Amended 
Complaint, not in the verified Complaint. Plaintiffs' 
motion to amend the verified Complaint was denied by this 
Court, except to the extent that it allowed additional 
parties Plaintiff to be added. Nevertheless, both parties 
have addressed the issue so this Court will deal with it. 
The Plaintiffs, in this Court's judgment, have failed 
in their burden to establish entitlement to damages 
pursuant to Title 57-1-33, Utah Code Annotated. I am not 
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persuaded that there was an improper withholding of the 
requested reconveyances, but even if there were, it was not 
done in bad faith, in this Court's view. The record 
supports the finding that the Defendants acted in reliance 
upon the advice of their counsel and did so in good faith. 
Slander of title. In this Court's view, the record 
is devoid of any showing that the Defendants acted 
maliciously in not excluding lots 1 through 5 from the 
notices of default, Exhibits 24, 55 and 36. On the 
contrary, this Court finds and so holds that the conduct 
was inadvertent and unintentional. Accordingly, this Court 
determines no cause of action on the slander of title claim 
As to the claim of Plaintiffs for damages, it is 
this Court's view that e^en if it were to find that the 
Defendants breached the operative documents, which I 
specifically do not so find, Palintiffs' damages are too 
remote, conjectural and speculative. The Plaintiffs have 
failed to establish that they have suffered actual damages 
resulting from any alleged breach by the Defendants. 
A*: the conclusion of the evidence in this trial, this 
Court took under advisement Plaintiffs' motion for Rule 37 
sanctions, and a review of that matter in the interim has 
led this Court to conclude that the request is inappropriate 
and accordingly, is denied. 
As to the issue of attorney's fees, in light of the 
foregoing, this Court determines that the Plaintiffs are 
responsible to pay attorney's fees to the Defendants. The 
Defendants are specifically herein awarded a reasonable 
attorney's fee, and to bring this matter to some ultimate 
conclusion, it is this Court's view that Mr. Winder should 
submit an affidavit in support of his claim for attorney's 
fees on behalf of the Defendants. If there is to be objec-
tion to the affidavit, then counsel can contact my clerk 
and schedule an evidentiary hearing to inquire into the 
particulars of that objection. It might well, however, 
serve counsel and this Court more efficiently if Mr. Winder' 
deposition were to be taken with regard to any concerns 
about the reasonableness of the affidavit which I anticipate 
will be filed by Mr. Winder. That is merely a suggestion. 
It is this Court's view that the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment should be prepared, Mr. 
Winder, by yourself, submitted, of course, to the Plaintiffs 
counsel in accordance with our Rule 5, and before submitting 
the same to the Court. 
One of the purposes, Counsel, of having you all here 
again is to inquire at this stage, now that I have 
concluded my ruling, if there are questions about the 
ruling. 
Mr. Anderson? 
MR. ANDERSON: not at this point, your Honor. We'll 
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file appropriate motions. 
THE COURT: Very well. Mr. Winder? 
MR. WINDER: None, your Honor. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Very well, Counsel. As I indicated at | 
the conclusion of the evidentiary phase of this trial, 
while it may not seem so to all parties and counsel involved 
I have been impressed with the manner in which counsel have 
handled themselves, in a professional and courteous i 
fashion, and my attitude is the same as it was then, not-
withstanding the fact that I have now ruled. 
If there is nothing further at this time, this Court 
will be in recess. 
(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded.) 
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X, ANNA M. BENNETT, do hereby certify: 
That I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter, License No. 
220, and one of the official court reporters of the State of 
Utah; that on the 30th day of March, 1988, I attended the 
within matter and reported in shorthand the proceedings had 
thereat? that later I caused my said shorthand proceedings 
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pages, numbered from 2 to 10,inclusive, constitute a full, 
true and correct account of the same to the best of my 
ability. 
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TRUST DEED 
With Aa»jnm«nt at RanU 
THIS TRUST DEED, aoda this _ J Q t h _ day pi — J U D B ' , i « l _ 
batvaaa ^?MJLM^lMn^4..KSE^.IUJTQi^lE0H 1L .SAUC2S, 
INll«SiA3T..POJW^..J^ , at TRUSTOR, 
whoaa eddraae • 44..£echange F l e ^ 4 J W t . X ^ J t t » A . V U h 
jSoSS^JTOJ»*«
 M rauSTEE<. „«-
» J I « J 8 W j r * j ^ ^
 n M BENEFICIARY. 
WITNESSETH Tbot Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST. 
I 
WITH POWER OF SALE, the JoDowinf deocribed property, aituatad in g>—»jt 
County, State of Utah: 
SEE DOaBXT *A- ATOOGD HERETO A*© BY THIS RSFTJC13 DCORPORATED KTCD*. 
Together with all buildinp, fiiturte and improvemenU thereon and all water rifhte, rifhte of 
way, eaaemenu. rtnti, auuca. profit*, income, UnemenU, hereditament! pmiicfea and appurtenaneee 
thereunto belonpnt, now or hereafter ueed or enjoyed with Mid property, or. any part thereof. 
SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the nfht, po wer and authority hereinafter fiven to and conferred upon 
Beneficiary to collect and apply auch renU, laauaa. and profit*; 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of the indtbtednaaa evidenced by t pro-
miaaory aote 0/ fwtw daU herewith, w the principal eun 0/ I M 2,CSS. 20 , made- by 
Tniaior, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the Lmaa. m the manner and with mumt aa therein 
•at forth, and any eiWnaione and/or rtoewale or modificjOona thereof, (2) the performance a! 
each agraoment of Truator herein eonuined; (3) the payment of auch additional loana or advancaa aa 
hereafter siay be made to Truator, ar bu auecaaaori or asjifnt. when evidenced by a promjaaory 
sou or aotaa ranting that they am aarurad by thia Truat Detd; and (4) the payment of all aumt 
eipendad or advanced by Bene hoary under or pursuant to the Urma hereof, tofclher with in urea t 
aat be a a — a — at # » Utah State Bar. a fcaae, hawJtM aaH taaa a—miaiba at wMtea 
w .two* MUwrteW la ee euca • nam m UuK a mfviimm MIMHIH » #• a lew* l a w i m 
Ulea; at a toOe janiraaai ar abstract aaaiaaay antaanaaa' *• 4m m*c± w a n — m Uuk. 
M DEFENDANT'S 
I EXHIBIT 
£L 
TO PROTECT THE SECURITY Of THIS TRUST DEED TRUSTOR AGREES. 
Ta hoop aaai properly 1a Mad aandltsoa a#U repajr aat la i i a a n or d*malam any build In* fVroaa. la 
I properly. Trustee farther afraaa 
i) Ta cawmaaca cvmairiartaaa promptly and la pursue aame wrth reaaaaabie diligence la compfotsaa 
orsUnco anth pJaar, PJMI apasnfaeaUaaa aalufaciary la Beaefanary. aaal 
fa) Ta ajlaw Boaafioary la kapact aaad property at ail lane* during caeujiructaoa. 
Trust**, ooon presentation a i t W u affidavit eigned ay Beneficiary setting forth facts thowlruj a default 
by Trustor ander thia aumberad paragraph, at authorised la accept aa true and aaacluaiva ail facta aad I U U -
amenta there** and la act Iheraoa hereunder 
L Ta aMrrar %a pay far aid amalntaia arfth Beneficiary antil the amdebtadabw aecured hereby a paal am full, 
audi evidence of title aa Beneficiary may raauir* including: abstract* af tiUa ar paliciaa a/ title insurance aaai 
any o* tensions at renewals thereof ar supplements thereto. 
4. Ta appear la and defend any acison ar proceeding purport w« at affect 'he aamniy hereof the tiUa la 
aaid property, or the rtfhta ar power* af Beaefsriary ar Trustee and should ienefanary mt Truaiaa elect la 
aJao appear am ar defend any audi action ar proceeding to par all reals mnd espenae* including cast af e w 
daara af Utla and attorney a faoa an a reasonable auai incurred by Beneficiary ar Trustee 
I Ta pay a4 teeet 10 days before delinquency all Utaa and assessment* affrrting aaai property. amdudlAg 
all a i w i a w u upon water com pah y stack and all rtnta uwMm«nu and chorrm (ar water appurtrnant la at 
uaad in connect***! with aaid properly la nay when due all encumbrsnee* chirge* *nJ lien* with interest, 
an aaid property ar any part thereof which at any Urat appaar ta ba prior or superior hereto ta pay all eaata, 
faao and espenaes af this Truat. 
• Should Tmaiar fad U make any payment a* to do any act aa herein provided than Benefsnary mt 
Trustee but without obi if at ion aa la da and without notice to or demand upon Trustor mnd without releasing 
Trustor from any obligation hereof may M«k* or do ih« same in auch manner and to auch estent aa either Bay 
deem aortas* ry Io protect lha security harvof beneficiary or Trustee bring authorised la mtrr upon aaid 
7 Ta pay amaaadlaialy and without daauvid all auma t«p»ndad barrundar by Banofacaary ar Traataa. 
«jkk balaraat fraoa data af aspandilura at U M rata af Ian par aani (10%) par annua* until paal anal lha rapay 
aboal Qtmt&al afcaii ha aamrad barrby 
IT IS MUTUALLY AGREED THAT: 
•L Sbauwi aaai pro party ar aay part tbaiouf ba lakaa me daaiafad by raaaaa af aay public l a j p w a w t 
av awafnitfuitaaa prorwHing pr atamaftd by dra mt aarthciuaka ar in any auS»r mannar Banafinary •ball ba 
aaliUad la all aaajpanaaiiaa awarda and athar paymama »r ralwf tnora/ar and ahaJI ba bntiuwd at Ma opua* 
ba roraairnrai appaar in and praorcuta in ita awn nam a any action or pror**diftf« ar la mmkm aay aaaaprw* 
aPtaa ar aatUammt. aa connection with auch taking mt dmmmt* All such rompanaation awarda damage*, nghta 
af attaan and pracaeda andudin« the procaada af any podcioa of fire mn4 ather tnauranca a/fectin« aaiaf proparty, 
ara hart by aaawjaad la Banafictary who auy alur deducting herefrom all Ma eapeitae* ancludung atlomry a lee*, 
apply lha aame mm any indebtadnoaa »ecurad hereby Truator agree* to etecuU auch further assignment* mi any 
anipaanuaa awanl daaaafaa. aad rafhta af acuwa aad pro audi aa tteadatiary mt Truaiaa mtmf rwauira, 
t Al aay uraa and from liana la uaaa a pea wnttUn raquoat mt Benefu-ury payaaenl af ila lea* and pra-
aaalauaai af thai Truat Dead and IK* nata far endorsement (aa eaaa af full recanveyanr* far canaollatiaa) aari 
ralenuaa) without an*etuif tho liabtlity mi any paraan far lha payment af the mdebtadnaaa arcurad barrby, 
Truaiaa mur (a) aanaent la tho a>aki*f mi any map ar plat mi aa«d property lb) join a* granting any •**•» 
•arnt ar craatiag aay raatraetaon thereon ic) pain an any aubordinatian or other agreement affertinff thM Truat Deed 
mt lha tarn mt charge thereof <d) raranvay. without warranty all mt m*r part af Mtd proparty Tho grant** ia 
any racanwjyanaa »*y ba daoenbod aa "lha person ar persona entitled thereto aad the recital* therein of any 
matter* or facta ahall ba conclusive proof af truthfuJneaa thereof Truator agree* I* pay reeaoaable Truaaeaa 
faaa far any af the aervtcee menuonod am thai paragraph. 
10 Aa additaanal aorunty Truator hereby oaaip* Beneficiary dunng the eonttnuanca af theee truala all 
ranla atauaa royalties an* prof eta of tho property al/erud by thia Truat D*«4 and mt any parsonaJ property 
locatad thereon Untd Truator ahall default in the payment af any indebirdnrae uecured hereby ar in tho per 
farmance mi any agree men I hereunder Truator ahall have th« right to rolled all auch rent* aatuee rayaltie* 
and profit* earned prior to default a* they become due and payable If Truster ahall default a* aforesaid 
Trustor* right to collect any af *uch money* shall ccaee and Rrnefirtary ahall ha«* the right with m* without 
iamuif piaiaiini* mi lha property effected hereby la colled all renia royalties aiaoce and profits Failure ar 
dasconUAuanc* ml Banaftciary at any UAM mt Iroa U a * la uma la collect any t«Kb meney* ahall awl am any 
atanaer affect lha aub»eo.ue«t anfarcamant by Beneficiary ml the right, power mnd authority la collect lha soma 
NatJuaf aaaUiaad haraus nor tho eierrio* af lha rifht by Fanafariary ta coJIed shall be mt ba construed la 
ba, an pifiramauea by Baaafanary mi any tenancy lease mt bptaon. aar aa aaaurapuaa mi Uabdiiy aadar, aar a 
aubordmataaa af lha lara a* charge af that Truat Daod la aay auch tenancy. Woo* ar apooav 
11. Upoa aay default by Trustor bersuoder Baaafanary asay al any bsaa withewt aaaiam. afihar km 
MffssM by atoat. *e by a raraeeor la ba appointed by a court (Truasor barrby oonwntuta la lha appmntment af 
Banaftciary aa auch racarear). arri without ref«rd to lha adaa,uary mi any aorunty for the indebtednasa harrby 
aamrad eater apea and Uke p n i i i e n ml aaid property mt any part thereof w tto r e t name are far a* 
aaJwmrssa aallad aaai raal*. aasuaa. and aroiiU amduduiff Ihosa past due mnd unpaid and apply * * • • * * * , * • • * 
aaata aaai aapaaaaa af aperaiaaa aaai aallecuaa. Induduig reaaimlle mtkmrmf laaa. apwa aay asJillaanaa* 
ascarod baaaby. aad b* awob aeoWt aa Baaafauary amay 4*mn 
11 Tha asmarbaf aaaa aaai labia* paaiamlaa mi mmi proawrty. bW aafWtaa af aaab ram* » -^J* • * * 
taafibv m mW •raaTiaj af Ara aad ather Uauraaca pdkess* ar rwaspasiaatiaa at awarda lar aay tat*M -
J Z , ^ ( .Ty'aewpertr. aad lha appissalasa or rafeaa* Iharaaf mm a/*rosaof ariail aat aura at amrea aay 
•WfauJl m aotaae mi aefoult bsraaadar mt *mealaiala aay ad fern purauara a* aacb aouaa. 
U . T W faAmra aa the part af BawAakry b* pesmpiJy eofeeoa aay right hereunder ahofl aac apirsaa aa 
r i r X a T T g J c b ^ h T p m i iSTwmZJttt^vMnlt aay aVauit ahall aat tmmULmU a «arsar af any aihac 
aabaamaaal default. 
I mi any bad rated a am aeoun 
hifhaat toadaf. tha aarthaaa pma payaasa w ia»f*f manay af • 
M k Tha pifwn candarunc tha aaia aMf. tor any aaaaa ha aWraa U N M ( , aiitpiai lha n i« tract to** to 
ton* antil * ahall to canjplfted m i b» awry CAM. aoiica af a— tpaaamaiU ahau to
 c»«#a to pualic aadaratem 
atom* to tMtb paraaa at lha tona and alaca Uat appamiad fat tha u k , pra»cted. a* lha aaia b y i p i i ^ 
tof toafar * * • ana day b»y*»d lha day aWnated •* , * * * * * * * • * •**•• * * * * * y * r * * f • * • « bt • * • • » «*» 
IS) «B r; 
. hartay amiaadiaialy dwa and fayaaJa u d for* do** DIM T O M ! Daad to lha toanaar prwidaa to tow 
far <h« farvcteawra a# siart«a<«« an r»J praparty M ^ B**«f*etanr ahall to aautlad I* mtm-tt to aaca pn 
mt aiaaadittira; <4| ail a4har mum than, aacwrad fcarvay: %m\ (S) lha r t n w ^ t r . if any. to 4 * paraaa •? paranaa 
aa/ly aatitJad tharvia. «r U M Tnattea. to to ^ M f f f i m , m^r^Mpmii lha toJanca af aash p r w l i a n * to* Caaaty rk af lha aaaaly to a** f t U M aaia tea* atom. ^ 
11 Upan tha accw raaaa af any dafaoft hanandar. aWaafiriary ahafl to»a tha apliaa la dadara aB 
•   payaaJ*  l  I  ! I M t  l  " ' ' 
anal ry i to _. 
tof ail coat* and aapanMa'aactdaal Iharate, inciudinf a raaaanacia auafaay'a laa to audi aciaanl m 
luad ay lha aaart. 
17. Banafk-iary awy apcoint a u r i i n o i ana>toa at any lima by filtog far vacatd to lha alTiet af tt» Caaaty 
llaaardaf • / aa*h aaanty to which aaid praparty a? aaana part tharaai • tiujalad a awtotHultaa mt tmataa Fraai 
Ilia lima Ilia autouujttaa b filed far racard. Iha saw tr**•)•• ahall avcraai to ail tha pa«an. iuimx aMlhaHty 
and UUa af lha IrutUt aaaiad Ktrtta at W any aucsaaaar tmaua Cadi audi autoiaiuteaa ahall to ataevtaa aa4 
•cknavtoiiai. and aaUca Ottraot aKail to gn** i*d araof liMraai aMaa. to Ina auaaar pravaito ay to«. 
I t . Tblt Truat Daai ahall apply to. tour* to tha baaattt af. 1*4 biaal all parliaa Karata. tliair Win . lata*—% 
a>itoa^ adauiuuatarv aaarutara, lauaajiim arri aa»i<aa All aaiifauaaa af Tniatar toraimdtr ara >a«nt aad 
aavaral TKa l a m •"aWatfietary" tKalt M M lha awntr and aalaar. ia«toato< any atoiiaa. af lha M U aarurad 
fcaraay- ta *** Traat DaW. arhaaawtr lha aanlait rao^atraa. tha •Marultaa gaaaar mrUtdm lha laraiaiaa **aVaf 
•awlar. aad tha atofular ftjuator aadaaaa tha piafai. 
I t . Tmatoa aeatpte thb Truat «rhaa tab Truat Dm4. duly aaavated aad actaaaitodtad, b mmU a puaik 
taaard at ptwidad ay law Truataa m mm aalifalad la aatify any party harato af p**dtfic aaia aadar any athar 
Tr>M( Daad ar af any actoaa ar praraaduif to which Traata*. Banafieiary. ac Tnaiiaa ahall to a party, aaiaas 
toaufM 9y Tiuaiaa. 
SO. Taia Tnait Daad ahail to aaaatraad aaaatdtof to tba lava af lha Slate af Utah 
*! Tha andtraifnad Trwtter wtuaW thai a aapy m* any •ateaa af dafaait and af any aaika af aaia 
barvuadar to ajMilad la tod al lha addraa* haraiatofatt art larth. 
•icmntoraai Tmatot 
( I ! Truftor u\ 
STATE OF UTAH. _ 
COUNTY OF 5aJpr *»• 
OB tha _ Ib t fe . day of ^ A J > . ItS.L ptraocaHy 
appaajtd bafora i ..PWJL fl...LrVCES. JCEEIg.TTT.TTlf#..I£ni H.. SU1CQ6. . 
tba aifsar(t) ^t tba abova inatrumtnt, wbo duly ackaowladftd to_ma tbat ..thay. aiacutad tha 
My Gemmiafiea Expire: S - l 
Woury f PubW raaidiag at: 
S4^.. . .Ui^. . .G^. 
( I f Truitor a Corporation) 
STATCOF 
COUNTY OF 
Oa tba it*. diyol ^A.D. l i l t paraoeaily 
«, who baiaf by aaa duly awaca. 
. IntTaritataj JbaatAlm r .Jnevr-
aafMTid bafora • » ^ . X X R O H . FL. 
aayi that ba k tha _ * r m f . i d e n t . . . 
tha corporatioa that aiacuUd tha abov« mnd forafoinf inatniroaat and that aaid nftmnant waa 
aifitod bi bahalf of aaid corporatioa by authority of iU by-Uvt (or by authority ol a raaolutioa 
aduiowWdgod • I tta board at* a W t o f i ) and aaid _ * 3 W E T H ^ 
to ffM that aaid cvrporttioo aiacutad tha 
My Cotnmiaaion Eapiraa: 
EXHIBIT 'A* 
Beginning at "a point South •*• 43' 36* Heat along tha North" 
Una of Lot i, 175.42 faat froai tha corner of Lota 1 and I, a 
braaa cap aat by tha U. S. Canaral Land Offlea, said braaa cap 
alto being South 00# 19* 46" Waat along aactlon Una 1336.14 
faat from the Northeaat cornar of Saction 1, Tovnahip 2 South, 
Ranga 3 Eaat, Salt Lake Baaa and Meridian; and running thancc 
South 19* 43* 36* Waat along tha North line of Lota 7 and I 
2946.91 faat to tha Northweet cornar of Lot 7j thence South 
00* 13c 29" Eaat along the Neat line of Lot 7, 1312,14 feet to 
the Southveat corner of Lot 7; thence North 19* 47' 41" Eaat 
along the South line of Lot 7, 812.67 feet; thence North 61* 
00* 00" Eaat 1956.90 feet? thenc% North 47* 33' 15" Eaat 
462.75 feet; thence North 42* 44a 40" Eaat 15.63 feet to the 
point of beginning. 
SUBJECT TO Easements, Encroachmenta, Restrictions, Rights-of-way 
and matters of record enforceable in law or equity. 
TRUST DEED NOTE 
OO NOT OCSTtOY THIS NOTi: WVot pmd. M I no* * « * Tr*. Oood - ~ n « f * * • , « » , , w r r * * ^ 
to TnMM for towttfltut*. Wforo rut* i j n u wtl bt moot. 
I. IttafflLJQ 
_ JVM. 30_
 # l 9 8 ; 
POt VAUJ1 UCBVXD, M I MdtniMtd, MBtiy tad amnJly, proMtt to pay to d» ordor of 
JOei C. SHARP and (ZPAIDINE Y. SHARP, 
rmr HTiNTiBm.SIXTY.agg-THiisaro OTXY-XXVE.MB-30/IQQ—J>OUAIS <$. 9ja3.Q55.3g >, 
wnh u i w ftMi data at o)t rata otf SHELVE par o u ( ULOft) par M U S OQ 
ud onoopai, aud MiaoMi tad lotarM poyaoia at fo 
SEE ADDENDUM A2TK3JED HEPETO AND BY THIS REFS*ENCE MACE A PART KERECF. 
M paymant iMil M Mpuod fim to accniod raw tod to* baUoa to d» raducnoa of pm>a pal Aa? 
M B • tn l l a in i M I paid « M I M asail Mu iQjoiM tharm/tar u dM M of tugh&MXl. __ pm 
MM <JJL3%) f« I M M ««i »*i and o*a\H b» subject to A Lit* pcymvit charge of 41 
of such ovmrduo paynvit. 
I I ao/aa If M B M M I M M J M I of mtd MBiloMMj or* pnoooaJ tod iatorox or toy pan catraof. or ifl 
M l f i f ill M l of toy i f M j s rnrtfunod m a t Tnuc Daad tananag xha aoca. dM hoidar berwo/, it us 
M f i t» ffcfMfti, a t j dadara tM aorara pnoopai aakaca tad tccruad ianr« 4u« tod 
If CM) M O I it loilonad by M •ooroay attar dtfaaJt it dM paymam of pnnapaJ or mttroK. other %ufc 
of VUBOUC sue too tndtffntd, joaafiy sod amnlly, tfrtt to pay all cores oad apcruo of coliecooa including 
t I M M M M I motnoy'i ftm> 
loo T****—. •ifoaov foanaaon aad andraan oaroaf amnliy warn prtttosmtm for paytoaat, rlominrf 
M i M d n oi diMMor tad iiuoaajini of Ma oata, tad OOOJMC to toy tad all tmoaioru o* tuta, rtmwtlv 
wtrrtn or awdr/icaooat o t i o r y hi gndiod by M I ooidtr oaroaf v ia rasporr to d» payooat or other pro-
M J M B of M * M O * tod to M I nkmm of 007 mcunrf, or 107 port tfeartof, wnh or without Mbtntuaon 
Too) M M • Msrod 07 a TfMi Dood of OVM 
INT-3STAIS FD/EALS, INC. , 
BY 
^ xdent 
'&J!kto£t—. 
^ - . 
LBCN H. SAWCEf-
ATC 110 
a DEFENDANT'S 
g EXHIBIT 
-2 — / 
ADCC2CZM to Trurt Daad Nota datad Jtaa 30, 1981, aaacutad by PMJL H. LMCES, 
BCBERT TOTON, LBCN H. SN2GBS, BnBGTNX WHEALS, DC., aa truator in favor 
of JOttf C. SHOT and GERAl£&e *. SBARP, a* Banaficiary. 
1. S » antira principal balanca of 963,OSS.30 tooathar with accruad intaaraat 
at tha rata of twalva paroant (12%) par annua ahall ba p*H aa follower 
*• a* or bafora Juna 30, 19ft, a principal payoant of $192,611.06, or 
mora tooathar with accruad intaraat on tha antira unpaid principal 
balanca ahall ba dua and payabla in ful l . 
B. OJ or bafora Jena 30, IStJ, a principal paynant of $192,611.06, or 
mora tooathar with accruad intaraat on tha antira unpaid principal 
balanca ahall ba dua and payabla in ful l . 
C. Ch or bafora Jtaa 30, 13a*, « principal paynant of $192,611.06, or 
nora tooathar with accruad intaraat on tha antira unpaid principal 
balanca ahall ba dua and payabla in ful l . 
D. Ch or bafora Juna 30, IMS, a principal paynant of $192,611.06, or 
nora tooathar with accruad intaraat on tha antira unpaid principal 
balanca ahall ba dua and payabla In fu l l . 
E. Ch or bafora Jona 30, 1M», a principal paynant of $192,611.06, or 
nora tooathar with accruad intaraat on tha antira unpaid principal 
balanca ahall ba dua and payabla in ful l . 
2. Truator ahall hava tha riojtt to prapay up to 50% of tha principal aacurad 
haraundar in any ona calandar yaar but in tha avant of any prapaymant a 
charoa in tha amount of $10,000.00 ahall ba aaami l for aach calandar 
yaar raducad from tha paynant achadula by prapaynant. 
3. Kannath R. Norton, Praaidant of Ihtarsisata Bantala, Inc., individually 
and paraonally doaa haraby guarantaa tha parfmnwitja of Intaratata 
Itatala, Inc. 
OWED thia day of Juna 1911. 
y a U M C. S X » , Banaficiary 
24E Y. SHARP, Banaficiaxy * & 2 
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SECOND AMENDED 
NOTICE OF TRUSTEE'S SALE 
The following described property will be sold at public 
auction to the highest bidder, payable in lawful money of the 
United States at the time of sale, at the South door of the 
Summit County Courthouse in Coalville, Utah, on September 5, 
1986, at 4:45 p.m. of said day, for the purpose of foreclosing at 
Trust Deed executed by Paul H. Landes, Robert Felton, Leon H. 
Saunders, Interstate Rentals, Inc., as tenants in common, as 
Trustors, in favor of Associated Title Company as Trustee, and 
John C. Sharp and Geraldine Y. Sharp, as Beneficiary, which said 
Trust Deed was recorded in the office of the County Recorder of 
Summit County, State of Utah, as Entry No. 181695, in Book M193, 
at Page 372, covering real property more particularly described 
as follows: 
Beginning at a point South 89 degrees 43'36" West along the 
North line of Lot 8, 175.42 feet from the corner of Lots 1 
and 8, a brass cap set by the U.S. General Land Office, said 
brass cap also being South 00 degrees 19'46" West along 
section line 1336.14 feet from the Northeast corner of 
Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian? and running thence South 89 degrees 43'46" 
West along the North line of Lot 7 and 8 2948.98 feet to the 
Northwest corner of Lot 7; thence South 00 degrees 13'29" 
East along the West line of Lot 7, 1312.84 feet to the 
Southwest corner of Lot 7; thence North 89 degrees 47'41" 
East along the South line of Lot 7, 832.67 feet; thence 
North 61 degrees 00'00" East 1956.90 feet; thence North 47 
degrees 33'15" East 4 62.7 5 feet; thence North 4 2 degrees 
44'40" East 85.63 feet to the point of beginning. 
SUBJECT TO Easements, Encroachments, Restrictions, Rights-
of-Way and matters ofrecord enforceable in law equity. 
NOTE: A portion of the above described property ; now 
known as White Pine Ranches, Phase 1, a Planned . ^idential 
Development according to the official plat thereor on file 
and of record in the Summit County Recorder's Office. Less 
and excepting Lots 1 -hrough 5, inclusive of said White Pine 
Ranches. Phase 1 ,. a Planned Residential Development. 
Dated this 4th day of August, 1986. 
ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY, 
a Utah Corporation 
Trustee 
" T31ake T. Heiner 
Its: Vice President 
/-% r> 
a DEFENDANT 
| EXHIBIT 
1 *) 
CONSENT TO RECORD 
PHASE I 
WHITE PINE RANCHES 
Beginning at the Northeast Corner of Section 1, Township 2 
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake 3ase and Meridian; thence South 
0° 19 f 46" West 1336,14 feet to the common corner of government 
lots 1 and 8 of said Section 1; thence South 89* 43f 36" West 
173.42 feet to the true point of beginning; thence South 39° 
43f 36* West'along the northerly boundary of Phase I, White 
Pine Ranches 2943.98 feet; thence South 0° 13f 29" East along 
the westerly line of Phase I, White Pine Ranches 1013.OS feet? 
thence North 63* 44' 00* East 371.36 feet to a point on a 60.00 
foot radius curve to the left (center bears North 60° 00! 00" 
East, 60.00 feet of which central angle is 104° 16f 02") ; 
thence southeasterly along the arc of said curve 109.19 feet to 
a point on a 25.00 foot radius reverse curve to the right 
(center bears South 44° 15? 02" East 25.00 feet of which the 
central ancle is 43° 06f 07"); thence northeasterly alone the 
arc of said curve 20.99 feet to a point on a 209.11 radius 
reverse curve to the left (center bears North 03° 30' 05* East 
209.11 feet of which the central ancle is 40° SO1 05"); thence 
northeasterly along the arc of said curve 149.03 feet to a 
point on a 70.00 foot radius reverse curve to the right (center 
bears South 37° 00' 00 r East 70.00 feet of which the central 
angle is 33® 07' 05"); thence northeasterly along the arc of 
said cruve a distance of 42.91 feet to a point of tangency; 
thence North 88° 07f 05" East 292.41 feet to a point on a 
405.0 0 foot radius curve to the left (center bears North 01* 
52f 55" West 405.0 0 feet of which the central angle is 46* 27' 
05"); thence northeasterly along the arc of said curve 323.35 
feet to a point of tangency; thence North 41° 40f 00" last 
73.91 feet to a point on a 471.04 foot radius curve to the 
right (center bears South 43a 20' 00" East 471.04 feet having 
a central angle of 33° 2Qf 00"); thence northeasterly along the 
arc of said curve 274.04 feet to a point on a 302.70 foot 
radius reverse curve to the left (center bears North IS3 GO1 
00" West 502.70 feet of which the central angle is 11° QC 
00") ; thence northeasterly along the arc of said curve 96.31 
feet to a point of tangency; thence North 64° 00r 00" last 
79.95 feet to a point en a 350.00 foot radius curve to the left 
(center bears North 25* 00f 00" West 330*00 feet cf which the 
central angle is If3 00' 00"); thence northeasterly along -he 
arc of said curve 97.74 feet to a point cf tangency; zzer.zs 
North 48° 00' 00" East 221.05 feet to a point on a 220.00 foot 
radius curve to the right (center bears South 42° 001 00" East 
220.00 feet of which the central angle is 42° 001 00"); thence 
northeasterly along the arc of said curve 161.27 feet to a 
point of tangency; thence North 90° 00' 00" East 188.36 feet to 
a point on a"l04.43 foot radius curve to the right (center 
bears South 00° 00f 00" East 104.43 feet of which the central 
angle is 45° 00f 00"); thence southeasterly along the arc of 
said curve 82.02 feet to a point on a 132.94 foot radius 
reverse curve to the left (center bears North 45° 00f 00" East 
132.94 feet of which the central angle is 65° 00f 00"); thence 
southeasterly along the arc of said curve 150.81 feet to a 
point on a 187.84 foot radius curve to the left (center bears 
North 20° 00' 00" West 187.84 feet of which the central angle 
is 18° 001 00"); thence northeasterly along the arc of said 
curve 59.01 feet to a point of tangency; thence North 52° 00f 
00" East 13.51 feet to a point on a 129.36 foot radius curve to 
the right (center bears South 38° 00' 00" East 129.36 feet of 
which the central angle is 18° 00' 00"); thence northeasterly 
along the arc of said curve 40.64 feet to a point on a 20.00 
foot radius curve to the right (center bears South 20° 00' 00" 
East 20.00 feet of which the central angle is 110° 001 00"); 
thence southeasterly along the arc of said curve 38.40 feet to 
a point of tangency; thence South 00° 00' 00" East 35.69 feet 
to a point on a 80.00 foot radius curve to the left (center 
bears North 90° 00! 00" East 80.00 feet of which the central 
angle is 31° 27f 59"); thence southeasterly along the arc of 
said curve 43.94 feet to a point on the westerly right-of-way 
of White Pine Canyon Road; thence North 47° 33f 15" East along 
said right-of-way 159.02 feet; thence North 42° 44f 40" East 
along said right-of-way 85.63 feet to the true point of 
beginning, together with a non-exclusive easement for water 
lines, water tank and water systems over, under and across the 
property, shown here near the southwest corner of the subject 
property, and specifically described in the Declaration of 
Protective Covenants and reserving unto the owners, for 
granting to the owners of adjacent or nearby property, a 
non-exclusive easement for utilities and vehicular and 
pedestrian access over the private roadway shown on the plat 
and from the well sites as developed but in such a manner as to 
not interfere with construction or development of the specific 
lot or lots containing the well site. 
Contains 32.8495 acres, more or less. 
r^ n 
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^ v ?/->3^3 
?:.ate '-f Utah 
County of Summit 
Jo/fj/c. Sharp " ' V Date 
On t h i s ^ 3 day of J/S83, personally appeared before 
me the undersigned Notary Public in and for said State and 
County, John C, Sharp, who after being duly sworn, acknowledged 
to me that he is the beneficiary of a deed of trust Book M193 
Page 372 recorded in Summit County, Utah, that he signed the 
owners dedication freely and voluntarily for and in behalf of 
said owners for the purpose therein mentioned and that said 
owners executed the same. 
My commission expires ^ / ^ W ^ ^ y c jH^ytt^^L^^ 
&<*<^Q f'S V>& Notary Public ^ 
Residing at 
"(7 
^iC 
State of Utah 
County of Summit 
On this J?3 d 
me the uncersi 
County, Gerald 
acknowledged t 
trust Book M19 
she sicned the 
W?AJ2 Uzl2ci3 
Date aidme Y. Sh^rp 
ay of /2'b)j S 1983, personally appeared before 
gned Notary Public in and for said State and 
ine Y. Sharp, who after being duly sworn, 
o me that she is the beneficiary of a deed of 
3 Page 372 recorded in Summit County, Utah, that 
owners dedication freely and voluntarily for and 
T"7" ~Z 7 T — • T-* • . i -a _j in behalf of said owners for the purpose tneTein mentioned and 
that said owners executed the same. " " * 
My commission 
v 
expires 
J9& 
Yfa* 
Notary Public' 
Residina at 
State of Utah 
County of Summit 
Donna Bartlett Moore / 
Assistant Vice P r e s i d e n t 
F o o t h i l l T h r i f t 
Date 
On this 6th day of Sent. , 1983, personally appeared before me 
the undersigned Notary Public in and for said State and County, 
Larry E. Grant, who after being duly sworn, acknowledged to me 
that he is the beneficiary of a deed of trust Book M237 Page 696 
recorded in Summit County, Utah, that he signed the owners 
dedication freely and voluntarily for and in behalf of said 
owners for the purpose therein mentioned an£<£l&«u^&£id owners 
executed the same. 
My commission expires 
State of Utah 
County of Summit 
fa day of/WT 
?ld EJ" Tur 
President and 
Utah First Bank 
Date 
xecutive Officer 
On this fa'~ of/NT/V" , 1983, personally appeared before me 
the undersigned Notary Public in and for said State and County, 
Harold E. Turley,Jr., who after being duly sworn, acknowledged to 
me that he is the beneficiary of a deed of trust Book 259 Page 846 
recorded in Summit County, Utah, that he signed the owners 
dedication freely and voluntarily for and in behalf of said owners 
for the purpose therein mentioned and that s^ yd owners executed the 
same. 
My commission expires 
KT S^i&USCti EX7iul3 SEFTfiSSSB 11.1984 
Notary P u b l i c 
R e s i d i n a a t ff:<T*^ L/rtJ^r 
MEMORANDUM OF CLOSING TERMS 
MEMORANDUM OF CLOSING TERMS dated June 30, 1981, 
executed by JOHN C. SHARP and GERALDINE Y. SHARP (herein-
after "Seller"), and ROBERT FELTON, LEON H. SAUNDERS, KENNETH 
R. NORTON, and PAUL H. LANDES (hereinafter collectively 
"Buyer"). 
This Memoranda.- is executed for the express purpose 
i 
of describing those^matters agreed upon by the parties hereto 
which survive the closing of the transaction. 
1. It is mutually agreed and understood that after 
recordation of the PUD Plat and the Declaration of Covenants, 
Conditions and Restrictions, and upon receipt of each 
$140,000.00 in principal (but not including the earnest money 
and down payment money), Seller shall execute and deliver to 
Buyer a Partial Deed of Reconveyance for one (1) PUD lot. 
2. Upon the payment of the release price, feuyer shall 
be entitled to the release of one (1) lot of Buyer's choice upon 
receipt of the payment or at any time thereafter. 
3. It is agreed that, at the time of execution of 
this Memorandum, Buyer has paid to Seller the sum of $620,000.00 
which will release from the Deed of Trust three (3) PUD lots. 
Upon the recordation of the PUD Plat and Declaration of Covenants, 
Conditions and Restrictions with the Summit County Recorder, 
Buyer shall be entitled to the release from the Deed of Trust of 
three (3) PUD lots of Buyer's choice together with the said road-
way. 
DEFENDANT 
EXHIBIT 
ZH 
4. In the event Buyer should pay to Seller any princi-
pal sum in excess of the agreed upon release price, said sum 
shall be applied toward the next release price, i.e., should Buyer 
make a principal payment of $160,000.00, the sum of $20,000.00 
($160,000.00 less $140,000.00) shall be applied toward the next 
release price which shall require an additional principal payment 
of $120,000.00 ($20,000.00 plus $120,000.00 equals $140,000.00) 
to release the next lot. 
5. The proposed plat is attached hereto as Exhibit 
"A" and by this reference incorporated herein. Seller hereby 
acknowledges and agrees to execute as a lienholder the original 
plat prior to recordation. Changes in the proposed plat and the 
Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions when pre-
pared shall be subject to the reasonable approval of Seller. 
6. Seller agrees to grant to Summit County the ten 
and one-half (10-1/2) foot strip of land outlined in red on 
Exhibit "A". Said conveyance shall be for the sole purpose of 
widening the County roadway. If possible, such grant shall be 
in the form of an easement. The County indicates that it is 
possible that the County road as it exists is not where it is 
platted. If such proves to be a fact, Seller agrees that upon 
proper vacation, quit claim and abandonment of the platted road 
by the County, Seller shall grant to the County (by way of 
easement if possible) the County road as it exists as it is 
shown on Exhibit "A". 
7. Buyer agrees to provide Seller with one (1) sewer 
connection and one (1) culinary water connection into Buyer's 
systems at such time as each is available, and Seller shall pay 
a connection fee and service fee equal to the pro rata cost to 
-2-
the purchaser of a lot in Buyer's proposed PUD plus any charges 
of Summit Water Distributing Company. The sewer and water 
connection granted above can be used by Seller in new 
construction if allowed on the 8.5 acre parcel or for connec-
tion to the existing residence or Seller. Should Seller require 
another water and/or sewer connection, upon payment of the same 
charge set forth in the prior sentence, if well and sewer line 
capacity is available in Buyer's systems, and if Buyer shall 
convey to Seller whatever water rights the Board of Health 
would require for one (1) culinary connection (not to exceed 
one acre/foot) and the location of the residences to be located 
on the retained approximately 8.5 acre portion of Seller's 
property shall be subject to the reasonable approval of Leon H. 
Saunders and the residences to be constructed on the said 8.5 
acre parcel shall be subject to the same restrictions as Buyer's 
residences are subject to under the Covenants, Conditions and 
Restrictions of White Pine Ranch PUD, Buyer shall grant to 
Seller another one (1) culinary connection and one (1) sewer 
connection. If Seller does not request the second culinary 
water connection and/or sewer connection, Seller is not 
subject to the conditions set forth in the immediately 
preceding sentence. The location through Buyer's property 
of the sewer line and culinary water line shall be designated 
by Buyer and Buyer will make such designation to the closest 
reasonable connection point to Seller's property. 
8. Buyer and Seller agree that none of them have en-
gaged a Real Estate Broker, Agent or Finder for the purposes of 
effecting this transaction and no commission, fee or other com-
pensation shall be due and owing to any such Broker, Agent or 
Finder as a result of this closing. 
9. This Memorandum and the closing documents executed 
simultaneously herewith contain all the understandings, warranties, 
~3-
representations and agreements among the parties and the same 
are entered into after each party has personally and fully in-
vestigated all facts and circumstances concerning the transac-
tions reflected by and contemplated herein and none of the 
parties are relying upon any statements or representations not 
embodied herein. 
10. Time is of the essence of this Memorandum and 
it may not be orally changed, modified or terminated except in 
writing signed by the party against whom the same is sought to 
be enforced. The terms of this Memorandum shall apply to and 
bind the heirs, executors, administrators, successors and 
Assigns of the respective parties hereto. 
11. In tfie event of breach or default of any obliga-
tion under this Memorandum, the defaulting party shall pay all 
expenses of enforcing the same or any right arising out of breach 
or default thereof, including reasonable attorneys' fees, whether 
incurred with or without suit and both before and after judgment. 
12. All warranties, covenants, obligations and agree-
ments contained herein shall survive the closing of this trans-
action and any and all documents and instruments delivered in 
connection herewith and shall remain binding upon the parties 
hereto. 
DATED this \L> day of Z J T U A N J , 1981. 
SELLER: 
c^-v- y<TU^JL 
^^^^L^. ^^t^yp 
GERALDINE Y. SHART / 
BUYER: 
eJj #U-
ROBERT, FELTON 
LEON H. SAUNDERS 
- 4 -
BUYER: 
KENNETH R. NOKTON 
PAOL H. LANCES 
-5-
^r: 
I JAMES G .VEST DO HEPCST ': 
NO. 3082 AS PRESCRIBED UNDER THE 
OWNERS, I riAVE VADE A SUP.E ' ZL 
JK.DED SAiD TRACT OF LAND . \ ^ J I ' 
AND ^HE SAME ~iAS BEEN : R R E : ~ . 
N49°23 '40"E 
2_ 17' 
S 39° 25' 68" t. RECORI 
WH 
*9°47'4l"E 
54 99' 
• ^ • _ - * - * t * i 
; i . * °05 '23 .V 
I N 8 9 M 7 41 E 
00* 
*Sr 
•DGEMENT 
•yQartar.-Mftkl fe, Q^»U4 ^Wi (W^ 
NORTHEAST CORNER 
1
 OF SEC 1,1 2S,R 3E, 
SALT LAKE BASE AND . 
MERIDIAN + 
• 4 BRASS 
^ CAP 
. DAY OF . 
.,1981 PERSONALLY HIS _ 
UNDERSIGNED NOTARY PUBLIC, ROBERT FELTON, 
DULY SWORN, DID SAY THAT THE WITHIN AND 
FICATE AND CONSENT TO RECORD WAS DULY 
>R AND IN BEHALF OF SAID INDIVIDUAL AND 
EXECUTE THE SAME 
NOTARY PUBLIC. 
RESIDING AT 
2948 98 
N89°43'36"E 
78 ' 93 64' 
CORNER OF LOTS I 8 8 
BRASS CAP) I/I6m COR 
OF SEC I, T 2S, R 3E, 
SA_T _AKE BASE AND 
MEK.DiAN 
BOUNDARY DESCRIPTION 
/ 
BEGINNING AT A POiNT SOUTH 9 9 ° 4 3 ' 3 6 " WEST ALONG THE 
NORTh LINE OF LOT 8, i7£ 4 2 ' FEET FROM THE CORNER OF LOTS 
I & 8 , WHICH IS A BRASS CAr SET BY THE U S GENERAL LAND 
OFFICE, SAID BRASS CAP ALSO BEING SOUTH 0 ° l 9 ' 4 6 " WEST ALONG SEC. 
JtlE 1336 14' FEET KROM THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF SECTION I, TOWN-
fHlr 2 SOUTH, RANGE 3 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, AND RUNNING 
^HENCE SOUTH 8 9 ° 43 '36" WEST ALONG THE NORTH LINE OF LOTS 7 AND 8 
2 J 4 8 9 8 ' FEET TO THE NORTHWEST CORNER OF LOT 7 , THENCE SOUTH 0 ° l 3 ' 2 9 " 
LAST ALONG THE WEST LINE OF LOT 7, 1312 84 ' FEET TO THE SOUTHWEST CORNER 
OF LOT 7, THENCE NORTH 8 9 ° 4 7 ' 4 l " EAST ALONG THE SOUTH LINE OF
 UGT 7, 832 67' 
FEET, THENCE NORTH 61 ° OO'OO" EAST 1956 9 0 ' FEET , THENCE NORTH 47°33 ' 15" EAST 
462 75' FEET, THENCE NORTH 4 2 ° 4 4 ' 4 0 " EAST S5 65' ^EET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING 
SUR\%YOR'S CERflFICATE 
0 HEREBY CERTIFY THAT i AM A REGISTERED LAND SURVEYOR AND THAT I HOLD CERTIFICATE 
UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF UTAH I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT BY AUTHORITY OF THE 
SURVEY OF THE TRACT OF LAND SHOWN ON THIS PLAT AND DESCRIBED ABOVE AND HAVE SuB-
*ND ,NTO LOTS AND STREETS HEREAFTER TO BE KNOWN AS WHITE PINE RANCHES 
ORRECTLY SURVEYED AND STAKED ON THE GROUND AS SHOWN ON THiS PLAT-
I JAVES G .VEST DO HEPC9> 
NO 3082 AS PRESCRIBED UNDER THt 
OWNERS, I HAVE MADE A SUR ;E> :* 
DIVIDED SAID TRACT OF LAND • \" r0 L 
AND THE SAME -lAS BEEN •"ORPEC~. 
N 49° 2 3 4 0 E 
21 17' 
S 39° 25'38" E 
" " b 9'' RECOR 
)047'4IME 
54 99" 
7n 
WbiMeJ-llkl fc, tt-oUA"^!^ 
DGEMENT NORTHEAST CORNER ' OF SEC I . T 2 S . R 3E, SALT LAKE BASE AND . 
MERIDIAN * 
fA BRASS 
^ CAP 
. DAY OF . .,1981 PERSONALLY 
NDERSlGNED NOTARY PUBLIC, ROBERT FELTON, 
)ULY SWORN, DID SAY THAT THE WITHIN AND 
ICATE AND CONSENT TO RECORD WAS DULY 
I AND IN BEHALF OF SAID INDIVIDUAL AND 
•XECUTE THE SAME. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
CORNER OF LOTS I ft 8 
(BRASS CAP) I / I6m COR 
OF SEC I, T 2S, R 3E, 
SA-,7 _AKE BASE ANO 
MEK.DIAN 
BOUNDARY DESCRIPTION 
BEGINNING AT A POiNT SOUTH 8 9 ° 4 3 ' 36" WEST ALONG THE 
NORTh LINE OF LOT 8 , 175 4 2 ' FEET FROM THE CORNER OF LOTS 
I ft 8 , WHICH IS A BRASS CAK SET BY THE U S GENERAL LAND 
OFFICE, SAID BRASS CAP ALSO BEING SOUTH 0 ° l 9 ' 4 6 " WEST ALONG SEC. 
•-TIE 1336 14' FEET FROM THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF SECTION I, TOWN-
SHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 3 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, AND RUNNING 
THENCE SOUTH 8 9 ° 43 '36" WEST ALONG THE NORTH LINE OF LOTS 7 AND 8 
2 i 4 8 9 8 ' FEET TO THE NORTHWEST CORNER OF LOT 7 , THENCE SOUTH 0 ° l 3 ' 29" 
LAST ALONG THE WEST LINE OF LOT 7, 1312 84* FEET TO THE SOUTHWEST CORNER 
OF LOT 7 , THENCE NORTH 8 9 ° 4 7 ' 4 l " EAST ALONG THE SOUTH LINE OF JDT 7, 832 67 ' 
FEET, THFNCE NORTH 6 i ° 0 0 ' 0 0 " EAST 1956 9 0 ' FEET, THENCE NORTH 47»33 ' l5" EAST 
462 75' FEET, THENCE NORTH 42° 44'40" EAST 85 65' FEET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING 
SUR\JtYOR'S CERTIFICATE 
HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I AM A REGISTERED LAND SURVEYOR AND THAT I HOLD CERTIFICATE 
NDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF UTAH I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT BY AUTHORITY OF THE 
URVEY OF THE TRACT OF LAND SHOWN ON THIS PLAT AND DESCRIBED ABOVE AND HAVE SUB-
D .NTO LOTS AND STREETS HEREAFTER TO BE KNOWN AS WHITE PINE RANCHES 
'ORRECTLf SURVEYED AND STAKED ON THE GROUND AS SHOWN ON THIS PLAT. 
I N 8 9 ° 4 7 41 E 
L
~ 54 99' 
100 
* * 
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EXHIBIT 'A" 
Beginning at a point South 89* 43' 36" Wast along tha North 
lina of Lot 8, 175.42 faat from tha comar of Lots 1 and 8, a 
brass cap sat by tha U. S. Ganaral Land Office, said brass cap 
also being South 00° 19* 46" West along section line 1336.14 
feet from the Northeast corner of Section 1, Township 2 South, 
Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence 
South 89° 43' 36" West along the North line of Lots 7 and 8 
2948.98 feet to the Northwest corner of Lot 7; thence South 
00* 13' 29" East along the West line of Lot 7, 1312.84 feet to 
the Southwest corner of Lot 7; thence North 89* 47' 41" East 
along the South .line of Lot 7, 832.67 feet; thence North 61* 
00* 00" East 1956.90 feet; thence North 47* 33' 15" East 
462.75 feet; thence North 42* 44* 40" East 85.63 feet to the 
point of beginning. 
SUBJECT TO Easements, Encroachments, Restrictions, Rights-of-Way 
and matters of record enforceable in law or equity. 
rorded at Request of 
ac M. Fee Paid $ 
by , Dep. Rnnk Page— Ref.:. 
Mail tax notice to„..BQber£..EelJ:on .. Addre»..44..E^Changg..P.la.c^
-
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
WARRANTY DEED 
(Special) 
JOHN C. SHARP and GERALDINE Y. SHARP, his wife, as tenants in tumun (the 
said John C. Sharp owning an undivided two-thirds (2/3) interest therein grantor 
and the said Geraldine Y. Sliarp avning an undivided one-third (1/3) interest 
therein) of Salt Lake City, Utah hereby 
CONVEY AND WARRANT against all claiming by, through or under said grantors 
to PAUL H. LANDES, ROBERT FELTOI, LEON H. SAUNDERS and INTERSTATE RENTALS, 
INC.* a Nevada Corporation, each as to an undivided 25% interest as 
tenants in carron and not as joint tenants grantee 
of Salt Lake City, Utah for the sum of 
Ten Dollars and other good and valuable consideration DOLLARS, 
the fojlowing described tract o( land in Summit County, 
State of Utah: 
SEE EXHIBIT -A* ATTACHED HERETO AND BY THIS REFERENCE 
INCORPORATED HfcSlEIN. 
mOt*e.o 
WITNESS, the hand of said grantor , this 
July . A. D. 19 81 
Signed in the Presence of 
16th day of 
STATE OF UTAH, , 
County o£...5alt Lake • 
On tMC/'v^tH- - lay of July . A. D. 15*1 
pcr$ona!ry..3pr^ared>cforeme
 Jcm c SHARp a n d GERALDINE Y. SHARP 
the signers-' of the willrin instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that the Y executed the 
M y commission expires 
. . . \ , . - .U..IJ,C^. 
1 / U| I^o«ry Public. 
EXHIBIT "A" 
Beginning at a point South 89° 43* 36" West a Long the North 
line of Lot 8, 175.42 feet from the corner of Lots 1 and 8, a 
brass cap set by the U. S. General Land Office, said brass cap 
also being South 00° 19* 46" West along section line 1336.14 
feet from the Northeast corner of Section 1, Township 2 South, 
Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence 
South 89* 43* 36" West along the North line of Lo- 7 and 8 
2948.98 feet to the Northwest corner of Lot 7; t\\ e South 
00° 13' 29" East along the West line of Lot. 7, 1.. .84 feet to 
the Southvjst corner of Lot 7; thence North 89* ••;. ' 41" East 
along the South line of Lot 7, 3 32.67 feet; thenco North 61* 
00* 00" East 1956.90 feet; thence North 47° 33' 15" East 
462.75 feet; thence North 42° 44' 40" East 85.63 feet to the 
point of beginning. 
SUBJECT TO Easements, Encroachme cs, Restrictions, Rights-of-Way 
and matters of record enforceable in law or equity. 
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Mr. John Sharp 
5068 Holladay Boulevard 
Salt Lake City# Utah 84117 
Re: White Pine Ranch Property 
Dear Jack: 
Enclosed please find the Covenants, Conditions and 
Restrictions and the subdivision plat that Hy Saunders proposes 
to record with your approval. The subdivision plat subdivides 
only a portion of the property he purchased from you, 
specifically the northern portions of the property. By Hy's 
signature, which I will obtain to this letter prior to 
releasing your consent to the recordation of the subdivision 
plat, he agrees that you continue to have vour right of 
approval with regarn ± Q how tne southern portion of the 
is platted. Your signature on tne enclosed consent 
only acknowledges your approval of his recording the 
the Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions, copy here 
At a later time in the near future Hy has indicated 
Lots 1 through 5 of the platted 
road (White Pine Lane) and the ten 
the County Road Commission. We will 
is presented. For your information, 
I have reviewed the payments under the Note and find that he is 
entitled to those releases. When those releases are made, 
to your instruction we will insure that rights are 
in White Pine Lane for access tor the southern 
of tne property purchased from you until your Deed of 
fully paid. Please call me with any questions you may 
property 
document 
plat and 
enclosed. 
he will seek release of 
subdivision along with his 
and one-half foot strip to 
handle that matter when it 
pursuant 
reseiyed 
portions 
Trust is 
have. 
Sincerely, 
\ / 
Jon C. 
N 
Heaton 
- DEFENDANTS 
1 . EXHIBIT 
JCH:pe 
End. 
1398B 
Approved: 
Bv _ 
L J W O A C M 
SPEOALE & FELTON 
Sw&i 220 Coufifliumd ftwncJii Ctnttf 
"4 324 South SlitaStPMC * . / .> 
UtLaka Gry,Utih 84111-2303 . 
801 389-021* 
November 21, 1983 
Jon Heaton 
Attorney at Law 
424 East 5th South • | DDINDANTS 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 I f iXHUfT 
HZ: White Pine 2anch Property 
Dear Jon: 
"?£&al 
Ey gave me your November 18, 1983 letter to Mr. John Sharp. We are in 
almost total agreement with that letter 'except for one item* 
- Tour letter states something regarding the reservation of an easement 
along White Pine Lane to be retained by Mr. Sharp for access. This was not 
part of the agreement and is not acceptable since it would mean rewriting our 
Covenants at this late date. With the release of Lots 1 - 5 , Mr. Sharp only 
^_
 m needs access to Lot 6 on the north half of the property. It is perfectly 
£ ^r:^ acceptable to us that he retain an easement over White Pine Lane to the 
southern part of his property as well as to Lot 6 from White Pine Canyon Road 
" "
 ?
 ^  ^N up to the western boundary of Lot 6. Actually, Mr. Sharp has no need for the 
<e' reservation of any easement since all of the property which will not be 
•' ry released may be accessed from White Pine Canyon Road. Nevertheless, we think 
Os ^ it is fair that an easement be retained as far as the western boundary of Lot 
^ \\ - You should be informed that we have spent almost two years "fussing" with 
^S^^**' the County for approval of this project and any future aeiavs are 
^ : ** intolerable. While I realise that we were late on a portion of the payment 
^~
 #,. because Mr. Hunter did not contribute his partnership share, that problem has 
£~ '\ been rectified, including all penalty sums which were due. For that delay I 
\> /*, can only apologize, but I must inform you that any delays in formalizing the 
r{% '/ ^<- items referred to in your letter and this letter will result in losing the 
\ y construction financing on this project. That, as you may know, could be very 
J^J ( , expensive. 
^\
 r In any event, Mr. Sharp has reauired that we live un to the exact terms 
\.x f of our agreement. Z can only insist that he now live uo to the exact terns as 
written. There is no ^revision for the reservation of an unnecessary easenen: 
across our road which would result in rewriting the covenants on the property, 
place an unreasonable burden upon the property to be conveyed, and very 
possibly cause us to lose our construction financing. 
In summary, I would just like to confirm our position that all rights of 
approval which Mr. and Mrs. Sharp retain pursuant, to our original purchase 
contract certainly continue as to the southern portion of the property, I 
would again apologize for the late payment, but I certainly think we paid for 
it in full. The easement which Mr. Sharp retains should be limited to the 
property which is not deeded pursuant to the terms of the contract and we are 
certainly in agreement with that as described in this letter. 
Please have your client sign his consent to the recordation immediately 
since time is very crucial to our construction financing. 
Ver^ truly yours, 
Robert Felton 
RF/tp 
cc: Hy Saunders 
1899 Long View Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
January 4, 1984 
Associated Title Company 
Box 1705 
1161 Park Avenue 
ParK City, Utah 84060 
Gentlemen: 
The undersigned John C. Sharp and Geraldine Y. Snarp, 
being the holders of all of the beneficial interest uncer that 
certain Deed of Trust dated June 30, 1981 in the original 
amount of $963,055.30, recorded July 16, 1981 as Entry No. 
181695 in Book M193 beginning at page 372 of the official 
records of Summit County, State of Utah, do hereby direct you 
as the Trustee under that Deed of Trust to release from tne 
Deed of Trust to the person or persons entitled thereto, Lots 1 
through 5 inclusive of White Pine Ranches, a planned 
residential development, according to the official plat thereot 
recorded as Entry No. 214524 on December 23, 1983. Except for 
the property described above, all other portions of the 
property remain subject to the Trustjpeed. 
DATED this /£ day of xA*Vi^£sx/j , 1984. 
'y^^f^/ 
;e?aldine Y. StrSnp — (J 
1462B 
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Law Offices 
SPECIALE & FELTON 
Suite 220 Coordinated Financial Center 
324 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -2303 
801 359-9218 
January 20, 1984 
John Heaton 
424 East 5th South 
No, 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RE: Deeds to Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 
Dear John: 
Hy talked to me on January 20, 1984, and to my astonishment, 
to ld me tha t we have not received the deed on our lo t s from Mr. 
Sharp. Would'you p lease c a l l me and confirm or explain what the 
s i t u a t i o n i s . 
I r e a l i z e tha t the deeds for the roads may be d i f f i c u l t to 
do, but I am at a complete loss as to why the other deed h a s n ' t 
been rece ived . 
Very t r u l y yours, 
Robert Felton 
RF/tp 
IM DEFENDANT'S 
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Associated Title Company 
P.O. Box 1705 
Park City/ Utah 84060 
PARTIAL RECONVEYANCE 
ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY/ a corporation organized and existing 
under the laws of the State of Utah/ with its principal office at 
Salt Lake/ of County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, as Trustee under a 
Trust Deed dated June 30/ 1981. Executed by Paul H. Landes/ Robert 
Felton/ Leon H. Saunders/ Interstate Rentals/ Inc./ ^s tenants in 
common/ as Trustor/ and recorded on July 16/ 1981/ as Entry No. 
181895/ in Book 193/ at Page 372 of the records of the County 
Recorder of Summit County/ Utah/ pursuant to a written request of the 
Beneficiary thereunder/ does hereby reconvey/ without warranty* to 
the person or persons entitled thereto/ a portion only of the trust 
property now held by said Trustee under said Trust Deed, whicn 
portion so reconveyed consists of real property situated in Submit 
County/ Utah/ described as follows: 
All of Lots 1 thru 5/ White Pine Ranches, Phase 1 A, 
Planned Residential Development/ according to the official 
plat thereof on file and of record in the Summit County 
Recorder's Office. 
Dated this 7th day of January/ 1986. 
Envy No. 248619 
ASSOCIATED TITLE 
3 — ^ - O ^ ^ y fr ^ ^ a - -r 
ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY/ 
Trustee 
STATE OP UTAH ) 
:SS. 
County of Salt Lake) 
500* 378«*688 
On the 7th day of January/ 1986/ personally appeared before me 
Blake T. Heiner/ who being by me duly sworn/ did say that he is the 
Vice President of Associated Title Company/ and that the foregoing 
instrument was signed in-behalf of said corporation by authority of a 
resolution of its board of - directors* and the said Blake-Tw Heiner 
duly acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same. 
My commission expires: 
December 17, 1988 
*1i<rw*m "• \ ^ ^ V 
NOTARY PUBLIC \\*T".- ^ ' - . I 1 v 
Residing at: Salt LaJce*/ '&&&.•••• ••., /Vl?"* 
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EmryNo 21452S J; . " — 
BEQUEST OF >9S0COT0 TITLE COMPANY 
1
 FEE AL^N SP^GGS SJM?.!'T CO -^i:^^' I 
DECLARATION OF PROTECTIVE COVENANTS FOR 
WHITE PINE RANCHES A PLANNED RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT 
THIS DECLARATION is made t h i s 27th day of September, 1983 by WHI.TF PINE 
RANCHES, a Utah partnership, and Leon Saunders, Robert Felton, Richard Rees 
i ^ f'O'JESr fty-
and Dan Hunter as individuals. ; * " 
'"' _. , v.iN sr-^oi. I'M: ' 
RECORDED -0EC8-> 1 ^ 5, l . ' . A V \ A\ 
1. Purpose of Covenants 
1.1 White Pine Ranches owns propeifc?" 1'fl^g^ U!Wy,~Se . a6 r a = = —' 
of Utah, described on Exhibit "AM attached hereto. The Exhibit "A" Property 
i s referred t o as the White Pine Ranches. The White Pine Randies Property is 
property vrfiich is subject t o t h i s Declaration and t o the Articles of 
Incorporation and By-Laws of the White Pine Ranches Association, a nonprofit 
association, copies of which are attached hereto as Exhibit "B?f. 
1.2 I t is the intention of White Pine Randies, expressed by i t s 
execution of the instrument, that the property described on Exhibit MAn (the 
Property^ be developed and maintained as a highly desirable residential 
area. I t is the purpose of these covenants that the present natural beauty, 
view and surrounding- of the White Pine Ranches Property shall be always 
protected insofar as i t Is possible in connection with the uses and structures 
permitted by t h i s instrument. White Pine Ranches hereby declares that the 
property and every part thereof is held and shall be held conveyed, devise^, CD 
leased, rented, encunfcered, used, occupied $nd unproved and otherwise affected 
in any manner subject t o the provisions of t h i s Declaration, each and all of 
whidi provisions are hereby declared to be in furtherance of the general plan 
and scheme of ownership referred t o herein and are further declared t o ^e for 
the benefit of the Property and every part thereof and for the benefit of each 
owner thereof. All provisions hereof shall be deemed t o run with the land as 
covenants runninr with the land or as equitable servitudes as the case may be, 
and jshall const i tute benefits and burdens t o the Declarant] i t s successor and 
assigns, and t o a l l par t ies hereafter canine* any interest of the Property an^ 
* * 
<* t 
. v / 
II• Definitions 
2.1 Declarant; "Declarant" means the persons executing this 
document together with their successors and assigns. 
2.2 Property; "Property" means that certain real property located 
in Summit County, Utah described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
2.3 Building; "Building" means any building constructed on the 
Property. 
2.4 Lot: A "Lot" shall mean any parcel of Property shown as such on 
the recorded plat of the Planned Unit Development. 
2.5 Owner: "Owner" shall mean the owner or owners of record of any 
Lot in the Planned Unit Development. 
2.6 Development: "Development" shall mean the Planned Residential 
Development located on the Exhibit "A" property subject to this Declaration 
upon and after recordation of the plat thereof and this Declaration in the 
records of Summit County. 
3. White Pine Ranches Association 
3.1 General Purposes and Powers: White Pine Ranches Association 
("Association") is formed as a not for profit corportion to be constituted and 
to perform functions as provided in this Declaration and to further the common 
Interests of all owners of Property which may be subject, in whole or in part, 
to any or all of the provisions, covenants, conditions and restrictions 
contained in this Declaration. The Association shall be obligated to and 
shall assume and perform all functions and obligations imposed on it or 
contemplated for it under this Declaration and any similar functions or 
obligations imposed on it or contemplated for it under any Amended Declaration 
with respect to any Property now or hereafter subject to this Declaration. 
The Assocation shall have all powers necessary or desirable to effectuate 
these purposes. It shall not engage in commercial, profit-making activity. 
3.2 Membership in White Pine Ranches Association: All persons who 
own any of the Lots in the Planned Residential Development, by whatever means 
acquired, shall automatically become Members of the Association, in accordance 
with the Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws of said Association as 
presently in effect and as the same may be duly amended from time to time and 
also filed or recorded in the Summit County records. 
IV. Architectural Committee. 
4.1 Architectual Committee: The Architectural Committee shall 
consist of three members. The Committee shall consist: of two members selected 
by Declarant with the one remaining member being selected by the White Pine 
Ranches Association. At such time as two years have expired from the date of 
recordation hereof or at such earlier time as Declarant shall designate, 
Declarant's membership shall pass to the Association. Said Architectural 
Committee shall have and exercise all of the powers, duties and 
responsibilities set out in this instrument. 
4.2. Approval by Architectural Committee: No improvements of any 
kind, Including but not limited to dwelling houses, swimming pools, ponds, 
parking areas, fences, walls, tennis courts, garages, drives, bridges, 
corrals, barns, outbuildings, antennae, flag poles, curbs and walks shall ever 
be erected, altered or permitted to remain on any Lots within Lais 
Development, nor shall any excavating, alteration of any stream, clearing, 
removal of trees, shrubs, or natural vegetation, or landscaping be done on any 
Lots within the Development, unless the complete plans and specifications 
therefor are approved by the Architectural Committee prior to the commencement 
of such work. A fee of $50.00 shall be paid to he Architectural Committee to 
cover costs and expenses of review. Improvements costing less than $500.00 
shall be submitted as directed to the Architectural Committee for approval but 
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the fee of $50.00 shall not be required. The Architectural Committee shall 
consider the materials to be used on the external features of all buildings or 
structures, including exterior colors, harmony of external design with 
existing structures within said subdivision, location with respect to 
topography, finished grade elevations and harmony of landscaping with the 
natural setting. The complete architectural plans and specifications must be 
prepared by an architect licensed by the State of Utah and must be submitted 
in duplicate including at least four different elevation views. One complete 
copy of plans and specifications shall be signed for identification by the 
Owner and left with the Architectural Committee. In the event the 
Architectural Committee fails to take any action within 45 days after complete 
plans for such work have been submitted to it, then all of such submitted 
plans shall be deemed to be approved* In the event the Architectural 
Committee shall disapprove any plans, the person submitting the plans may 
appeal the matter at the next annual or special meeting of the Members of the 
Association, where an affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of the 
membership shall be required to change the decision of the Architectural 
Committee. 
4.3 Variances: Where circumstances, such as topography, hardship, 
location of property lines, location of stream or other matters require, the 
Architectural Committee may, by an affirmative vote of a majority of the 
members of the Architectural Committee, allow reasonable variance as to any of 
the architectural covenants and restrictions contained in this instrument or 
any applicable Amended Declaration, on such terms and conditions as it shall 
require. 
4.4 General Requirements: The Architectural Committee shall 
exercise its best judgment to see that all improvements, construction, 
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landscaping and alterations on the lands within the Development conform and 
harmonize with the natural surroundings and with existing structures with 
relation to external design, materials, comparable value, color, siting, 
height, topography, grade and finished group evelation. 
4.5 Preliminary Approvals: Persons who anticipate constructing 
improvements on Lots within the Development, whether they already own Lots or 
are contemplating the purchase of such Lots, may submit preliminary sketches 
of such Improvements to the Architectural Committee for informal and 
preliminary approval or disapproval. All preliminary sketches shall be 
submitted in duplicate and shall contain a proposed site plan, together with 
sufficient general information on all aspects that will be required to be in 
the complete plans and specifications to allow the Architectural Committee to 
act intelligently to give an informed and preliminary or informal approval or 
disapproval• 
4.6 Plans: The Architectural Committee shall disapprove any plans 
submitted to it which are not sufficient for it to exercise the judgment 
required of it by these covenants. 
4.7 Architectural Committee Not Liable: The Architectural Committee 
shall not be liable in damages to any person submitting any plans for 
approval, or to the Association or to any Owner or Owners of Lots within the 
Development, by reason of any action, failure to act, approval, disapproval, 
or failure to approve or disapprove, with regard to such plans. Any person 
acquiring the title to any Property in the Development or any person 
submitting plans to the Architectural Committee for approval, by so doing 
shall be deemed to have agreed and covenanted that he will not bring any 
action or suit to recover damages against the Architectural Committee, its 
members as individuals, or its advisors, employees or agents. 
4.8 Written Records: The Architectural Commitee shall keep and 
safeguard complete written records of all applications for approval submitted 
to it (including one set of all preliminary sketches and all architectural 
plans so submitted) and of all actions of approval or disapproval and all 
other actions taken by it under the provisions of this instrument which 
records shall be maintained for a minimum of five years after approval or 
disapproval• 
V. General Restrictions on All Property 
5.1 Zoning Regulations: No lands within the Development shall ever 
be occupied or used by or for any Building or purpose or in any manner which 
is contrary to the Zoning regulations applicable thereto validly in force from 
time to time. 
5.2 No Mining, Drilling or Quarrying: No mining, quarrying, 
tunneling, excavating or drilling for any substances within the earth, 
Including oil, gas, minerals, gravel, sand, rock and earth shall be permitted 
on the surface of the Property. 
5.3 No Business Uses: The Lots within the Property shall be used 
exclusively for residential living purposes, such purposes to be confined to 
approved residential buildings within the Property. No Lots within the 
Property shall ever be occupied or used for any commercial or business 
purposes, provided, however, tha nothing in this Paragraph 5.3 shall be deemed 
to prevent (a) Declarant or its duly authorized agent from using any Lot owned 
by Declarant or such agent for the location of a sales office, or sales model, 
or (b) any owner or his duly authorized agent from renting or leasing said 
owner's residential building for residential uses from time to time, subject 
to all of the provisions of this Declaration but nightly rentals are 
prohibited and any allowed rental must be for no less than one month in 
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duration, under written lease with rent prepaid one month in advance and a 
copy of this Declaration 
5.4 Restriction on Signs: With the exception of a sign no larger 
than three square fee identifying the architect and a sign of similar 
dimension identifying the prime contractor to be displayed only during the 
course of construction, no signs or advertising devices, Including but without 
limitation, signs advertising the Lot or Building for sale or rent and 
commercial, political, informational or directional signs or devices, shall be 
erected or maintained on any of the Propety, except signs approved in writing 
by the Architectural Committee as to size, materials, color and location: (a) 
as necessary to identify ownership of the Lots and its address; (b) as 
necessary to give directions (c) to advise of rules and regulations; (d) to 
caution or warn of danager; and (e) as may be required by law. 
5»5 Restrictions on Animals: Except for no more than four horses 
per lot, and no more than 11 horses for Lot 5, all in approved barns and 
corrals, no animals other than ordinary household pets shall be kept or 
allowed to remain on any of the Property unless and until written 
authorization is obtained from the Board of Trustees of the Association. The 
Board of Trustees, in its sole discretion, shall have the right at any time in 
its sole discretion, to revoke any authorization given and shall additionally 
have the power to require any Owner, lessee or person in possession of lands 
in the Development to remove any animal or pet which is kept in violation of 
this restriction or any animal or pet which is not disciplined or which 
constitutes an undue annoyance to other Owners or lessees of land in the 
Development• 
5.6 No Resubdivislon: No Lot shall be subdivided and no Building 
shall be constructed or allowed to remain on any tract that comprises less 
than one full Lot. 
5.7 Underground Utility Lines: All water, gas, electrical, 
telephone, and other electronic pipes and lines and all other utility lines 
within the limits of the Property must be buried underground and may not be 
exposed above the surface of the ground. 
5.8 Service Yards: All clothes lines, equipment, service yards or 
storage piles on any Lot in the Property shall be kept screened by approved 
planning or fencing so as to conceal them from the view of neighboring Lots, 
streets, access roads and areas surrounding the Property 
5.9 Maintenance of Property: All Property and all improvements on 
any Lot shall be kept and maintained by the owner thereof in clean, safe, 
attractive and sightly condition and in good repair. Landscaping of a front 
yard of approved size on each Lot must be complete within one year of the time 
of completion of the Building of the Lot* Where natural vegetation is kept, 
such natural vegetation must be maintained reasonably free of unsightly weeds 
and free of trash. 
5.10 No Noxious or Offensive Activity: No noxious or offensive 
activity shall be carried on upon any Property nor shall anything be done or 
placed on any Property which is or may become a nuisance or cause 
embarrassment, disturbance or annoyance to others. 
5.11 No Hazardous Activities: No activities shall be conducted on 
any Property and no improvements constructed on any Property which are or 
might be unsafe or hazardous to any person or property. Without limiting the 
generality of the foregoing, no firearms shall be discharged upon ay Property; 
and no open fires shall be lighted or permitted on any Propety except in a 
contained barbecue while attended and in use for cooking purposes or within 
safe and well-designed interior fireplace. 
- f t -
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5.12 No Unslghtliness: No unsightliness shall be permitted upon any 
of the Property. Without limiting the generality of the Property. Without 
limiting the generality of the foregoing, (a) any unsightly structures, 
facilities, equipment, tools, boats, vehicles other than automobiles, objects 
and conditions shall be enclosed within an approved Building or appropriately 
screened from view, except equipment and tools when in actual use for 
maintenance or repairs; (b) no trailers, mobile homes, tractors, truck campers 
or trucks other than pickup trucks shall be kept or permitted to remain upon 
the Property; (c) no vehicle, boat or equipment shall be constructed, 
reconstructed, repaired or abandoned upon any of the Property unless 
appropriately screened from view; (d) no lumber, grass shrub or tree 
clippings, plant waste, metals, bulk materials, weeds or scrap shall be kept, 
stored or allowed to grow or accumulate on any of the Property; (e) refuse, 
garbage and trash shall be placed an kept at all times in a covered container 
and such container shall be kept within an enclosed structure or appropriately 
screened from view; (f) hanging, drying or airing of clothing or household 
fabrics shall not be permitted within Buildings or on Lots if visible from 
Buildings, Lots or other areas surrounding the Property. Violation of this 
section or other restrictive sections of this Declaration shall allow the 
Assocaition to correct the violation at the expense of the owner and if such 
cost is not paid by the Owner a lien upon the applicable Lot can be placed and 
foreclosed under Articles VIII and IX hereof. 
5.13 No Annoying Lights, Sounds or Odors: No light shall be emitted 
from any Lot or Property which is unreasonably bright or causes unreasonable 
glare; no sound shall be emitted from any Lot or Property which is 
unreasonably loud or annoying, including, but without limitation, speakers, 
horns, whistles, bells or other sound devices, except security and fire alarm 
-9-
devices used exclusively to protect any of the Property or Buildings; and no 
odors shall be emitted from any Lot or Property which are noxious or offensive 
to others. 
5.14 Septic Tanks and Sewage Disposal: Underground sewer lines have 
been Installed to service each lot on the property. This system terminates 
where the property intersects White Pines Canyon Road. In the event a sewer 
line has been installed from Highway U224 to the subject property, then, 
without exception, each Owner shall connect to that system within six (6) 
months of the installation of the main line. In the event any Owner falls~"or 
refuses to connect to the sewer system, then an action may be brought by the 
Association, Summit County, or the Synderville Basin Sewer Improvement 
District to compel said connection. This requirement shall exist in addition 
to all state or local laws governing the requirement to hook up to the sewer 
system. Septic tanks may be permlssable if approved by the Architectural 
Committee, all governmental health authorities having jurisdiction and Summit 
County up and until six (6) months after the trunkline is installed. 
5.15 Slopes or Terraces: All slopes or terraces on any Lot shall be 
maintained so as to prevent any erosion thereof upon adjacent streets or 
adjoining property. 
5.16 Ingress and Egress: No ingress or egress to properties 
designated hereunder shall be permitted for use of any person or vehicle 
except through designated gateways and roadways, unless authorized in writing 
by the Board of Trustees. Any such authorization shall become null and void 
if the security of said area is diminished. However, Declarant, its 
successors or assigns, reserves the right to maintain and use or convey the 
right to use established easements and rights-of-way. Owners whose Lots are 
located along the perimeter of designated properties described herein shall be 
100 
responsible for maintaining any fencing placed along such perimeter by 
Developer or the Association according to its original state or replacing such 
with a wall or fence for the purpose of preserving or improving the security 
of the area. Alternative or replacement fencing shall meet the prior written 
approval of the Board of Trustee. 
5.17 Landscaping Control: Each Owner shall maintain his Lot in an 
attractive and safe manner so as not to detract from the community. Natural 
vegetation shall not be disturbed until commencement of construction and then 
only as required for construction and approved landscaping. 
5«18 Maintenance of Entrance Ways: Commencing at the time of 
occupancy or completion of the dwelling, each Owner of adjacent Lots shall be 
responsible to maintain in an attractive manner any special landscaping 
emplaced at street entrances or locations by the Declarant or the 
Association. Such maintenance shall Include watering and weeding of planting 
areas* The Association shall be responsible for maintenance of signs and 
special lighting, if any. 
5.19 Building and Landscaping Time Restrictions: The construction 
of all structures shall proceed diligently upon commencement and shall be 
completed within a period of eighteen months following commencement of 
construction. The approved front yard of each Lot shall be landscaped within 
a period of one (1) year following completion or occupancy of the dwelling. 
Areas covered with natural foliage will be considered landscaped so long as 
unsightly weeds are controlled. Any Owners possessing vacant lots shall be 
responsible for keeping such Lots clean in appearance and free from all refuse 
and potential fire hazards. No vacant Lot shall be used for storage of any 
kind except during the construction period. 
5.20 Failure to Remove Rubbish or Comply: Upon failure or neglect 
of any Owner to remove rubbish, trash, weeds or unsightly debris from his Lot 
or to otherwise comply with these covenants within 10 days after written 
notice to remove such or to comply has been mailed to him by the Association, 
the Association may cause the same to be removed or the Property to be brought 
into compliance and the Lot Owner shall be responsible for Che reasonable 
expenses of such removal or compliance. Failure to pay such expenses shall 
result In a special charge against the Lot Owner's account and may result in a 
lien against said Lot as outlined in Articles VIII and IX of these Covenants. 
5.21 Permissible Building Area: With respect to Lots in White Pine 
Ranches, no construction of any kind, other than approved corrals and barns, 
shall take place beyond the permissible building area for each Lot (as shown 
on the plat) without special consideration and written approval by the 
Architectural Committee. Locatoln of buildings within the permissible 
building area is subject to approval of the Architectural Committee. No 
corrals shall be located closer than 50 feet to any property line. 
5.22 Erosion Control: Each owner of a Lot in White Pine Ranches 
shall be responsible to Insure that no erosion or water drainage shall take 
place on his Lot which may adversely affect neighboring propetles and/or 
roads. 
5.23 Disturbance of Hillsides: Any disturbance of hillsides shall 
be controlled by theWhite Pine Ranches Association. Grading plans, retaining 
walls, revegetatlon, etc., shall be approved by the White Pine Ranches 
Association through its Architectural Committee. 
5.24 Perimeter Fences: Perimeter fencing shall not be permitted in 
the Development except for such perimeter fencing as Declarant or Che 
Association may install along Lot boundaries. Interior fencing if approved by 
the Architectural Committee shall be permitted. 
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5.25 Special Use: Declarant discloses that a covered water 
reservoir shall be constructed. Easements for the reservoir, access roads and 
distribution lines for any such reservoir erected may be declared at a later 
date. 
5.26 Rules and Regulations: No owner shall violate the rules and 
regulations for the use of the Lots as adopted from time to time by the 
Association, No such rules or regulations shall be established which violate 
the intention or provisions of this Declaration or which shall unreasonably 
restrict the use of any Lot by the Owner thereof. 
VI. Restrictions on Lots 
6.1 Number and Location of Buildings: No Buildings or structures 
shall be placed, erected, altered or permitted to remain on any Lot other than 
one single-family dwelling house, and one garage together with related non-
residential structures and improvements of the types described in Section 4.2 
hereof. Each Lot must be improved with a garage with at least a two-car 
capacity at the time of construction of the dwelling house on the Lot. 
The building sites for all Buildings and structures shall be approved by 
the Architectural Committee. In approving or disapproving the building sites, 
the Architectural Committee shall take into consideration the locations with 
respect to topography and finished grade elevations and the effect thereof on 
the setting and surrounding of the Development and the view of surrounding 
Owners• 
6.2 Residence Floor Area: The residence structure which may be 
constructed on a Lot in the Property shall have a minimum living floor area, 
exclusive of garage, balconies, porches and patios of 2,000 square feet for a 
one floor structure and a minimum of 1,200 square feet per floor for split 
entry and a two story home. 
6.3 Dwelling House to be Constructed First: No garage or other 
structure shall be constructed on any Lot until after commencement of 
construction of the dwelling house on the same Lot except as otherwise 
specifically permitted by the Architectural Committee. All construction and 
alteration work shall be prosecuted diligently, and each Building, structure, 
or improvement which is commenced on any Lot shall be entirely completed 
within eighteen (18) months after commencement of construction. 
6.4 Setbacks: Unless specifically authorized hereunder, all 
Buildings and structures on all Lots shall be set back at least 50 feet from 
the side Lot lines and within the permissible building area for each Lot. 
6.5 Height Limitations: No building or structure shall be placed, 
erected, altered or permitted to remain on any Lot, which exceeds a height of 
28 feet measured vertically from the average finished grade elevation of the 
foundation of such buldlng or structure* In all events building height must 
comply with applicable zoning ordinances. 
6.6 Towers and Antennae: No towers, and no exposed or outside 
radio, television or other electronic antennae, with the exception of normal 
television receiving antennae, excluding satellite dishes, shall be allowed or 
permitted to remain on any Lot, unless the Committee is satisfied they cannot 
be seen from anywhere off the subject Lot. 
6.7 Used or Temporary Structures: No used or previously erected or 
temporary house or structure and no house trailer, mobile home, camper or non-
permanent outbuilding shall ever be placed, erected or allowed to remain on 
any Lot except during construction periods, and no dwelling house shall be 
occupied in any manner prior to its completion and the issuance of a 
certificate of occupancy. 
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6.8 Fire Sprinklers: All residences and ancillary buildings 
excepting sheds and small storage units shall have complete automatic 
sprinkling systems installed at the time of construction. 
6.9 Fences: It is the general intention that fencing if installed 
on the Property have a continuity of appearance in keeping with the setting 
and surroundings of the Poperty. No fence shall be allowed to be constructed 
or remain accross a stream on the Property. Fences, corral fences, screens or 
walls which are associated or connected with a Building or structure may be 
allowed if of such design, material and height as approved by the 
Architectural Committee. 
6.10 Flashings and Roof Gutters: Flashing or roof gutters or other 
metal fittings on the exterior of Buildings shall be painted to match adjacent 
materials on Buildings* 
VII. Enforcement 
7*1 Enforcement and Remedies: The obligations, provisions, 
covenants, restrictions and conditions contained in this Declaration or any 
Amended Declaration shall be enforceable by Declarant or by any Owner of a Lot 
subject to this Declaration by a proceeding for a prohibitive or mandatory 
injunction. If court proceedings are instituted in conection with the rights 
of enforcement and remedies provided in this Declaration, the prevailing party 
shall be entitled to recover its costs and expenses in connection therewith, 
including reasonable attorney's fees. 
7.2 Protection of Encumbrances: No violation or breach of any 
provision, restriction, covenant or condition contained in this Declaration or 
any Amended Declaration and no action to enforce the same shall defeat or 
render invalid the lien of any first mortgage or first deed of trust taken in 
good faith and for value and perfected by recording prior to the time of 
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recording of an instrument giving notice of such violation or breach, or the 
title or interest of the Holder thereof or the title acquired by any purchaser 
upon foreclosure of any such first mortgage or first deed of trust• Any such 
purchaser shall, however, take subject to this Declaration and any Amended 
Declaration except only that non-continuing violations or breaches which occur 
prior to such foreclosure shall not be deemed breaches or violations hereof 
with respect to such purchaser, his heirs, personal representatives, 
successors and assigns. 
7.3 Limited Liability: Neither Declarant, the Association, the 
Board of Trustees of the Association, the Architectural Committee nor any 
member, agent or employee of any of the same shall be liable to any party for 
any action or for any failure to act with respect to any matter if the action 
taken or failure to act was in good faith and without malice. 
VIII. Covenant for Maintenance Assessments 
8.1 Creation of the Lien and Personal Obligation for Assessments: 
Each Owner, by acceptance of a real estate contract or deed for a Lot, whether 
or not it shall be so expressed in any such contract or deed, is deemed to 
covenant and agree to pay to the Association: (1) regular assessments or 
charges and (2) special assessments for capital Improvements, such assessments 
to be fixed, established and collected from time to time as hereinafter 
provided and (3) expenses incurred by the Association pursuant to Section 5.20 
hereof. The regular and special assessments and expenses together with such 
interest thereon and costs of collection thereof, as hereinafter provided, 
shall be a charge on the Lot and shall be a continuing lien upon the Lot 
against which each such assessment or charge is made. Each such assessment or 
charge together with such ic^rest, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees, 
shall also be the personal obligation of the person who was the Owner of such 
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property at the time when the assessment or charge fell due. The personal 
obligation shall not pass to his successors in title unless expressly assumed 
by them and approved by the Association. No membership may be transferred to 
a subsequent Lot owner until all due charges, assessments, Interest and 
penalty charges have been paid in full. 
All taxes or assessments due on the private road shall be a joint and 
several obligation with the Association and each homeowner. The Declarants 
believe that it is important to maintain the private nature of the road 
servicing this Project and if the Association, for any reason, fails to pay 
all taxes and assessments levied by Summit County upon this road, then the 
obligation shall be a joint and several obligation of the individual home 
owners. In the event of nonpayment by the Association, Summit County may 
enforce this obligation against the land owners individually, including 
reasonable attorney's fees. 
8.2 Purpose of Assessments: The assessments levied by the 
Association shall be used exclusively for the purpose of promoting the 
recreation, health, safety, security and welfare of the members of the 
Association and, in particular, for the improvement and maintenance of the 
properties, the private roadways and trails, the private water system and 
services and facilities devoted to these purposes and related to the use and 
enjoyment of the Owners, including specifically, security personnel and 
gatekeepers if utilized. 
8.3 Regular Assessments: The amount and time of payment of regular 
assessments shall be determined by the Board of Trustees of the Association 
pursuant to the Articles of Incorporation and By*-La.ws of said Association 
after giving due consideration to the current costs and future needs of the 
Association. Written notice of the amount of an assessment, regular or 
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special, shall be sent to every Owner, and the due date for the payment of 
same shall be set forth in said notice. 
8.4 Special Assessments for Capital Improvements: In addition to 
the regular assessments, the Association may levy in any calendar year, a 
special assessment applicable to that year only, for the purpose of defraying, 
in whole or inpart, the cost of any construction or reconstruction, unexpected 
repair or replacement of a described capitl improvement upon any common area, 
including the necessary fixtures and personal property related thereto, 
provided that any such assessment shall have the assent of two-thirds of the 
votes of the members who are voting in person or by proxy at a meetng duly 
called for this purpose, written notice of which shall be sent to all members 
not less than ten (10) days in advance of the meeting, setting forth the 
purpose of the meeting, 
•^-> Uniform Rate of Assessment: Both regular and special 
assessments shall be fixed at a uniform rate for all Lots and may be collected 
on a monthly, quarterly or annual basis. 
8»6 Date of Commencement of Regular Assessments and Fixing 
Thereof. The regular assessments provided for herein shall commence as to 
each Lot on the first day of the month following the purchase of each Lot by 
an individual Owner. Monthly, quarter, or annual assessments will be payable 
at times determined by the Board of Trustees of the Association. 
8.7 Certificate of Payment: The Association shall, upon demand, 
furnish to any Owner liable for said assessment, a certificate in writing 
signed by an Officer of the Association, setting forth whether the regular and 
special assessment son a specified Lot have been paid, and the amount of the 
delinquency, if any. A reasonable charge may be made by the Board for the 
issuance of these certificates. Such certificate shall be conclusive evidence 
of payment of any assessment therein stated to have been paid. 
IX. Non-Payment of Assessments or Charges 
9.1 Delinquency: Any assessment or charge provided for in this 
Declaration, which is not paid when due, shall be delinquent. With respect to 
each assessment or charge not paid within ten (10) days after its due date, 
the Association may, at its election, require the owner to pay a "late charge1' 
in a sum to be determined by the Association, but not to exceed $100.00 for 
each delinquent assessment or charge. If any such assessment or charge is not 
paid within ten (10) days after the due date, the assessment or charge shall 
also bear interest from the due date at the rate of 18Z per annum, and the 
Association may, at its option, bring an action at law against the Owner 
personally obligated to pay the same, or, upon compliance with the notice 
provisions set forth in Section 9.2 hereof, to foreclose the lien (provided 
for in Section 8.1 hereof) against the Lot, and there shall be added to the 
amount of such assessment or charge the late charge, the interest and the 
costs of preparing and filing the notices and complaint in such action, and 
in the event a judgment is obtained, such judgment shall include said late 
charge, interest and a reasonable attorney's fee, together with the costs of 
action. Each Owner vests in the Association or its assigns, the right and 
power to bring all actions at law or lien foreclosure against such Owners for 
the collection of such delinquent assessment or charge. 
In the event of the Association or any Owner's failure to pay all taxes 
due on the road or to connect to the water system as required by Paragraph 
5.14, Summit County shall have standing and authority to bring whatever action 
it deems necessary to enforce the provision of these Covenants relative to the 
road and water system and in the event of suit may recover its attorney's fees 
and costs against the Association or any delinquent Owner. These powers shall 
be in addition to and not in lieu of any rights or responsibilities maintained 
by Summit County. 
9.2 Notice of Lien: No action shall be brought to foreclose said 
assessment, charge or lien or to proceed under the power of sale herein 
provided less than thirty (30) days after the date a notice of claim of lien 
is deposited in the United States mail, certified or registered, addressed to 
the Owner of said Lot and such notice is recorded in Summit County property 
records. 
9.3 Foreclosure Sale: Any such foreclosure and subsequent sale 
provided for above is to be conducted in accordance with the laws of the State 
of Utah relating to liens mortgages, or deeds of trust. The Association, 
through its duly authorized agents, shall have the power to bid on the lot at 
foreclosure sale, and to acquire hold, lease, mortgage and convey the same. 
9.4 Curing of Default: Upon the timely curing of any default for 
which a notice of claim of lien was filed by the Association, the officers of 
the Association are hereby authorized to file or record, as the case may be, 
an appropriate release of such notice, upon payment by the defaulting owner of 
a fee to be determined by the Association, but not to exceed $100.00 for each 
delinquent payment, to cover the costs of preparing and filing or recording 
such release, plus the payment of such other costs, Interest or fees as shall 
have been incurred. 
9.5 Cumulative Remedies: The assessment or charge lien and the 
rights to foreclosure and sale thereunder shall be in addition to and not in 
substitution for all other rights and remedies which the Association and its 
assigns may have hereunder and by law, including a suit to recover a money 
judgment for unpaid assessments and charges as above provided. 
9.6 Subordination of Assessment and Charge Liens: If any Lot 
subject to a monetary lien created by any provision hereof shall be subject to 
a lien of a first mortgage or first deed of trust: (1) the foreclosure of any 
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lien created by anything set forth in this Declaration shall not operate to 
affect or impair the lien of such first deed of trust; and (2) the foreclosure 
of the lien of a first deed of trust or the acceptance of a deed in lieu of 
foreclosure of the the first deed of trust shall not operate to affect or 
impair the lien hereof, except that the lien hereof for said charges as shall 
have occurred up to the foreclosure or the acceptance of the deed in lieu of 
foreclosure shall be subordinate to the lien of the first deed of trust, with 
the foreclosure-purchaser or deed-in-lieu-grantee talcing title free of the 
lien hereof for all said charges that have accrued up to the time of the 
foreclosure or deed given in lieu of foreclosure; but subject to the lien for 
all charges that shall accrue subsequent to the foreclosure or deed given in 
lieu of foreclosure. 
X. Duties and Powers of the Association 
10.1 Duties and Powers: In addition to the duties and powers 
enumerated in the Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws, or elsewhere provided 
for herein, and without limiting the generality thereof, the Association 
shall: 
(a) Own, and/or maintain and otherwise manage or provide for 
the maintenance of all of the common areas and all facilities, improvements 
and landscaping thereon, including but not limited to the private streets and 
pathways, water system and fire hydrants, street fixtures, any guard house at 
the entrance to the properties and all other property acquired by the 
Association. 
(b) Establish and maintain street entrance ways and the 
esquestrian and pedestrian pathways and maintain street signs and special 
lighting which may be placed by the Association. Watering and weeding of 
planting areas shall be the responsibility of Lot Owners as specified in 
Article V. 
(c) Pay any real and personal property taxes and other charges 
assessed against any common areas. 
(d) Have the authority to obtain, for the benefit of any common 
areas, any water, gas and electric services and refuse collection. 
(e) Grant easements where necessary for utilities, and sewer 
facilities over the common areas to serve the common areas and the Lots. 
(f) Maintain such policy or policies of insurance as the Board 
of Trustees of the Association deems necessary or desirable in furthering the 
purposes of and protecting the Interests of the Association ad its members. 
(g) Have the authority to employ if required a manager or other 
persons and to contract with Independent contractors or managing agents to 
perform all or any part of the duties and responsibilities of the Association, 
provided that any contract with a person or firm appointed as a manager or 
managing agent during the period of Declarant's control of the Association 
shall provide for the right of the Association to terminate the same by two-
thirds majority vote at an annual meeting of the members of the Association. 
(h) Have the power to establish and maintain working capital 
and contingency fund in an amount to be determined by the Board of Trustees of 
the Association. 
(i) Have a duty to maintain any private streets, private 
pathways, guard house and parking within the common area. 
XI • Easements 
11.1 Rights and Duties: The rights and duties of the Owners of Lots 
with respect to sanitary sewer and water, electricity, gas and telephone and 
cable television lines and drainage facilities shall be governed by the 
following: 
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(a) Wherever sanitary sewer connections and/or water 
connections or electricity, gas or telephone and cable television lines or 
drainage facilities are installed with connections, lines or facilities, or 
any portion thereof located in or upon property owned by the Association, the 
Association and the Owners of any Lot served by said connections, lines or 
facilities shall have the right, and are hereby granted an easement to the 
full extent necessary therefor, to enter upon the property or to have utility 
companies enter upon the property in or upon which said connections, lines or 
facilities, or any portion thereof, lie, to repair, replace and generally 
maintain said connections as and when the same may be necessary. 
(b) Wherever sanitary sewer connections and/or water 
connections or electricity, gas or telephone or cable television lines or 
drainage facilities are Installed within the properties, which connections 
serve more than one Lot, the Owner of each Lot served by said connections 
shall be entitled to the full use and enjoyment of such portions of said 
connections as service his Lot. 
11.2 Easements Reserved: Easements over the Lots and common area 
properties for the installation and maintenance of electric, telephone, cable 
television, water, gas and sanitary sewer lines, water wells, private streets, 
water reservoir, private pathways, drainage facilities, and street entrance 
ways as shown on the recorded tract map of the properties, other documents of 
record or existing prior to October 30, 1983 are hereby reserved by Declarant, 
together with the right to grant and transfer the same. 
11.3 Security: Easements for the purpose of installing and 
maintaining the security of any fencing surrounding the Property are hereby 
reserved by Declarent, together with the right to grant and transfer the same. 
XII. Private Roadways and Pathways 
11 
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12«1 On the plat of the Planned Unit Development, there is set forth 
a certain fifty foot wide easement as common area of the Development which 
easement Includes within its boundaries the private roadway of the Development 
and its adjacent esquestrlan trail and pedestrian and jogger trail. The 
portions of the reserved property covered with hard surface or asphalt shall 
be restricted to vehicle use. The portions of the reserved area not hard 
surfaced shall be available for equestrian, pedestrian and jogger use. The 
hard-surfaced roadway of the Development is or will be constructed according 
to the following minimum standards: 
1. Subgrades 
2. 5ff Gravel sub-base course 1 1/2" maximum 
3. 3" Gravel base course 3/4" maximum 
4. 4" Bituminous surface course 
5. Total Width 24 feet, asphalt 18 feet 
Each Owner of each Lot in the Develoment covenants and agrees that the above 
standards in some respects do not meet the minimum standards of Summit County, 
Utah for publicly dedicated roadway. Likewise, each owner of each Lot in the 
Development understands that the roadway ts^ not and shall not be dedicated as 
public roadway but will remain private roadway for the use and benefit of the 
owners of Lots in the Development. Declarants believe that the preservation 
of the private road is important to maintain the integrity and unique nature 
of this Development. It is for this reason that each Owner bears a personal 
responsibility to pay the taxes which may be assessed on this roadway in the 
event they are not paid by the Association. This is necessary to insure to 
Summit County that the taxes will be paid on this property and that the Owners 
will not attempt to make this roadway public and thereby require Summit County 
to assume the maintenance thereof. 
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Each Lot Owner covenants and agrees on behalf of himself and his 
successors and assigns that no public dedication of the private roadway shall 
be sought. This covenant shall run with the land and this Paragraph 12, 
regardless of the other provisions of these Covenants, shall not be amendable 
by the Owners without the consent of the governing body of Summit County. 
Said consent may be withheld without cause. 
12.2 The expense of maintaining, improving, plowing, and cleaning 
the private roadway and equestrian trail and pedestrian and jogger trail shall 
be a common expense of the Association in the manner set forth in this 
Declaration. 
12.3 The Declarants reserve the right to expand this project without 
limitation. Declarant also reserves the right to service any or all of the 
additional property through the use of the private road, provided that any 
additional project shall contain covenants containing the restrictions 
contained in Paragraph 12.1 as to maintaining the privacy of this road. 
XIII. Private later System 
13.1 The Association jaf Owners of Lots in White Pine Ranches Planned 
Unit Development is the owner of six residential connections to the well. The 
Association shall be responsible for upkeep and maintenance. The Declarants 
shall be entitled to the excess water, provided, however, that if such excess 
is utilized, Declarants or their assigns shall participate, pro rata, in the 
upkeep and maintenance charges. The Association shall also own and be 
responsible for a covered reservoir which may be located on the Development or 
at a suitable location off the property at the discretion of the Declarants. 
Costs and expenses of operation of this water system (but not the cost of 
construction of the required wells, pipelines and reservoir) shall be a common 
expense of the Lot Owners of White Pine Ranches pursuant to the terms and 
conditions of this Declaration. 
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XIV • Gtntrml Provisions 
14.1 Duration of Declaration: Any provision, covenant, condition or 
restriction cntained in the Declaration or any Amended Declaration which is 
subject to the common lav rule sometimes referred to as the rule against 
perpetuities, shall continue and remain in full force and effet for the period 
of 60 years from the date of recordation of this Declaration or until this 
Declaration is terminated as hereinafter provided, whichever first occurs. 
All other provisions, covenants, conditions and restrictions contained in the 
Declaration or any Amended Declaration shall continue and remain n full force 
and effect until January 1, 2060 A.D., provided, however, that unless at least 
one year prior to said time of expiration, there is recorded an instrument 
directing the termination of the Declaration, executed by the Owners of all of 
the Lots then subject to this Declaration, said other provisions, covenants, 
conditions and restrictions shall continue automatically for an additional ten 
years and thereafter for successive periods of ten years unless, at least one 
year prior to expiration of any such extended period of duration, this 
Declaration is terminated by recorded instrument directing termination signed 
by the Owners of all of the Lots then subject to this Declaration as 
aforesaid. 
14.2 Amendment or Revocation: At any time while any provision, 
covenant, condition or restriction contained in this Declaraton or any Amended 
Declarations in force and effect, it may be amended or repealed by the 
recording of a written instrument specifying the amendment or the repeal, 
executed by the Owners of all of the Lots then subject to this Declaration. 
No such amendment or repeal shall be effective with respect to the holder or 
successor or assign of the Holder of a first mortgage or first deed of trust 
recorded prior to recording of the instrument specifying the amendment or 
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repeal unless such holder executes the said instrument. Declarant may amend 
these Declarations at any time within 18 months of recordation. 
Paragraph 5.14 regarding the requirement for each Owner to hook up to the 
sewer system once the trunkline is brought from Highway U224 to the entrance 
of the property shall not be subject to amendment or revocation under any 
circumstances whatsoever. This shall constitute a covenant and equitable 
servitude which shall run with the land and be binding on each Owner, their 
successors and assigns. Section 12 of these Covenants dealing with the 
roadway and the preservation of its private nature, as well as all provisions 
regarding the responsibility of the Association and the Owners to pay all 
taxes due on the road and maintain that road shall not be amended or revoked 
without the written consent of the governing body of Summit County, Utah. 
14.3 Severability: Invalidity or unenforceability of any provision 
of this Declaration or any Amended Declaration in whole or in part shall not 
affect the validity or enforceability of any other provision or valid and 
enforceable part of a provision of this Declaration. 
14.4 Captions: The captions and headings in this instrument are for 
convenience only and shall not be considered in construing any provision, 
restriction, covenant or condition contained in this Declaration. 
14.5 No Waiver: Failure to enforce any provision, restriction, 
covenant or condition in this Declaration or in any Supplemental or Amended 
Declaration shall not operate as a waiver of any such provision, restriction, 
covenant or condition or any other provision, restriction, covenant or 
condition. 
14.6 Construction: The provision of this Declaration shall be 
liberally construed to effectuate its purpose of creating a uniform plan for 
the development of a residential community or tract and for the maintenance of 
common recreational facilities and common areas and streets. 
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1A.7 Nuisance; The result of every act or omission, whereby any provision, 
condition, restriction, covenant, easement or reservation contained In this Dedaratlon Is 
violated in whole or in part, is hereby declared to be and constitutes a nuisance, and 
every remedy allowed by law or equity against a nuisance, either public or private, shall 
be applicable against every such result, and may be exercised by the Association, or any 
other land owner In the tracts. Such remedy shall be deemed cumulative and not 
exclusive. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, White Pine Ranches has executed this Declaration the 
day and year first above written. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OP SALT LAKE ) 
On the Tr*\ day of 
WHITE ?iyij RANCHER, a Utah Partnership 
By:' 
By: 
Leon H. Saunders, Partner 
<^au^y^r^ 
<v 
Dan Hunter, Partner 
Robert Felt on, Partner 
P A A A —* 
, 1983, personally appeared before me 
Dan Hunter, who, being by me duly sworn did say that he is a Partner in White Pine 
Ranches, a Utah partnership, and that he executed the within and foregoing Declaration 
of Protective Covenants for White Pine Ranches on behalf of said Partnership. 
1 
Residing at: <^*£C iS /" 
"5^ 
My Com mission Expires: 
a 
STATE OP UTAH ) 
: ss« 
COUNTY OP SALT LAKE ) 
On the rj | day of «JI^Q\VVM>*\ ,1983, personally appeared before me 
Robert Felt on, who, being by me duly sworn did say that he Is a Partner in White Pine 
Ranches, a Utah partnership, and that he executed the within and foregoing Declaration 
of Protective Covenants for White Pine Ranches on behalf of said Partnership, 
My Com mission Expires: 
STATE OP UTAH ) 
: so* 
COUNTY OP SALT LAKE ) 
On the ~L~) day of ^%jf , 1983, personally appeared before me J* 
Richard Rees, who, being by me duly sworn did say that he is a Partner in White Pine 
Ranches, a Utah partnership, and that he executed the within and foregoing Declaration 
of Protective Covenants for White Pine Ranches on behalf of said Partnership. 
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Notary Public 
Residing at: 
My Com mission Expires: 
iJzY/r^ 
STATE OP UTAH ) 
: 88. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the 7 n day of ^jtf~ ?1983, personally appeared before me 
Leon H. Saunders, who, being by a e duly sworn did say that he Is a Partner In White Pine 
Ranches, a Utah partnership, and that he executed the within and foregoing Declaration 
of Protective Covenants for White Pine Ranches on behalf of said Partnership* 
Notary Public 
Residing at: St-€ Cs^/^" 
My Commission Expires: 
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" A " 
CONSENT TO RECORD 
PHASE I 
WHITE PINE RANCHES 
Beginning at the Northeast Corner of Section 1, Township 2 
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence South 
0° 19f 46" West 1336.14 feet to the common corner of government 
lots 1 and 8 of said Section 1; thence South 89° 43' 36" West 
175.42 feet to the true point of beginning; thence South 89° 
43' 36" West along the northerly boundary of Phase I, White 
Pine Ranches 2948.98 feet; thence South 0° 13f 29" East along 
the westerly line of Phase I, White Pine Ranches 1013.05 feet; 
thence North 65° 441 00" East 571.36 feet to a point on a 60.00 
foot radius curve to the left (center bears North 60° 00f 00" 
East, 60.00 feet of which central angle is 104° 16f 02"); 
thence southeasterly along the arc of said curve 109.19 feet to 
a point on a 25.00 foot radius reverse curve to the right 
(center bears South 44° 16' 02" East 25.00 feet of which the 
central angle is 48° 06' 07"); thence northeasterly along the 
arc of said curve 20.99 feet to a point on a 209.11 radius 
reverse curve to the left (center bears North 03° 50' 05" East 
209.11 feet of which the central angle is 40° 501 05"); thence 
northeasterly along the arc of said curve 149.03 feet to a 
point on a 70.00 foot radius reverse curve to the right (center 
bears South 37° 00f 00f East 70.00 feet of which the central 
angle is 35° 07' 0-5"); thence northeasterly along the arc of 
said cruve a distance of 42.91 feet to a point of tangency; 
thence North 88° 07' 05" East 292.41 feet to a point on a 
405.00 foot radius curve to the left (center bears North 01° 
52f 55" West 405.00 feet of which the central angle is 46° 27f 
05"); thence northeasterly along the arc of said curve 328.35 
feet to a point of tangency; thence North 41° 40' 00" East 
78.91 feet to a point on a 471.04 foot radius curve to the 
right (center bears South 48° 20' 00" East 471.04 feet having 
a central angle of 33° 20' 00"); thence northeasterly along the 
arc of said curve 274.04 feet to a point on a 502.70 foot 
radius reverse curve to the left (center bears North 15° 00' 
00" West 502.70 feet of which the central angle is 11° 00 • 
00"); thence northeasterly along the arc of said curve 96.51 
feet to a point of tangency; thence North 64° 00 • 00" East 
79.95 feet to a point on a 350.00 foot radius curve to the left 
(center bears North 26° 00' 00" West 350.00 feet of which the 
central angle is 16° 001 00"); thence northeasterly along the 
arc of said curve 97.74 feet to a point of tangency; thence 
,o» 2 8 3 - 31 
North 48° 00' 00" East 221.05 feet to a point on a 220.00 foot 
radius curve to the right (center bears South 42° 00f 00" East 
220.00 feet of which the central angle is 42° 00f 00"); thence 
northeasterly along the arc of said curve 161.27 feet to a 
point of tangency; thence North 90° 00' 00" East 188.36 feet to 
a point on a 104.43 foot radius curve to the right (center 
bears South 00° 00f 00" East 104.43 feet of which the central 
angle is 45° 001 00"); thence southeasterly along the arc of 
said curve 82.02 feet to a point on a 132.94 foot radius 
reverse curve to the left (center bears North 45° 00f 00" East 
132.94 feet of which the central angle is 65° 00f 00"); thence 
southeasterly along the arc of said curve 150.81 feet to a 
point on a 187.84 foot radius curve to the left (center bears 
North 20° 00' 00" West 187.84 feet of which the central angle 
is 18° 00f 00"); thence northeasterly along the arc of said 
curve 59.01 feet to a point of tangency; thence North 52° 001 
00" East 13.51 feet to a point on a 129.36 foot radius curve to 
the right (center bears South 38° 001 00" East 129.36 feet of 
which the central angle, is 18° 00' 00"); thence northeasterly 
along the arc of said curve 40.64 feet to a point on a 20.00 
foot radius curve to the right (center bears South 20° 00f 00" 
East 20.00 feet of which the central angle is 110° 00f 00"); 
thence southeasterly along the arc of said curve 38.40 feet to 
a point of tangency; thence South 00° 001 00" East 35.69 feet 
to a point on a 80.00 foot radius curve to the left (center 
bears North 90° 00' 00" East 80.00 feet of which the central 
angle is 31° 27' 59"); thence southeasterly along the arc of 
said curve 43.94 feet to a point on the westerly right-of-way 
of White Pine Canyon Road; thence North 47° 33' 15" East along 
said right-of-way 159.02 feet; thence North 42° 44f 40" East 
along said right-of-way 85.63 feet to the true point of 
beginning, together with a non-exclusive easement for water 
lines, water tank and water systems over, under and across the 
property, shown here near the southwest corner of the subject 
property, and specifically described in the Declaration of 
Protective Covenants and reserving unto the owners, f o j ^ 
granting to the owners of adjacent or nearby property, a 
non-exclusive easement for utilities and vehicular and 
pedestrian access over the private roadway shown on the plat 
and from the well sites as developed but in such a manner as to 
not interfere with construction or development of the specific 
lot or lots containing the well site. 
Contains 32.8495 acres, more or less. 
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F" -i'-e r.f U t a h 
County of Summit 
z2L 
Date Sharp 
personally appeared before 
>:2^^3 
On t h i s ^ ? day of /U^J 0^83,
 t . . _ ._ _ . 
me the undersigned Notary Public in and for said State and 
County, John C. Sharp, who after being duly sworn, acknowledged 
to me that he is the beneficiary of a deed of trust Book M193 
Page 372 recorded in Summit County, Utah, that he signed the 
owners dedication freely and voluntarily for and in behalf of 
A X^aidj/owners for the purpose therein mentioned and that said 
V- owne^executed the same. 
My commission expires 
^ 
Notary Publ: 
Residing at 
//->3-£3 
State of Utah 
County of Summit 
rp // Date 
On this J3 day of /2^f}j V 1983, personally appeared before 
me the undersigned Notary Public in and for said State and 
County, Geraldine Y. Sharp, who after being duly sworn, 
acknowledged to me that she is the beneficiary of a deed of 
trust Book M193 Page 372 recorded in Summit County, Utah, that 
she signed the owners dedication freely and voluntarily for and 
ift#ikphaii[ of said owners for the purpose therein mentioned and 
t&fet''$aidl*6>mers executed the same. 
.^•' My co . .. A 
ission -expires 
Ykui^^^ 
\ 
Notary Publ 
Resic ^ . ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
N4 
J 
6C3K 283»* 33 
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State of Utah 
County of Summit 
bonna Bartlett Moore 
Assistant Vice Pres ident 
F o o t h i l l Thr i f t 
Date 
On this 6th day of Sept. , 1983, personally appeared before me 
the undersigned Notary Public in and for said State and County, 
Larry E. Grant, who after being duly sworn, acknowledged to me 
that he is the beneficiary of a deed of trust Book M237 Page 696 
recorded in Summit County, Utah, that he signed the owners 
dedication freely and voluntarily for and in behalf of said 
owners for the purpose therein mentioned an3<£*wter&3id owners 
executed the same. 
My commission expires 
State of Utah 
County of Summit 
IT* ^ 
On t h i s fa- day ot^fT 
the undersigned Notary Publ 
Harold E. Turley,Jr., who a 
me that he is the beneficia 
recorded in Summit County, 
dedication freely and volun 
for the purpose therein men 
same. 
My commission e x p i r e s 
MY &3&3HJ&MON B F & I 3 ££PTi»fiOI I t . 19M 
President and Chi 
Utah First Bank 
Date 
xecutive Officer 
, 1983, personally appeared before me 
ic in and for said State and County, 
fter being duly sworn, acknowledged to 
ry of a deed of trust Book ^fr^age^Mft 
Utah, that he signed the o^fttftQsr :;. ''\ 
tarily for and in behalf jSjf^ j^ aid owners. 
'd owp^ B^ f/ex^ cufaBd' thfe 
o 4» 
tioned and that 
Notary Pu 
Residing a 
s. 
"^'""z"c^vy 
t ffo<rAi^ l/r<$th< "' 
acc^ 
283' " 34 
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State of Utah 
County of Summit 
LAND INVESTMENT CORPORATION 
Ldon H. Saunders, President Date 
On this -//• day of / / , 1983 personally appeared before me 
the undersigned Notary Publix in and For said State and County, Leon H. 
Saunders, President of Saunders Land Investment Corporation, who after being-
duly sworn, acknowledged to me that he is the beneficiary of a deed of trust 
Book M193 Page 372 recorded in Summit County, Utah, that he signed the owners 
dedication freely a*id. voluntarily for and in behalf of said owners for the 
purpose
 r therein mentioned and that said owners executed the^ajne^ 
Notary Public 
Residing-at: "  ^ ' < 6 ' / 
. I3jr Comnvt^toi^ Expires: 
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ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION ' O , ' • ; ; . 
OP 
WHITE PINE RANCHES HOME OWNERS ASSOCIATION _,_,, , - - . . 
WE, the undersigned, na tu ra l persons of the age of 21 years or more, act ing as 
incorpora tors of a corporat ion under the Utah Non-Profit Corporation Cooperative 
Association Act , adopt the following Articles of Incorporat ion for such Non-Profit 
Corporation: 
ARTICLE I 
The name of the Corporation is : 
WHITE PINE RANCHES HOME OWNERS ASSOCIATION 
The principal place of business of the Corporation is 324 South Sta te S t ree t , No. 
220, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
ARTICLE H. 
The period of i ts durat ion Is perpetual . 
ARTICLE HI 
The purpose or purposes for which the Corporation Is organized a r e : 
A# The Corporation is formed for purposes o ther than pecunuary profit, and 
shal l opera te ent irely as a non-profit corporat ion, and no profits shall inure to the benefit 
of any member thereof, ' '• 
.... 5>*K= 3C 
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B. A par t icular object and purposes for which the Corporation is formed are 
the adminis t ra t ion and management of the White Plan Ranches Planned Unit 
Development with the fur ther purpose of promoting the genera l i n t e r e s t and welfare of 
i t s res idents . 
C. To do al l and everything necessary , sui table , convenient , or proper for 
the accompl ishment of any of the purposes or a t t a i nmen t of any one or more of the 
objects herein enumera ted or inc identa l to the powers herein named or which shall, a t 
any t i m e , appear condusive or expedient for the protec t ion or benefit of i ts members, 
with al l the powers now or he rea f t e r conferred by the laws of the S ta te of Utah upon 
non-profit corporat ion under the genera l incorporat ion laws of the State of Utah. 
ARTICLE W 
There shall be only one (1) classif ication among members of the Corporation who 
shall be admi t t ed . The requi rements for membership shall be: 
A. The membership of the Corporation shall be l imited to six (6) members 
who shall each be the owner of one (1) lo t in White Pine Ranches, a planned unit 
development in Summit County, S ta te of Utah. 
B. In the event a lo t is owned or is being purchased by more than one (1) 
person, wri t ten designation shall be given to the Association of the person who is ent i t led 
to vote the share represented by the designated lo t . 
C. All members shall pay assessment or fees as se t by the Board of the 
Association or as otherwise required by the By-Laws or the Covenants, Conditions and 
Restr ic t ions of White Pine Ranches. 
D. Membership shall be regulated and governed by By-Laws adopted by the 
Board of the Association and by the Covenants, Conditions and Restr ict ions on file in the 
Summit County Recorder 's off ice. 
.-. 283^ 37 
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£• Each member shall be ent i t led to al l r ights and privileges as prescribed 
by these Art icles , the By-Laws of the Corporation, and the Covenants, Conditions, and 
Restr ic t ions of White Pine Ranches, a planned unit development* 
ARTICLE V 
The Corporation shall have no author i ty to Issue shares of stock in said 
Corporation* 
ARTICLE VI 
The Corporation shall be governed by a Board of three (3) t rus tees who shall be 
e lec ted by a membership for a term of two (2) years* The Board shall be e lected annually 
in January of each year and shal l serve for the term of two (2) years or unti l thei r 
successors are elected* Said Board shall be e lec ted by members of the Corporation in 
a t t endance a t the genera l annual meeting to be held for tha t purpose* The Board of the 
Corporation shall e l ec t and shall decide who shall be president , vice-president , and 
s e c r e t a r y / t r e a s u r e r . 
The following shal l be the Board of the Corporation unti l the i r successors are 
e lec ted and qualified: 
Robert Felton 
324 South Sta te #220 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Hy Saunders 
1899 Longview Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Dan Hunter 
P.O. Box 78 
Park City, Utah 84060 
, fc*T--* 38 
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The following shall be officers of the Corporation unti l the i r successors are 
e lec ted and qualified: 
President - Robert Felton 
V i c e - P r e s i d e n t - Hy Saunders 
S e c r e t a r y / T r e a s u r e r - Dan Hunter 
ARTICLE VI 
The name and addresses of each incorpora tor a r e : 
Robert Felton 
324 South Sta te #220 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Hy Saunders 
1899 Long view Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Dan Hunter 
P.O. Box 78 
Park City, Utah 84060 
ARTICLE V m 
The post office address of the Coporation's regis tered office is: 
324 South S ta te S t ree t 
Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
The name of the Corporation's initial regis tered agent is: 
Robert Felton 
324 South S ta te S t ree t 
Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
~
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ARTICLE IX 
The Board Ja hereby empowered without fur ther consent of i ts membership to 
negot ia te necessary con t rac t s or incur debt for and on behalf of the membership or as 
otherwise provided in i t s By-Laws or as established in the Covenants, Conditions and 
Restr ic t ions of White Pine Ranches . 
Fur ther , the Board may make any further rules and regulat ions as well as amend 
the const i tut ion and By-Laws of the Corporation. 
ARTICLE X 
The incorpora tors , Board, officers, and members of this Corporation shal l not be 
l iable in ay way, nor shall the i r proper ty , r e a l or personal, be liable for the obligations of 
the Corporation. 
ARTICLE XI 
These Articles may be amended, a l t e red , or changed at any t ime by vote of four 
(4) members of the Corporat ion. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we, Robert Fel ton, Hy Saunders, and Dan Hunter, being 
a l l of the incorpora tors hereinabove named have hereunto se t our respect ive hands 
this *• | ~ d a y of August, 1983. 
8j£> «^^-
tktc tf'xk'i-
Dan Hunter 
- 5 -
STATE OF UTAH 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
the r^Py^ day of Augus^l983, 
a notary public, hereby certify that on 
personally appeared before me Robert Felton, Hy 
Saunders, and Dan Hunter, who being by me first duly sworn, declare that they ar the 
persons who signed the foregoing Articles of Incorporation of White Pine Ranches Owners 
Association, as the incorporators thereof, and that the statements thereirt"'contained are"*\ 
true. 
-lij»»« hi,. 
Eary Public / „%?-&/* j ^ I, /?4 
Bfridtng at: 
Hy Com mission Expires: 
'""MlHiS*' 
,^ 23? - 41 
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57-1-19, Trust deeds — Definitions of terms. 
As used in Sections 57-1-20 through 57-1-36: 
(1) "Beneficiary" means the person named or otherwise designated in a 
trust deed as the person for whose benefit a trust deed is given, or his 
successor in interest. 
(2) "Trustor" means the person conveying real property by a trust deed 
as security for the performance of an obligation. 
(3) "Trust deed" means a deed executed in conformity with Sections 
57-1-20 through 57-1-36 and conveying real property to a trustee in trust 
to secure the performance of an obligation of the trustor or other person 
named in the deed to a beneficiary. 
(4) "Trustee" means a person to whom title to real property is conveyed 
by trust deed, or his successor in interest. 
(5) "Real property" has the same meaning as set forth in Section 
57-1-1. 
(6) "Trust property" means the real property conveyed by the trust 
deed. 
57-1-33. Satisfaction of obligation secured by trust deed— 
Reconveyance of trust property. 
When the obligation secured by any trust deed has been satisfied, the 
trustee shall, upon written request by the beneficiary, reconvey the trust 
property. The reconveyance may designate the grantee therein as "the person 
or persons entitled thereto." The beneficiary under such trust deed shall de-
liver to the trustor or his successor in interest the trust deed and the note or 
other evidence of the obligation so satisfied. Any beneficiary under such trust 
deed who refuses to request a reconveyance from the trustee for a period of 
thirty days after written demand therefor is made by the trustor or his succes-
sor in interest shall be liable to the trustor or his successor in interest, as the 
case may be, for double damages resulting from such refusal, or such trustor 
or his successor in interest may bring an action against the beneficiary and 
trustee to compel a reconveyance of the trust property and in such action the 
judgment of the court shall be that the trustee reconvey the trust property and 
that the beneficiary pay to the trustor, or his successor in interest, as the case 
may be, the costs of suit including a reasonable attorney's fee and all damages 
resulting from the refusal of the beneficiary to request a reconveyance as 
hereinabove provided. 
July 1, 19S6 
Mr. Jack Sharp 
3000 Connor Streetf #11 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Re: Sale of White Pine Ranches 
Dear Jack: 
As you believed, we did receive a signed copy of the 
Order with regard to the FDIC. Please find a copy of it here 
enclosed. The California contact person who called me with 
regard to a possible purchase of the property or your position 
in it some months back was an attorney named Joel Bryan. His 
phone number is (805) 496-4293. I have not heard from hin 
since about April. (He called July 1, 19S6 after dictating 
this letter. I gave him your phone number.) 
With regard to the conveyance of lots pursuant to your 
Deed of Trust, the following information would apply. As you 
recall, a plat was placed on a part of the property designating 
this part as Lots 1 through 6 inclusive, White Pine Ranches 
Phase I. The remaining portion of the property was not 
platted. There was released from your Trust Deed Lots 1 
through 5 of the platted portion of White Pine Ranches. You 
will recall that the Trust Deed requires release only of 
platted lots. Lot 6 of the platted White Pine Ranches, all of 
the unplatted portions of the property and the roadway prepared 
and developed by Hy Saunders remains subject to your Deed of 
Trust. We have an agreement with Felton with regard to the 
roadway that though the roadway itself is subject to the Deed 
of Trust, it is so subject to insure access to you to the 
portions of the property remaining subject to your Deed of 
Trust should your Deed of Trust be foreclosed with regard to 
any portions of the property. You will recall—there has been a 
lot of pressure to release the road, /I have refused so to do 
Mr. Jack Sharp 
July 1, 1986 
Page 2 
because of your need of it for access and this is pursuant to a 
discussion I had with Felton that I have notes in my file 
regarding. 
Information on unpaid balances of your Note has in 
most cases been furnished by you to me rather than the reverse 
but I think my notes indicate that as of December of 1985 there 
was owed $199/649.06 composed of $198,561.06 principal and 
interest to December 27, 1985, $520.00 for attorney fees, 
$368.00 for four days of interest to bring the sum to December 
31, 1985 and $200.00 for charges of Associated Title. I am not 
certain of these figures. They are my notes to conversations I 
had with you at that time. Once these figures are verified as 
accurate, we could work toward bringing those figures current 
by adding the additional fees, interest and costs. 
Best wishes, 
Jon C. Heaton 
JCH:pe 
34073 
